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Abstract 
Airports have long been considered as an industry in which firms are able to exert significant market 
power. Nowadays, there is controversial discussion whether airports face a degree of competition 
which is sufficient to constrain potentially abusive behaviour resulting from this market power. The 
level of competition encountered by European airports has hence been evaluated by analysing the 
switching potential of both airlines and passengers between different airports, for example. The 
research within this thesis contributes to the field of airport competition by analysing the degree of 
potential competition 36 European hub airports face on their origin-destination market in their local 
catchments as well as on the transfer market within the period from 2000 to 2016. For this purpose, 
a two-step approach is applied for each market, with first analysing the degree of market 
concentration, using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index as a measure, for each destination offered at the 
hub airports and the respective development over time. In the second step, the effect of market 
concentration on the seat capacities at the hub airports is estimated. 
This analysis shows that the majority of European hub airports has a dominant position on both the 
origin-destination and transfer market. However, it can be observed that the level of market 
concentration has been decreasing over time, thus implying a higher overlap between destinations 
offered at hub airports and their competitive counterparts. Passengers thus have more alternatives 
available when travelling between two points, this increasing switching ability therefore imposes 
potential constraints on airport market power. In the second step of the analysis, the above approach 
is complemented by empirically estimating the impact of an increase in market concentration, and 
additional factors such as the presence of low cost carriers at competing airports, on the seat capacities 
offered on a particular destination. Using panel data for the considered time period, the statistically 
significant results show that an increase in market concentration leads to a decrease in the amount of 
seats as well the flight frequencies offered to a destination. These findings are coherent for both the 
origin-destination and transfer market. Considering the decrease in market concentration across the 
majority of European hub airports, it can in turn be inferred that more seats and frequencies are 
supplied on the respective routes, resulting in an increase in consumer welfare.  
This approach and the respective findings in this thesis serve as further guidance to policy makers 
deciding on the extent of economic regulation feasible for individual hub airports in Europe. From an 
airport and airline standpoint these results can, of course, also be applied to gain insight as to which 
airports are their main competitors, and which routes face a high overlap with other airports and 
airlines, thus designing their network structure accordingly. 
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 Introduction 
“… a major hub airport can exploit its significant market power over airlines that, due to 
the markets they serve and their investment in a route network, are captive customers for 
the airport.” (Smyth & Pearce, 2007:p.9) 
 
This particular argument has been one of many adding to the discussion on airport market 
power and the need to restrain this industry from abusive price setting behaviour. The notion 
of airports being natural monopolies due to their cost structure and locational specifics, and 
the resulting limited constraints of market power have dominated the discussion in academia 
and industry. As a result, airport charging structures have long been subject to various forms 
of ex-ante, and in some limited cases ex-post economic regulation, such as cost-based or 
incentive regulation, since it is assumed that the inherent market structure of this industry 
leads to allocative, productive and dynamic inefficiency (Starkie, 2004; Smyth & Pearce, 
2007; Niemeier, 2009).  
However, discussion on the costs of economic regulation potentially arising due to setting 
wrong incentives for the airport in question, and the changing European airport landscape 
have been fostering the debate on a re-thinking of the current regulatory practice in the airport 
sector (Reinhold et al., 2010; Niemeier, 2009; Frontier Economics, 2009; Burghouwt & 
Hakfoort, 2001; Dobruszkes, Givoni & Vowles, 2017; Dobruszkes, 2013). The focus of this 
thesis is placed on the analysis of competitive constraints, i.e. the constraints imposed on 
market power, arising from, for example, the deregulation of the European airline market 
from the 1990s onwards, and the resulting increasing presence of multiple (low cost) airlines. 
The impact of these various developments in the air transport sector and the resulting effects 
on the degree of airport market power are controversially discussed (Thelle et al., 2012; 
Smyth & Pearce, 2007; Müller et al., 2010). A comprehensive analysis of the effects requires 
the consideration of those market segments at the airport which constitute the monopolistic 
bottleneck, and are thus currently subject to economic regulation at most European airports. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of these different market segments, which are divided into 
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airport services and airport infrastructure according to Müller et al. (2010); a similar 
discussion of airport market segments can also be found in Frontier Economics (2009) or 
Polk & Bilotkach (2013).  
 
Figure 1: Airport market segments 
Source: own depiction based on Müller et al. (2010) 
Based on these definitions, research has been focusing on the assessment of market power 
either across all relevant segments, or on particular markets and the degree of competition 
prevalent in these. Competition authorities have established frameworks to investigate the 
overall level of competition for individual airports and to implement tailored economic 
regulation accordingly (e.g. Competition Commission, 2009b; Civil Aviation Authority, 
2016). A range of studies has been assessing different factors that impose competition for 
airports, such as the potential of airlines to switch their operations between airports and the 
associated costs (Thelle et al., 2012; Maertens, 2012; Polk & Bilotkach, 2013; Müller et al., 
2010). Another aspect concerns the substitution potential passengers have, and which factors 
determine their choice in selecting a particular airport, both for point-to-point and transfer 
flights (Starkie, 2010; Redondi, Malighetti & Paleari, 2011; Wiltshire, 2013; Burghouwt & 
Redondi, 2013; Malina, 2010; Mandel, 1998). An important issue in this regard has been the 
emergence of low cost carriers on the European aviation market, contributing to the growth 
of secondary or regional airports, which has been argued to put increasing competitive 
constraints on hub airports (Burghouwt, Mendes de Leon & De Wit, 2015; Dobruszkes, 2013; 
Thelle et al., 2012).  
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Looking at the interaction between aviation and non-aviation services has been the focus of 
studies by Bracaglia, D’Alfonso & Nastasi (2014); Gillen (2009); Gillen & Mantin (2013), 
who highlight that airports have the incentive to set their charges at a level to incentivise 
airlines to increase their passenger base by either offering more frequent services or 
increasing the capacities per flight. This development may be an effective restraint to the 
airport’s exertion of market power. Furthermore, welfare implications of increased 
competition have been assessed by Allroggen & Malina (2010); Lin (2006); Brueckner & 
Spiller (1991). The findings of these studies differ in terms of the degree of competition faced 
by (European) airports. Müller et al. (2010) and Wiltshire (2013), for example, highlight the 
limited extent of competition the airports in their analyses are exposed to, and postulate that 
some form of economic regulation is still required. Thelle et al. (2012), on the other hand, 
conclude from their analysis of the competitive environment faced by different European 
airports that constraints on market power have been increasing, and that regulatory 
frameworks should therefore be amended or even rendered obsolete.  
Building on this current research landscape in the field of airport competition, this thesis 
focuses on the assessment of potential competitive constraints imposed on European hub 
airports. For this purpose, those airports within Europe with the highest passenger volume in 
2016 as well as those which represent the node of a network carrier operating a hub-and-
spoke network are considered (Airports Council International Europe, 2016b, 2016a). This 
sample size represents an extension of the current research on competition for hub airports, 
which focuses on various subsets of the dataset considered here. For all these airports, both 
the origin and destination (O&D) and the transfer market are analysed in terms of their 
development over time, the overlap of offered destinations with other airports and carriers, 
and the comparison across these airports. The complementary assessment of these two 
markets is essential in the case of hub airports since these engage in a close vertical 
relationship with their network carriers. These operate a hub-and-spoke network at the airport 
node and thus enable transfer passengers to connect between two feasible flights. Hence, 
passengers are fed into the node from different origins and bundled to travel to a single 
destination, which enables the carrier to realise economies of density, for example. The size 
of these two markets and the degree of interaction between the hub airport and the network 
carrier, however, differ across the sample of European airports. Therefore, it is necessary to 
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first consider both markets individually, and secondly assess the potential competitive 
constraints of both markets together to obtain a comprehensive picture for each airport.  
The degree of potential competition European hub airports face, both in terms of the origin-
destination market in their local catchments as well as on the transfer market, is the main 
focus of the research in the following chapters. Both markets are analysed according to the 
same structure and research methodologies, starting with the assessment of the level of 
market concentration each European hub airport faces in its local catchment and on the 
transfer market, and the respective development over time. Employing data for the years 
2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 exceeds the observed time periods within most other 
studies on airport competition, and therefore provides an extension to existing research by 
considering this long-term development.  
In order to get a detailed insight into the hub airports’ position in their respective markets, 
market concentration is assessed on the individual destination level. Using the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index as a proxy for this, yields information on how much each route at a hub 
airport is concentrated in terms of airline seats offered. Considering the local catchment of 
an airport, for example, a rather even distribution of seats to a particular destination across 
all catchment airports suggests that passengers have the potential to substitute between 
different airports. This availability of substitutes therefore may impose constraints on a hub 
airport’s market power. This first part of the assessment delivers a detailed insight into each 
hub airport’s position in both the origin-destination and the transfer market. However, since 
airport market power cannot be directly inferred from a high degree of market concentration, 
the second strand of research in this thesis provides an extension to the methodologies 
currently applied in airport competition assessment. Here, the effects of market 
concentration, and other factors potentially constraining market power, on airport output are 
empirically estimated using panel data for the observed period.  
It is assumed that in case there is little substitution potential on a particular destination, i.e. 
this route exhibits high market concentration, the amount of seats offered is restricted, 
compared to routes with a higher overlap across different airports. As stated by the 
Productivity Commission (2011), “… a monopolist will maximise its profits by reducing the 
total output of goods or services it supplies to the market, in order to increase the price 
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charged” (p.71). Furthermore, as highlighted above, the rise of low cost carriers and the 
associated growth of additional competitors in the European airport landscape is assumed to 
put competitive pressure on hub airports. This development currently mainly refers to the 
origin-destination market, the implications of low cost carrier presence are therefore only 
assessed in regard to the local catchment of hub airports, and not in terms of the transfer 
market. The same applies to the availability of rail services, which may act as substitutes or 
complements for air services offered at hub airports. Estimating these effects is also included 
in the analysis of competition in the local catchment.  
In the analysis of competition in the local catchment of hub airports, the assessment focuses 
on these hub airports and their secondary counterparts, and how the increased offer of flights 
and seats at the latter impacts the traffic development at European hub airports. Within the 
first step of this assessment the degree of market concentration in the local catchment is 
analysed, followed by an empirical estimation of the respective effects on the output supplied 
at the hub airport. The impact low cost carriers as well as rail services have on air services at 
hub airports provides a further extension to this analysis. The following research questions 
are hence being investigated: 
(1) How concentrated is the origin-destination market in the local catchment of European 
hub airports, and has there been a development to a less concentrated one in between 
2000 and 2016? 
(2) What is the impact of market concentration on the output decisions, in terms of seats 
offered to a particular destination, at European hub airports? As a measure for market 
concentration, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is employed as explanatory variable 
in the regression analysis. 
(3) As discussed earlier, low cost carriers are presumed to have an impact on the rising 
constraints on hub airports’ market power, since these particular airlines are often 
believed to locate their operations at smaller airports with spare capacity, i.e. those 
secondary airports within a hub airport’s catchment, see, for example, Dobruszkes, 
Givoni & Vowles (2017). The third research question therefore assesses the impact 
of low cost carrier presence on the output provided at hub airports.  
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(4) Furthermore, potential competition from other modes of transport, such as (high-
speed) rail, might constrain the market power of hub airports. The fourth research 
question therefore focuses on the evaluation of the effect of (high-speed) rail services 
on the seats offered at European hub airports.  
A similar structure can also be found for the analysis of competition on the transfer market. 
This market in particular is characterised by a close interlinkage between a hub airport and 
its respective network carrier. The latter are those airlines offering transfer connections for 
passengers via the hub airport. When assessing market concentration on the transfer market, 
the connections offered by network carriers and their alliance partner are thus taken into 
consideration. Based on this assumption, the analysis of this market starts with a detailed 
analysis of the degree of market concentration, and the respective development over time, 
for the European hub airports in the dataset. Following this, the effects of a high degree of 
market concentration on the transfer connections offered via the hubs are assessed 
empirically, yielding the following research questions: 
(5) How concentrated is the transfer market, in relation to the number of transfer 
connections and the capacities offered via each European hub airport, and has there 
been a development to a less concentrated market in between 2000 and 2016? 
(6) What is the impact of market concentration on the output decisions, in terms of seats 
offered on a transfer connection, at European hub airports? A transfer connection is 
a route offered from origin A to destination B via a hub airport H, which is comprised 
of the European hub airports considered in this thesis. As a measure for market 
concentration, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for each available transfer connection 
is employed as explanatory variable in the regression analysis.  
In order to evaluate and discuss these research questions, the thesis is structured into four 
main parts, focusing on (1) the theoretical background necessary for the assessment of market 
power in an industry (Chapter 2), with particular emphasis on the discussion of approaches 
currently applied in competition policy to assess the degree of market power in an industry, 
thus building the basis for the second part of the thesis. This provides (2) a discussion of the 
market structure of the airport industry (Chapter 3), placing a focus on the specific vertical 
relationship between airports and airlines, and putting the research questions addressed 
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within this thesis into the context of the current airport competition research landscape. 
Applying the findings and assumptions discussed in the first two parts of the thesis, the 
remaining parts assess (3) competition in the local catchment of European hub airports 
(Chapter 4), focusing on research questions (1) to (4), followed by the analysis of the transfer 
market at these airports (Chapter 5), addressing research questions (5) and (6). 
Complementing these four main parts of the thesis is Chapter 6 which discusses the findings 
of the thesis in relation to the initial research questions posed, and outlines implications to 
the potential competition European hub airports face both in their local catchment and on the 
transfer market.   

 Theoretical Foundations for the 
Assessment of Market Power 
Airports have long been considered as an industry in which firms are able to exert significant 
market power and hence often became subject to economic regulation. The economic theory 
underlying the sources of firms’ market power including natural monopolies, potential entry 
barriers as well as assessment approaches of market power are therefore discussed in detail 
in this chapter to provide the foundation for the discussion of airport market power. In the 
case of monopoly power a firm might only be able to raise its prices incrementally above the 
marginal cost, and not be able to earn competitive profits, though (Landes & Posner, 1981). 
The Lerner index, which measures the difference between prices and marginal cost as a 
fraction of price, is therefore applied in determining a firm’s market power, for example. The 
degree of this strongly depends on the elasticity of demand in the market, and it thus 
influences the ability of the firm to exert market power.  
In line with this, Chapter 2.1 starts with a detailed outline of the theory of natural monopolies 
and potential entry barriers that might restrain competition. Following that, the different 
approaches taken to assess the degree of market power is subject of Chapter 2.2, with a 
particular focus on methodologies applied to define the relevant market and to measure 
market concentration. Controversy has arisen as to which approaches and respective 
underlying economic theory provide the most feasible methodology, especially considering 
its application in past and current competition policy. Understanding the different sides 
supporting distinct ways of assessing monopolistic or oligopolistic industries hence yields a 
comprehensive overview of each approach’s drawbacks as well as data requirements1.  
 Market power and rationale for economic regulation 
Providing the underlying concepts for the discussion of market power in the airport industry, 
Chapter 2.1 focuses on the economic theory of (natural) monopolies and related aspects. 
                                                 
1 Part of this chapter has been published in: Paul, A. (2015) Theoretical Foundations Relevant for the Analysis 
of Hub Airport Competition, in: Zeitschrift für Verkehrswissenschaft, 86. Jahrgang, 2015, Heft 1, pp. 47-64.  
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Building on this, Chapter 2.1.2 discusses potential barriers to entry of new competitors to a 
market, highlighting the different views as to the feasibility of the diverse barriers 
2.1.1 The economic theory of natural monopolies 
A monopoly exists if a particular good is supplied by only one firm in the market and if this 
firm either raises the price (Pm) of the good above marginal cost (MC) in order to maximise 
profits or by selecting the profit-maximising output (Qm), as depicted in Figure 2 (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston & Green, 1995:p.384; Carlton & Perloff, 2005:p.89), assuming a simple setting to 
illustrate the negative impacts of a monopoly.  
 
Figure 2: Monopoly profit maximisation 
Source: Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995:p.386)  
Instead of setting the output where prices are equal to marginal costs as in a perfectly 
competitive market (Qc), the monopolist chooses its optimal output level where marginal 
revenue (MR) equals marginal cost. This monopoly output, however, deviates from the 
socially optimal output level and is hence considered as a distortion resulting in welfare 
losses (“deadweight loss of monopoly”) and thus a cost to society due to foregone consumer 
surplus (Church & Ware, 2000:p.34). The dark shaded area in Figure 2 shows this deadweight 
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loss which is also considered as allocative inefficiency since output remains below the social 
optimum. 
In addition to this adverse welfare effect of monopoly behaviour, other disadvantages of a 
monopoly are assumed in the form of x-inefficiencies and rent-seeking behaviour. The 
former concept has first been highlighted by Leibenstein (1966) in saying that monopoly 
firms lack incentives to minimise costs, describing different industry examples to support his 
argument. These might stem from “managerial slack” (Church & Ware, 2000:p.145) or as 
Leibenstein (1978) puts it that “[it] results from incomplete contracts, effort discretion, and 
non-maximizing behaviour, rather than lack of information or errors” (p. 203). The 
introduction of competition to the market thus leads to cost minimisation efforts by the 
monopolist since previously it had been lacking incentives to increase both productive and 
dynamic efficiency, in addition to the allocative inefficiency discussed above. Productive 
inefficiency means that a firm does not choose the optimal technology, which might result in 
a further deviation from the socially optimal output level (Motta, 2009:p.45). Dynamic 
inefficiency addresses a firm’s incentive to invest in new technologies and innovation. The 
argument in this case is that monopolistic firms do not see the necessity to do so unless they 
can increase their overall profit. In a competitive environment, however, dynamic efficiency 
is said to play a much greater role since it enables a firm to gain a competitive advantage of 
their rivals in the market (Motta, 2009:p.56).  
There have been a range of empirical studies supporting these arguments across different 
industries2. However, critics of this reasoning argue that a monopolist’s profit maximising 
strategy is inherent with efforts to minimise costs and that incentives for product as well as 
dynamic efficiency are also apparent in a monopolistic market environment (Carlton & 
Perloff, 2005:p.94). Stigler (1976) states that the observation of firms’ inefficiencies by 
Leibenstein (1966) can be ascribed to allocative inefficiency along the lines of classical price 
theory. And that x-inefficiencies are due to firms operating on different production frontiers, 
meaning they have a different “entrepreneurial capacity” (p. 215), and not to the fact that a 
monopolist foregoes the aim of profit maximisation. Further, Button & Weyman-Jones 
                                                 
2 See Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon (2005:p.171) for an overview of empirical studies supporting the x-
inefficiency argument in terms of a firm’s monopoly behaviour.  
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(1992) point out that the methodological approach taken and the underlying assumptions of 
a model used to determine the level of x-inefficiency in a firm can be biased and thus strongly 
influence the outcome of an empirical investigation.  
Motta (2009:p.56) and Perelman (2011) highlight that the x-inefficiency debate emphasises 
the principal-agent problem and its importance in identifying managerial and organisational 
misconduct which can lead to welfare losses. Frantz (1992) also points out that the theory of 
x-inefficiencies hints at irrational behaviour of individuals which is not assumed in classical 
economy theory and therefore caused a controversial debate on how this should be treated in 
the theory of the firm. In addition to allocative inefficiency and x-inefficiencies, Posner 
(1975), inter alia, brought forward the notion that a monopolist spends his profits in order to 
maintain its position and hence “the cost of obtaining a monopoly is exactly equal to the 
expected profit of being a monopolist” (p.809). This rent-seeking hypothesis implies that the 
social costs of monopoly are even higher than the initially assumed deadweight loss (Tirole, 
1989:p.76; Church & Ware, 2000:p.147; Carlton & Perloff, 2005:p.96; Motta, 2009:p.45).  
The existence of a natural monopoly in an industry is one of the rationales for economic 
regulation. Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1988:p.17) state that “an industry is said to be a natural 
monopoly if, over the entire range of outputs, the firm’s cost function is subadditive” which 
allows only one firm to produce the socially-optimal output in a cost-minimising way. 
Therefore, economic regulation addresses the arising trade-off between productive efficiency 
and allocative inefficiency in the single-firm case: Consumers benefit from a single firm 
producing in the least-cost way but have to bear the cost associated with a single producer 
setting monopoly prices (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.401).  
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Figure 3: Natural monopoly in the single-product case 
Source: Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon (2005:p.407) 
To illustrate the concept of a natural monopoly in more detail, Figure 3 shows the single-
product natural monopoly case. Up to the output level Q’ a firm’s production is characterized 
by economies of scale and it exhibits a declining average cost curve (AC) with increasing 
output. For the output range up to Q’ a single firm can therefore produce the output in the 
least-cost manner (M). However, although economies of scale are sufficient in the single-
product case, they are not a necessary condition for the existence of a natural monopoly, 
which can also prevail in the case of diseconomies of scale, i.e. in the example for output 
larger than Q’. Considering the case of two firms in the market and their respective average 
cost curve (AC2) shows that the range of subadditivity exists up to the output level Q* at 
which a single firm can produce at least cost. At the point where market demand D intersects 
the average cost curve AC, the cost function is subadditive and hence leads to a natural 
monopoly with output Q0 and price P0. (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.405; 
Braeutigam, 1989; Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1988:p.108) 
In reality, however, the single-product case often does not apply since firms are offering 
multiple products to its customers, e.g. such as an airline offering direct and connecting 
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flights. In the multi-product case economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient but 
a natural monopoly exists if the cost function is subadditive. In this regard, the concept of 
economies of scope is of importance which says that “… it is cheaper to produce the two 
output levels [in a two-product case] together in one plant than to produce similar amounts 
of each good in single-product plants.” (Church & Ware, 2000:p.58). For the two-product 
case, economies of scope exist if the following inequality holds:  
𝐶 𝑄 , 𝑄 𝐶 𝑄 , 0 𝐶 0, 𝑄  (1) 
With C being the cost of production and Q1 representing the output of commodity 1 and Q2 
the output of commodity 2. A single firm can produce the combination of these multiple 
products in the least cost manner if the cost function is subadditive (Viscusi, Harrington & 
Vernon, 2005:p.405). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between economies of scope 
and the notion of cost subadditivity, which is defined in the following way: 
𝐶 𝑸 𝐶 𝑸  (2) 
In which k denotes the amount of different firms i in the market (i = 1, …, k) and n is the 
number of products b in the market, with b = 1, …, n. The amount of output of product b 
being produced by firm i is thus denoted 𝑄  and the vector 𝑸  in (2) is the vector of outputs 
of firm i (𝑄 , 𝑄 , … , 𝑄 )3 (Braeutigam, 1989). Considering this definition, according to 
(Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1988:p.17) a “… cost function 𝐶 𝑸  is strictly subadditive at Q 
if for any and all quantities of outputs 𝑸 , … , 𝑸 , 𝑸 𝑸, 𝑖 1, … , 𝑘, 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝑸
𝑸” and thus yielding (2). If the combined production of multiple products within a firm is 
cheaper than the production of each commodity in separate firms economies of scope are 
present, whereas in the presence of cost subadditivity at industry output level, both in the 
case of single and multiple products, a single firm ensures the least-cost production.  
A natural monopoly is said to be sustainable if it can deter entry by potential competitors, or 
if it is too costly for potential competitors to enter the market. However, in the example 
depicted in Figure 3 the firm faces diseconomies of scale in producing the industry output 
                                                 
3 The equation also holds for the single-product case in which n is equal to 1 and (2) reduces to 𝐶 𝑄
∑ 𝐶 𝑄 . 
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level and thus serving the entire market. Assuming that an entrant has the same technology 
as the incumbent firm, perceives no entry barriers such as sunk costs and that it expects the 
incumbent to keep its price unchanged for some time after the entry, this competitor would 
charge a price which is below P0 and produce output below the industry output level of  Q0, 
leaving the incumbent with the supply of the remaining output (Viscusi, Harrington & 
Vernon, 2005:p.408; Braeutigam, 1989), this represents the case of a weak monopoly of the 
incumbent firm. 
2.1.2 Potential barriers to entry 
Market power of a firm hence does not necessarily imply that it may exploit this since other 
firms may be able to enter the market (Braeutigam, 1989). Barriers to entry are an important 
criterion when considering the number of firms in a market as well as those of potential 
entrants. Regarding the definition and subsequent identification of entry barriers, much 
controversy has arisen among economists. The different views on entry barriers in an industry 
are exemplary represented by their main contributors in this chapter. One line of argument, 
supported by Stigler (1968) and stated by Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1988:p.282) in the way 
that “[an] entry barrier is anything that requires an expenditure by a new entrant into an 
industry, but imposes no equivalent cost upon an incumbent”, defines an entry barrier as 
leading to higher long-run average costs for the new entrant compared to the market 
incumbent. Bain (1968), on the contrary, postulates “the extent to which, in the long run, 
established firms can elevate their selling prices above the minimal average costs of 
production and distribution ... without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry" (p. 
252). In this view, the disadvantage of a new entrant towards an incumbent firm is enabled 
by economies of scale, as well as product differentiation and absolute cost advantages 
(Church & Ware, 2000:p.513). For the purpose of the discussion of entry barriers, it is 
distinguished between (1) structural entry barriers (or structural advantages of incumbent 
firms as depicted in Figure 44), those ascribed to the (2) strategic behaviour of firms in order 
to prevent rivals from entering the market, and (3) barriers resulting from governments giving 
                                                 
4 Due to the scope of research addressed within this thesis, not all potential advantages of incumbent firms are 
discussed in detail but those are highlighted which are often discussed in more detail in the economic literature 
in regard to entry barriers or entry deterrence.  
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only one or few firms access to the market (Church & Ware, 2000:p.116). Furthermore, 
Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon (2005:p.165) propose several indicators which are relevant 
for the assessment of entry conditions including the number of potential competitors, the 
length and costs of entry, the quality of access to the same technologies and information as 
the incumbent, and the exit costs associated with leaving the industry.  
 
Figure 4: Overview of potential advantages for incumbent firms 
Source: Hüschelrath (2009:p.225)  
Structural barriers refer to economies of scale, sunk expenditures of the entrant, absolute cost 
advantage of the incumbent as well as product differentiation intended to create loyalty for 
an incumbent’s brand. Especially in regard to economies of scale as an entry barrier opinions 
diverge widely. In the presence of these, the line of reasoning following Bain (1968) argues 
that a new entrant would incur losses because production will take place at a scale at which 
it is disadvantaged due to producing at higher average costs than the incumbent5. Stigler 
(1968) opposes that market entry is profitable if the competitor charges a price lower than 
                                                 
5 In Figure 3 this means that an entrant would produce an output level less than Q’ at which the price is higher 
than that of the incumbent at output level Q’. Charging the same price as the incumbent would lead to losses 
by the entrant and therefore make entry unprofitable (Church & Ware, 2000:p.119). 
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the incumbent and is thus able to redirect all market demand to its products. In this regard, 
according to the definition of entry barriers by Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1988:p.289), 
highlighted above, fixed costs do not represent a barrier to entry since they have to be borne 
by entrants and incumbents alike. The reason why an incumbent has an advantage over a new 
entrant might rather be that consumers are unwilling to switch to a new entrant’s products 
due to the brand loyalty they have with the incumbent’s products (Viscusi, Harrington & 
Vernon, 2005:p.171). This is not due to economies of scale but to the incumbent’s attempt to 
differentiate its products from its competitors’. Product differentiation refers to a firm 
attaching unique characteristics to its products to prevent them from being perfect substitutes 
with other firms’ products (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:p.79). Customers therefore incur 
switching costs when attempting to substitute products, thus being a potential barrier to entry 
for new entrants6 (Tirole, 1989:p.277).  
Absolute cost advantages of the incumbent may arise due to having access to cheaper 
production technologies or capital required for entry. However, Posner (1979) argues that 
capital requirements in itself are not a barrier to entry giving the example that the amount 
required by a new entrant to build the smallest efficient plant size is spread over the lifetime 
of the plant. These annual costs are also incurred by the incumbent assuming that it plans to 
replace their plants as well (p. 929). An entrant might be disadvantaged, though, since it bears 
a higher level of uncertainty or risk regarding its investment compared to the player already 
operating in the market (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.170). Based on this overview 
of structural entry barriers it can be seen that there is no coherent definition which serves as 
a strict guideline how to investigate the sustainability of monopolistic behaviour7. 
The second category of entry barriers, or potential entry deterrence, discussed in the 
economic literature can be accrued to the strategic behaviour of incumbents before or after 
the entry of new firms (Figure 4). Strategic behaviour of firms to keep their rivals from 
                                                 
6 An example of product differentiation also exists in the form of network benefits for users as in the case of 
mobile messaging services WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger and its competitors. In January 2017, both 
WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger had 1 billion active monthly users compared to less than 900 million for 
mobile messaging services ranking in third and fourth place (Statista, 2017). For a user, having more friends 
using the same mobile messaging service therefore increases the attractiveness of this particular platform.  
7 This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 2.2, highlighting again some differences between the different 
schools of thought, Harvard and Chicago, by discussing the different perspectives and assumptions in regard to 
the assessment of market power.  
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entering the market or inducing them to exit it may take on different forms, some exemplary 
ones will be outlined in more detail. Respective strategies address the raising of rivals’ costs 
or a reduction of their respective revenues. The latter strategy often becomes apparent in the 
form of predatory or limit pricing in an industry.  
Predatory pricing means that a firms lowers its price once new competitors enter the market 
in order to make it unprofitable for these to participate in production efforts. In the case of 
new competitors entering the market, economic theory says that in equilibrium prices are 
falling due to each firm maximizing its profits given the other firm’s price (Viscusi, 
Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.307), an expected outcome of competition therefore is lower 
prices. However, in conducting predatory pricing incumbent firms have the intent to lower 
prices to a level so as to drive out new entrants and thus being able to earn future profits. 
Once these potential competitors have either left the market or restrained from entering in 
the first place, the incumbent raises its prices again, i.e. “… there is a temporary sacrifice of 
net revenues in the expectation of future gains” (Areeda & Turner, 1975:p.698). The threat 
by the incumbent to lower prices upon entry has to be perceived as credible by potential 
entrants otherwise this game would be repeated once the incumbent raises its prices in order 
to recoup its short-run losses (Church & Ware, 2000:p.646). This credibility is heightened if 
the incumbent has greater financial means compared to its potential competitors and if the 
outlook to gain future profits is substantial. In case competitors have similar financial means, 
the game may take place repeatedly, thus decreasing the incentives of the incumbent to 
engage in such pricing strategies. However, finding empirical evidence on predatory pricing 
has been the subject of diverse lawsuits, with economic theory evolving alongside and 
providing the theoretical assessment framework, recently in the form of game theoretic 
models, for the identification of such behaviour (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.321; 
Church & Ware, 2000:p.661; Motta, 2009:p.416).  
One issue related to predatory pricing is the definition and identification of the appropriate 
cost against which prices are benchmarked. Areeda & Turner (1975) propose to apply 
average variable costs as cost measure, “… despite the possibility that average variable cost 
will differ from marginal cost, it is a useful surrogate for predatory pricing analysis” (p.718). 
However, this measure has been discussed as being incorrect and new approaches have been 
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put forward such as average total cost or average incremental costs (Motta, 2009:p.448). In 
antitrust law, a comprehensive assessment is thus conducted on a case-by-case basis 
analysing the underlying market structure, evidence supporting pricing strategies and 
possible recoupment by firms as well as other relevant factors8 (Viscusi, Harrington & 
Vernon, 2005:p.322). Predatory pricing is seen as an attempt of incumbent firms to induce 
competitors to exit the market.  
The strategy of limit pricing, on the other hand, is intended to deter competitors from entering 
the market in the first place. In this strategy, the incumbent basically sets its output so as to 
reduce the residual demand for a potential entrant to a level at which the potential earnings 
are unprofitable for the competitor, and it thus decides not to enter the market (Viscusi, 
Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.186; Church & Ware, 2000:p.478). Here, it is required that the 
entrant credibly believes that the incumbent will maintain this particular pre-entry output 
level and thus render it unprofitable for new competitors to enter the market, which is known 
as the Bain-Sylos postulate. Critics of this approach, however, argue that the entrant’s 
decision to enter the market is independent of the incumbent’s previous output level. This is 
reasoned by the assumption that all competitors engage in Cournot competition once in the 
market and thus simultaneously determine their respective output level.  
If limit pricing is to work, pre-entry output has to have an effect on the post-entry equilibrium 
in the market, which can be justified by the presence of adjustment costs in production of the 
incumbent firm, for example9. This implies that an incumbent may not be able to adjust its 
output quickly from one production period to the next due to these costs and thus its pre-
entry output may have a deterring effect on potential entrants. (Church & Ware, 2000:p.478; 
Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.186) Discussing the derivation of these linkages and 
the impact on firms’ behaviour, i.e. the use of limit pricing and potential benefits resulting 
                                                 
8 Demsetz (1982) highlights different criteria which are often applied to determine the presence of predatory 
pricing and which can assist in identifying the difference between competitive and predatory prices: (1) firms’ 
prospect of obtaining higher prices in the future by selling at a price below marginal cost today, (2) in case 
incumbent firms expand their output level upon the entry of new firms, this hints to the existence of predation, 
and market incumbents should be prohibited to do so for a predetermined period after entry, and (3) the 
motivation behind a firm’s price decrease which is more of a legal criterion than an economic one.  
9 Adjustment costs are those costs that arise if a firm has to adjust its level of production from one period to 
another; these costs include, for example, inventories, the accumulation of capital, or lay-off payments for 
workers which are no longer required in case of a reduced production level (Carlton & Perloff, 2005:p.280). 
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for the incumbent, are not within the scope of this thesis. The intention here is to provide an 
overview of different mechanisms which can be employed by incumbent firms to deter entry 
or induce rivals to exit the market.  
Further strategies employed by incumbent firms are outlined by Salop & Scheffman (1983) 
as attempts to raise rivals’ costs, a strategy to deter entry in the first place. This may incur at 
only little cost for the incumbent since, “[for] example, a mandatory product standard may 
exclude rivals while being virtually costless to the predator” (p.267), other examples include 
increasing advertising expenditures, or the implementation of industry-wide wage contracts. 
Ibid. and Salop & Scheffman (1983) outline that this particular strategy might be more 
appealing to incumbent firms than reducing their rivals’ revenues since it does not necessarily 
require the commitment of financial resources by the incumbent as is the case with predatory 
or limit pricing. A sufficient condition for the incumbent to profitably engage in this strategy 
therefore “[…] is that it increases the marginal cost of the (fringe) rival firms more than it 
increases the average costs of the dominant firm” (Church & Ware, 2000:p.628).  
In addition to those strategies previously highlighted, vertical foreclosure can represent an 
attempt to exclude rivals from the market. A simple example of vertical integration between 
an upstream firm (U1) and a downstream firm (D1) where both the upstream and the 
downstream market are oligopolistic is depicted in Figure 510. In the case of competition on 
the upstream market, prices are equal to marginal cost in equilibrium. Assuming vertical 
integration between U1 and D1, as depicted in the right-hand part of Figure 5, it is presumed 
that the now integrated firm supplies input at the same price as before the integration. Further 
supposing that the now integrated firm U1 does not provide inputs to downstream firm 2 
(D2) anymore, the latter faces a monopoly on the upstream market and is thus likely to face 
a higher input price and raise its prices accordingly to compensate for these. This induces a 
higher price by the now integrated downstream firm 1 (D1) as well, enabling it to increase 
its profits, and thus representing an anticompetitive effect of the vertical integration. (Viscusi, 
Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.251) 
                                                 
10 In this setting it is assumed that the two upstream firms supply homogeneous goods to the downstream firms 
and engage in Bertrand competition, the downstream firms produce differentiated products using the same 
technology and can thus either use inputs from upstream firm 1 (U1) or upstream firm 2 (U2) (Church & Ware, 
2000:p.632). 
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Figure 5: Vertical foreclosure 
Source: Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon (2005:p.249)  
However, the overall output of a vertical integration may be different in case the upstream 
firms’ products are differentiated and therefore no perfect substitutes, or if these firms engage 
in Cournot instead of Bertrand competition. This may lead to the upstream firms not pricing 
at marginal cost, representing the case of double marginalization and vertical integration will 
reduce this effect and will be welfare-enhancing. Other aspects to be considered in the setting 
outlined in Figure 5 are the commitment of upstream firm 1 (U1) not to sell to downstream 
firm 2 (D2) and the case in which the remaining unintegrated firms (U2, D2) may also pursue 
vertical integration (Church & Ware, 2000:p.633).  
In regard to vertical or horizontal foreclosure within an industry, Rey & Tirole (2007) define 
the concept of foreclosure and provide a good review as well as extension to the existing 
foreclosure literature. They establish a theoretical framework with which to assess the 
benefits and costs of market foreclosure. This occurs if the owner of a bottleneck, e.g. airport 
infrastructure, restricts access to its facilities for competitive firms on the downstream 
market, e.g. airlines, in order to increase its profits. Another option can be to engage in 
exclusive deals with specific downstream firms. Comanor & Frech (1985) investigate 
exclusive dealing and the resulting anticompetitive effects in an industry. This model 
assumes that the incumbent on the upstream market may engage in some form of exclusive 
dealing in order to deter the entry of a new manufacturer. The analysis of low-pricing and 
high-pricing strategies shows that the incumbent profits regardless of the selected strategy. 
The decision of the downstream player depends on the consumers brand preference for the 
U1 U2
D1 D2
U1 U2
D1 D2
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incumbent's product. If this preference is strong, the downstream producer engages in 
exclusive dealing only if the incumbent opts for the high-price strategy. However, the low-
price strategy is more likely to occur since more consumers will buy the incumbent's product. 
In this case, no exclusive dealing occurs. Ibid. highlight that the credible threat of the 
incumbent to engage in vertical integration may already deter an entrant's strategy.  
Salinger (1988) analyses the effects of a vertical merger in the case of oligopolistic market 
structures on both the upstream and downstream market. The results imply that vertical 
mergers have both positive and negative welfare effects by removing the double 
marginalization effect and increasing the price of the intermediate good, respectively. 
Diverging from this is the model by Ordover, Saloner & Salop (1990). Here, successive 
duopolies with two firms in both the upstream and the downstream market are assumed and 
there are no market imperfections such as double marginalization. The model focuses on 
whether vertical foreclosure can be applied by a firm in order to increase its market share 
towards its rival. Ibid. analyse how measures such as counterstrategies of the non-integrated 
firms or a bidding process for the merger influence the incentives for vertical foreclosure. In 
the analytical model, the firms engage in Bertrand competition and they offer homogeneous 
input on the upstream market, have differentiated products downstream and equal market 
shares on their respective market. The authors find that for vertical foreclosure to be 
successful the gain acquired by the unintegrated upstream firm has to be larger than the loss 
incurred by the unintegrated downstream firm. Furthermore, social welfare decreases since 
there are no efficiency gains to be accrued by the merger due to the lack of previous double 
marginalization.  
A similar analytical approach is taken by Chen (2001). Here, prices are also considered as 
strategic complements and hence competitors on the downstream market engage in Bertrand 
competition. Ibid. finds that there is a collusive effect and an efficiency effect going along 
with vertical integration. The former denotes the case of market foreclosure and the latter the 
gain in social welfare to be achieved by vertical integration. The analysis shows that the 
collusive effect prevails if the downstream firms are close substitutes. 
Another area of potential entry barriers for new competitors are restrictions imposed by 
government due to various reasons. One is the granting of intellectual property rights, in the 
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form of patents, or copyrights which are intended to protect a firm’s innovations, and enable 
it to gain a temporary monopoly and thus to reap the benefits from its investment in research 
and development (R&D) activities (Tirole, 1989:p.390; Carlton & Perloff, 2005:p.102; 
Motta, 2009:p.65). Further, Demsetz (1982) outlines that government intervention can aim 
at ensuring the benefits of productive efficiency of a natural monopoly by restricting the 
production to a single firm. This firm then often becomes subject to economic regulation in 
order to minimize the allocative inefficiency associated with a monopolisation of the market 
(see Chapter 2.1.1). Another barrier to enter a particular market can be the requirement of a 
licence which is granted by a public authority only and which restricts the market to licence 
holders (ibid.). 
It is possible that, in the theory of contestability, the mere threat of potential entry by a 
competitor restrains the existing firm from abusing its market power (Baumol, Panzar & 
Willig, 1988). Baumol (1982) states that for markets to be perfectly contestable there has to 
be “… no cost discrimination against entrants [and] that any firm … in the process of 
departure can recoup any costs incurred in the entry process” (p. 4). Based on this, for the 
threat of entry to be credible several conditions have be fulfilled: (1) All producers, either 
being new to the market or existing ones, have access to the same production technology, 
including input prices and information about demand, (2) the absence of sunk costs, meaning 
that a new entrant can fully recover its costs upon exit11, and (3) the time it takes a firm to 
start production in the market (entry lag) is shorter than the time it takes the incumbent to 
adjust its prices (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.172; Church & Ware, 2000:p.507; 
Tirole, 1989:p.308; Motta, 2009:p.73). Resulting from these conditions is a hit-and-run entry 
by potential competitors which enter in case they detect an opportunity to earn positive 
profits. Therefore, the welfare implications of a perfectly contestable market are that 
economic profits in a contestable market have to be zero, there are no inefficiencies in the 
long-run equilibrium, and prices must at least equal marginal costs (Baumol, 1982). In this 
regard, ibid. emphasises that the contestable market theory objects that an industry, fulfilling 
                                                 
11 Sunk costs are described by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988) in the way that “[the] need to sink money into 
a new enterprise, whether into physical capital, advertising, or anything else, imposes a difference between the 
incremental cost and the incremental risk that are faced by an entrant and an incumbent” (p. 290). Ibid. therefore 
state that sunk costs can be a barrier to entry.   
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the above conditions, with no entry and high concentration is prone to abuse its market power 
and that antitrust policy thus has to consider the implications of potential competition more 
carefully.  
Another conclusion drawn from the theory of contestable markets is the divergence from the 
theory that industry structure is determined exogenously in stating that it is determined 
simultaneously with prices and outputs (ibid.). In regard to the promotion of the theory of 
contestable markets, a controversial debate as to the underlying assumptions and resulting 
implications for market structure and performance arose. Weitzman (1983) states that “… 
you cannot have a range of decreasing average cost without sunk costs” (p. 486), but that in 
the absence of sunk costs the technology is rather characterised by constant returns to scale 
(Church & Ware, 2000:p.509). Regarding the conditions that have to be fulfilled for a market 
to be (perfectly) contestable, Schwartz and Reynolds (1983) argue that the results change 
significantly in case these conditions are slightly altered or relaxed12. Despite the criticism it 
received, contestability theory has contributed to the development of antitrust policy in regard 
to the assessment of market power as it “… shifts attention away from structural measures of 
market power … and from the nature of oligopoly interactions towards variables that affect 
the ease of entry and exit” (Schwartz, 1986:p.37)13.  
 Approaches towards the assessment of market power 
Building on the theoretical background on natural monopolies and potential entry barriers in 
Chapter 2.1, Chapter 2.2 focuses on the discussion of different approaches that have been 
applied to assess the degree of market power a firm possesses, with a particular discussion 
on current applications in competition policy both in the European Union and the United 
States (Chapter 2.2.1). Sine potential antitrust cases are often investigated by defining the 
                                                 
12 For example, in case a potential competitor cannot enter instantaneously, thus facing an entry lag, and at the 
same time the incumbent faces no price-adjustment lag, the entrant will base its entry on the oligopolistic game 
the firms engage in after entry. The incumbent will therefore set its prices at monopoly level before entry and 
market power is hence not constrained by contestability (Schwartz & Reynolds, 1983). Baumol, Panzar & 
Willig (1983) provide a detailed reply to the issues raised in relation to contestability theory. These will not be 
elaborated in further detail here, though, since this particular theory is not in the focus of this thesis.  
13 Taking the airline industry as an example, which is often considered as being (im)perfectly contestable, both 
Borenstein (1992) and Peteraf (1995) outline that the application of contestability theory in the airline industry 
may not be robust, suggesting that there are sunk costs apparent in this industry. 
2 Theoretical Foundations for the Assessment of Market Power 
25 
relevant market for consideration and subsequently assessing the degree of market power as 
well as entry barriers, respective approaches are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.2.2.    
2.2.1 Developments regarding the assessment of market power 
Following the line of argument in Chapter 2.1 on the existence of a natural monopoly and 
the outline of the controversial discussion on structural as well as strategic entry barriers, the 
different approaches determining the degree of market power a firm faces have been equally 
debated in the past. Within this chapter the focus is placed on two different approaches taken 
to determine the degree of market power (Figure 6), the direct and indirect assessment. 
Discussing the development as well as the economic reasoning of these different approaches 
yields a more detailed insight into their respective feasibility for the economic analysis of 
antitrust cases.  
 
Figure 6: Assessment of market power 
Source: Hüschelrath (2009:p.172) 
The indirect assessment of market power is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm which was first introduced in the 1930s and 1940s in the field of industrial 
organisation as a means to analyse and explain industry performance. It is an approach which 
assesses the market power of a firm indirectly since “… market power is inferred from the 
presence of high concentration figures and significant entry barriers” (Hüschelrath, 
2009:p.172). Two of the main early contributors to the SCP approach have been Mason 
(1937, 1939) and Bain (1951, 1954, 1956) who are linked to the so called Harvard School of 
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thought. In the SCP approach, a causal relationship between the different parameters 
characterising an industry – structure, conduct, and performance – is assumed (see Figure 7). 
In order to understand an industry’s performance, i.e. its efficiency level and degree of 
technical progress, it is essential to analyse the conduct of the market participants in terms of 
decisions concerning pricing, advertising, or investment in research and development (R&D) 
(Church & Ware, 2000:p.426). Since measuring the conduct of firms in an industry proved 
to be difficult, traditional approaches in this field focused on determining market structure 
and inferring to market performance, assuming a linear and stable relationship between these 
parameters, i.e. “… to explain, through an examination of the structure of markets and the 
organisation of firms, differences in competitive practices including price, production, and 
investment policies” (Mason, 1939:p.66).  
In this theory of structuralism, market structure is determined by, inter alia, analysing the 
number of buyers and sellers in the market, i.e. the respective level of concentration, since 
“[moderate] concentration should tend to give rise to quasi-competitive market behaviour … 
whereas high concentration should provide an environment conducive to effective collusion 
or its equivalent” (Bain, 1950:p.44).  
 
Figure 7: The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in Industrial Organisation 
Source: Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon (2005:p.63)  
As stated by Bain (1950) and discussed in Chapter 2.1.2, market structure includes multi 
dimensions and hence, in addition to firm concentration, entry conditions are an important 
criterion to analyse the competitiveness of a market as is the degree of product differentiation 
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firms engage in. One argument of this approach states that “… both high concentration and 
high barriers to entry were necessary to produce excess profits in long-run equilibrium” 
(Schmalensee, 1989:p.969), which is why the causal effect of these on firms’ profitability 
levels, as a measure for the performance in an industry, have been tested in various studies. 
As highlighted before, economic profits are assumed to reflect the degree of market power 
of a firm. Measures of market performance hence include the rate of return, the price-cost 
margin, or Tobin’s q, and usually accounting data has been used as a proxy to calculate the 
respective values. Therefore, in the SCP approach measures of profitability are applied to 
reflect this relationship. However, one of the main drawbacks here are the potential 
measurement errors and data availability inherent in the calculation of rates of return, price-
cost margins and Tobin’s q (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Profitability measures 
Profitability 
measure 
Definition Drawbacks14 
Rates of return Measuring how much is earned per 
one dollar investment, used as a proxy 
for economic profits 
Clear distinction between economic 
and accounting profits; 
measurement errors of e.g. capital 
cost 
Price-cost 
margin 
Lerner index defines the difference 
between price and marginal cost as a 
fraction of price 
Unavailability of marginal cost data, 
average cost as a proxy might cause 
bias 
Tobin’s q Ratio of the market value of the firm 
to its assets’ replacement cost 
Using a proxy for economic profit 
may lead to biased results 
Source: own depiction based on Carlton & Perloff (2005); Church & Ware (2000)  
Along these lines, Bain (1951) conducted an empirical analysis to test the relationship 
between market structure and performance using data for the American manufacturing 
industry, i.e. conducting an inter-industry study, between 1936 and 1940, with the hypothesis 
“… that the average profit rate of firms in oligopolistic industries of a high concentration will 
tend to be significantly larger than that of firms in less concentrated oligopolies or in 
industries of atomistic structure” (p. 294). One aspect ibid. highlights as a crucial first step 
in this approach is the definition of the relevant market which is to be analysed. As outlined 
in Figure 6, this represents the initial step in the indirect approach to assess the market power 
                                                 
14 See also Schmalensee (1989) for potential measurement errors associated with determining profitability and 
how these can be addressed. 
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of firms in an industry15. The results suggest a positive correlation between profit rates and 
industry concentration and a critical concentration ratio of 70 per cent (using the 8-firm 
concentration ratio) above which the correlation was more pronounced.  
Comanor & Wilson (1967) advance the previous analysis by empirically testing for the effect 
of advertising, here applied as a proxy for the degree of product differentiation in an industry, 
on profit rates, also applying an inter-industry data set. In the model, profit rates observed in 
the considered industries serve as dependent variable, and seller concentration, the rate of 
growth demand, economies of scale in production in relation to the size of the market, 
absolute capital requirements for a plant, and advertising represent proxies for the different 
structural parameters of a market and are hence included as independent variables. Ibid. finds 
that “[industries] with high advertising outlays earn, on average, at a profit rate which 
exceeds that of other industries by nearly four percentage points” (p. 437)16. Leonard Weiss 
has also been a contributor to this field in following the structural approach to detect market 
power and potential abuse in an industry. Weiss (1979), inter alia, focused on analysing the 
relationship between concentration and price instead of profits and empirical evidence from 
different industry studies yields a positive effect of concentration on prices. This relation has 
been confirmed by various other studies, as outlined in Schmalensee (1989), and appeared to 
be statistically more robust than the relation between concentration and profit margins17. 
Following the assumptions of the SCP approach, antitrust analysis has thus been deducing 
an industry’s or firm’s performance from the level of concentration, which is often known as 
the per se rule, i.e. assuming that high concentration will likely end in anticompetitive 
behaviour (Piraino, 2007).  
However, criticism in regard to these empirical studies highlighted the problems of causality 
and potential endogeneity in the structural models as well as the use of inter-industry data to 
derive implications for the treatment of mergers in an industry or monopolised markets. In 
                                                 
15 The specific elements and respective tests of this particular approach will be further discussed in Chapter 
2.2.2. 
16 Ibid. also test for the impact of concentration, scale economies and capital requirements; due to high 
collinearity between these factors the joint impact of these is considered and the results show a significant 
impact on the profit rates across industries.  
17 Ibid. outlines a large range of studies which have been investigating the relation between concentration and 
profitability and comes to the conclusion, after careful examination of the different results, that the relation 
between concentration and profits is weak statistically. 
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regard to causality, the relationship between market structure, conduct and performance is 
not necessarily unidirectional, but conduct can have an influence on the market structure, as 
illustrated by the dashed arrow in Figure 7. Examples of this reverse relationship include the 
investment in research and development of a firm to gain a competitive advantage over other 
firms in the market, further fostered by firm protection in the form of intellectual property 
rights by the government which might leave a firm with a larger market share due to its 
exclusive rights for a particular good (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005:p.62). These 
causal loops apparent in the SCP model may lead to the problem of endogeneity in estimating 
structural models, i.e. determining independent variables which are exogenous in the long-
run proves to be a difficult task (Schmalensee, 1989).  
Furthermore, since the focus of early SCP studies has been on inter-industry studies, 
symmetry in explanatory variables across industries was assumed. However, since the 
inherent structure of different industries is determined by a large variety of factors, including 
historic developments for example, the structure is rather asymmetric and therefore 
conclusions drawn from cross-industry studies can lead to biased results (Carlton & Perloff, 
2005:p.265; Church & Ware, 2000:p.439). Schmalensee (1989) points out that cross-industry 
studies aiming at analysing market performance and the factors shaping it can rather 
contribute to the field of industrial organisation by providing valuable descriptive analysis 
on different industries. Further biases arising from measurement errors are due to the 
inappropriate definition of the relevant antitrust market. The definition has to account for 
product heterogeneity and potential close substitutes, for example (Church & Ware, 
2000:p.604). Deducing potential market power or competitive constraints applying a too 
wide or too narrow market definition can lead to false conclusions and hence misguided 
policy incentives. This particular aspect will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 2.2.2.  
The SCP approach hence became widely criticised, for one due to its rigidity of assumptions 
and the resulting implications for antitrust cases, i.e. postulating that a highly concentrated 
market results in anticompetitive behaviour. Representatives of the Chicago School argued 
that “… deconcentration may have the total effect of promoting inefficiency even though it 
also may reduce some monopoly-caused inefficiencies” (Demsetz, 1973:p.4) since a high 
level of concentration in an industry may imply that large firms are more efficient. The 
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empirical evidence in ibid. supports the assumption that high concentration in an industry 
may result from superior efficiency of the large firm. Breaking up this industry into smaller 
firms may thus result in higher costs and ultimately in losses in regard to consumer welfare. 
This approach led to antitrust policy being more focused on the implications for consumer 
welfare as a whole, as postulated by Bork (1966) “… to distinguish between agreements or 
activities that increase wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction 
of output” (p. 7). Representatives of this distinct approach focused on price theory to analyse 
and interpret market structure and firm behaviour and accordingly criticising the early 
postulations of the Harvard School as not following economic theory, especially with regard 
to rational profit maximisation (Posner, 1979).  
The diverging assumptions of the two schools of thought, Harvard and Chicago, especially 
in the 1960s, thus also became apparent in regard to the entry barriers new competitors face 
in an industry, as outlined in Chapter 2.1.2. In this regard, the notion of advertising as a 
barrier to entry has been opposed since it is rather considered as reduction of search costs for 
consumers than product differentiation which creates a lock-in effect with customers (ibid.). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, these assumptions, pursued by Chicago School economists, led to 
the proposal that only very specific cases required antitrust investigation, namely “… explicit 
price fixing and larger horizontal mergers (mergers to monopoly)” (Posner, 1979:p.933), 
which became known as the rule of reason (Piraino, 2007; Baker, 1999)18.  
As a response to the criticism regarding the SCP approach – deriving generalised statements 
about market structure and implications for performance from inter-industry studies, 
potential measurement errors arising from the use of accounting data, and the assumption 
that performance can be directly inferred from structure – a new and enhanced empirical 
approach of determining market power was developed (Bresnahan, 1989). This “new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO)” or direct assessment (Figure 6) focuses on the 
estimation of market power in a single industry instead of cross-sectional analyses and relies 
on structural models to directly determine firms’ conduct in a particular industry (Church & 
Ware, 2000:p.440). Basically, this approach models the perceived outcome in an industry, 
                                                 
18 However, Stiglitz (2017) states that the Chicago School approach to competition policy, i.e. restricting 
antitrust intervention only to few cases, has not been followed through with in European Union competition 
law.  
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which is assumed to exert market power, by applying theoretical models from oligopoly 
theory and by using econometric techniques to test these formal theories (Carlton & Perloff, 
2005:p.275; Motta, 2009:p.126). By this, the estimation of conduct parameters reveals 
whether firms’ reactions to changes in price comply with competitive, competing oligopoly, 
or collusive models (Davis & Garcés, 2010:p.343)19.  
One methodology applied in this field is the estimation of the residual demand elasticity, 
which constitutes an empirical test to define the geographical scope of an antitrust market or 
the extent of market power of a firm (Scheffman & Spiller, 1987; Landes & Posner, 1981). 
Whereas ibid. concentrate on a homogenous product market, Baker and Bresnahan (1988) 
analyse an industry with differentiated products. The residual demand is the function which 
denotes a firm’s relationship between price and quantity, considering the supply decisions of 
the other firms in the market. This approach relies on the model of the dominant firm and its 
fringe firms. The former is thus assumed to have market power in case the fringe firms have 
a relatively inelastic supply (Davis & Garcés, 2010:p.222). Pakes (2017) provides an 
overview on both static and dynamic models currently applied in competition analysis, 
stating that in selecting appropriate methodologies it has to be considered that available 
information can be used and that these approaches comply with the resources available for 
policy makers. 
However, the differences apparent between the two schools of economic thought, Harvard 
and Chicago, and their perception of antitrust analysis have been disappearing over time, or 
as Posner (1979) formulates it, “… it is no longer worth talking about different schools of 
academic antitrust analysis” (p. 925). Weiss (1979), for example, after investigating the 
relationship between concentration and capacity decisions, alleviates his view that mergers 
and concentration per se should be considered illegal but instead states that there are potential 
gains to be incurred from large firms operating in an industry. As a result “… many of the 
horizontal merger cases that reached the Supreme Court in the 1960’s were decided too 
strictly” (Weiss, 1979:p.1119). Views have also been converging in regard to the treatment 
of vertical integration between firms. Initially considered by Harvard economists as harming 
                                                 
19 Without the availability of a structural model, non-parametric approaches have also been applied of which 
examples can be found in Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) and Panzar and Rosse (1987). 
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the positive effects of competition and therefore in need of antitrust intervention, work in the 
1970s and onwards has revised this proposition towards one that highlights the benefits of 
such mergers (Posner, 1979). However, ibid. also emphasises that at that time discrepancies 
remained in regard to the meaning and treatment of concentration within an industry, though 
representatives of both schools moved away from their positions of either per se illegality or 
per se legality of a concentrated industry and towards a more detailed assessment of specific 
cases.  
The overall goal of antitrust policy, especially in regard to mergers, has become consumer 
welfare, i.e. guaranteeing product quality and variety as well as ensuring that firms do not set 
too high prices or reduce output, and thus to “… protect competition, not competitors” 
(Hovenkamp & Shapiro, 2017:p.10). Along the advancement of economic theory, 
competition policy in the U.S. thus shifted from a strict derivation of market performance 
from market structure to an approach in which potential anticompetitive behaviour is 
assumed and firms are put in the position to refute this assumption, i.e. produce evidence that 
e.g. a horizontal merger is welfare enhancing (ibid.). In detecting the degree of concentration 
in an industry and thus potential anticompetitive behaviour of firms, the role of market shares 
and market concentration in antitrust analysis has changed over time, but these parameters 
are still applied as a supplement in the analysis of, inter alia, horizontal mergers or significant 
market power of a firm (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010; 
European Commission, 2002)20:    
“Nonetheless, economic theory and subsequent empirical evidence do not suggest ignoring 
market shares and concentration in merger analysis. First, various theories of oligopoly conduct - 
both static and dynamic models of firm interaction - are consistent with the view that 
competition with fewer significant firms on average is associated with higher prices. In general, 
the smaller the number of firms, the more likely the firms will be able to reach a mutually 
satisfactory outcome at a higher-than-competitive price. Unilateral price increases or output 
restraints also are more likely to be profitable when the merged firms have higher market shares, 
ceteris paribus. Accordingly, a horizontal merger reducing the number of rivals from four to 
                                                 
20 The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010) states that values of the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index, as a measure of concentration, between 0.15 and 0.25 depict an industry which is moderately 
concentrated and that values above 0.25 represent a highly concentrated industry. The European Commission 
(2004) considers post-merger cases and defines HHI values below 0.1 and between 0.1 and 0.2 to be rather non-
critical; furthermore assuming a delta below 0.025 compared to pre-merger HHI values. The European 
Commission highlights that the nature of the merging firms has to be considered, e.g. if the firms are both 
important innovators in the industry. Usually, other factors apart from the HHI are included and decisions 
regarding mergers are made on a case by case basis. 
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three, or three to two, would be more likely to raise competitive concerns than one reducing the 
number from ten to nine, ceteris paribus”.  
         (Salop, 2015:p.276) 
Stiglitz (2017) makes the case for the broadening of current competition policy, i.e. moving 
away from the focus on only specific cases as under the rule of reason, and not merely relying 
on the “natural forces of competition” (p. 12). In this regard, ibid. states that imperfections 
in information or even small deviations from the situation of a perfectly competitive market 
can cause abusive behaviour of the dominant firm which should be taken into account by 
current competition policy. Looking at developments in the U.S., Hovenkamp and Shapiro 
(2017) and Shapiro (2017) also support stronger antitrust enforcement policies to be put in 
place. Competition policy in the European Union pursues an indirect approach of market 
assessment as illustrated in Figure 6, essentially following the different steps of relevant 
market definition, concentration and entry analysis. It thus provides guidelines according to 
which national regulatory authorities are recommended to assess cases of assumed market 
power to “… ensure that they can fully justify any form of early, ex-ante intervention in an 
emerging market” (European Commission, 2002:p.10). Table 2 highlights this approach, 
respective guidelines and criteria which are to be considered in the assessment of significant 
market power.  
According to these guidelines it can be tested whether a firm is experiencing significant 
market power. The definition of the relevant market for antitrust analysis, i.e. the products 
and services which are included in this market as well as the geographical scope of it, is the 
crucial first step within the proposed guidelines. One approach often applied is the 
hypothetical monopoly test which assesses the effects of a “[…] small but significant, lasting 
increase of a product or service, assuming that the prices of all other products or services 
remain constant”, on other firms’ or consumers’ behaviour (European Commission, 2002). 
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Table 2: Approach of the European Commission in assessing market power 
Steps  Approach and criteria 
(1) Definition of the relevant 
market 
 Description of products/ services making up the market; 
assessment of geographical scope 
 Consideration of competitive constraints: (a) demand side 
substitution, (b) supply side substitution, (c) potential 
competition 
 Potential application of hypothetical monopoly test (“only 
with regard to products or services, the price of which is 
freely determined and not subject to regulation” – p. 11) 
 Relevant market clustered by products/ services serving the 
same end use by consumers 
 Definition of geographic market: analysis of consumer 
preferences and geographic purchase behaviour 
(2) Assessing significant 
market power 
(dominance) 
 Significant market power exists if “[a firm] enjoys a position 
equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers” (p. 15) 
 A dominant position does not equal anticompetitive 
behaviour 
 Ability to increase price/ restrict output without incurring 
losses 
 Initial assessment of market shares (considering volume and 
value of sales) 
(3) Other criteria to be 
considered in the analysis 
of potential market power 
(potential entry barriers) 
 Overall size of considered firm 
 Control of infrastructure not easily duplicated 
 Absence of or low countervailing power 
 Product/service diversification 
 Economies of scale/scope 
 Vertical integration 
 Absence of potential competition 
 Barriers of expansion 
Source: Based on European Commission (2002) 
Having defined the relevant market, within the second step, market shares are applied to 
assess whether a firm has a dominant position in the market. Since this does not necessarily 
mean that a firm is abusing its market power by restricting output or increasing price, the 
third step proposed within the guidelines focuses on the assessment of potential entry 
barriers, which have been discussed already in Chapter 2.1.2. Those aspects related to the 
definition of the relevant market and market concentration are discussed in more detail in the 
following Chapter 2.2.2 since the economic theory and the associated guidelines proposed 
by the European Commission (2002) and the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
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Commission (2010) will be used as the baseline for the assessment of market power of 
European hub airports.  
2.2.2 Definition of the relevant market and concentration analysis 
The definition of the relevant market in competition or antitrust analysis is the crucial and 
essential first step in defining the boundaries within which a firm’s market power is to be 
assessed. In this context, antitrust studies refer to the concept of an antitrust market as 
opposed to an economic market (Church & Ware, 2000:p.601). Both definitions comprise a 
product and a geographic dimension. The economic market determines the market place for 
particular products, the respective buyers and sellers and the interaction between these that 
determine price setting behaviour. Products in the economic market are considered close 
substitutes if there are high cross-price elasticities of demand and supply. Demand side 
substitutability means that customers can either switch to a substitute product if the price of 
other options increases or they can buy their products from a different location. Supply side 
substitutability refers to the producer being able to switch to the production of other products, 
i.e. those which can be rather easily produced with the available input factors (Davis & 
Garcés, 2010:p.163). The antitrust market in comparison focuses on a particular firm and 
whether this firm exerts market power in its particular market, i.e. “[in] antitrust analysis, a 
market is collection of products and geographic locations, delineated as part of an inquiry 
aimed at making inferences about market power and anticompetitive effects” (Baker, 
2007:p.130). This market thus comprises the relevant products of a firm and the geographic 
scale or market containing potential competitors.  
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Table 3: Approaches to defining relevant (antitrust) markets 
Approach Definition Required data 
Qualitative assessment Outline of product characteristics 
and identification of relevant 
demand and supply side substitutes 
Product characteristics 
Price level differences 
and price correlations 
Observation of movement of prices 
of selected products, i.e. perfect 
substitutes only differ in regard to 
transportation costs 
Cost and demand data of 
included products 
Natural experiments Analysis of reaction of one 
product’s price to effect of 
exogenous shock on price of 
another good 
Exogenous shock, price 
information 
Estimation of substitution 
effect 
Consumer choice modelling in 
regard to different available 
alternatives 
Consumer-level data on 
available choices (revealed vs. 
stated preferences data) 
Shipment data  Analysis of level of imports vs. 
exports in a market 
Import and export data, firm 
purchasing data 
Critical loss analysis 
(CLA) 
Analysis of the loss in sales a firms 
incurs after a price increase,   
Marginal cost data, product 
own-price elasticity of demand 
Hypothetical monopoly 
test (pricing constraints) 
Analysing the profitability of a 
price increase of the considered 
firm: 
 SSNIP test 
 FERM 
Marginal cost data, product 
own-price elasticity of demand 
Source: own depiction, based on Davis & Garcés (2010) 
There are different approaches which are used to define the relevant antitrust market 
including price level differences and price correlations, natural experiments (e.g. exogenous 
shocks), shipment data (transportation costs) to determine the geographic market, or the 
measurement of pricing constraints (see Table 3). Baker (2007) discusses some of these 
approaches and points out potential deficiencies which may lead to biased results, especially 
considering the use of price correlations, shipment data, and critical loss analysis. Using the 
correlation between prices across different firms’ products to define a relevant market can be 
misleading, since this can be induced by a shift in demand, thus not necessarily implying that 
products are (perfect) substitutes. Ibid. also criticises that the use of shipment data may lead 
to a biased definition of the relevant market, since it applies the flow rates of imports and 
exports at current prices. Considering that a price increase may induce a distant firm to offer 
its products on the defined market is thus not taken into account.  
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Another way to analyse the effects of a price increase and thus determine the relevant antitrust 
market is the critical loss analysis (CLA) in which the question “how much do sales need to 
drop in order to render an x [per cent] price increase unprofitable” (Davis & Garcés, 
2010:p.211) defines the relevant market by giving an indication to the pricing constraints 
imposed by other firms. In this particular application case, Baker (2007) points out that 
inferring demand elasticities from price-cost margins is not a reliable approach, since the 
amount of critical loss incurred from a price increase depends on the height of price-cost 
margins before a merger. In case a firm already faces a high mark-up above marginal cost 
this results in a smaller critical loss. Relying on this approach therefore does not provide a 
reliable indicator to the expected level of buyer substitution.  
Considering this criticism, a common methodology often recommended in antitrust 
guidelines in the European Union and the United States is the hypothetical monopoly test 
(European Commission, 2002; U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
2010). Here, the relevant antitrust market is defined by assessing the effect of a small price 
increase on buyers’ substitution behaviour, accordingly a firm would not find it profitable to 
increase the price for its products if buyers move to the products from other suppliers or 
locations. In this case the relevant market is too small and a broader definition has to be 
selected (Baker, 2007). If the prices are constrained and cannot be increased profitably, 
further products representing close substitutes have to be included in the market until the firm 
under investigation can increase its prices without losing customers. The first step in regard 
to the hypothetical monopoly test is the definition of the narrowest product or geographic 
market, i.e. the smallest set of products which allows the hypothetical monopolist to raise 
prices. Following that, it is investigated whether the firm can increase the price to a profitable 
level.  
One measure for this is the small but significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test, 
which represents a price-based implementation of the hypothetical monopoly test (Church & 
Ware, 2000:p.602; Motta, 2009:p.102; Davis & Garcés, 2010:p.201). The SSNIP test, being 
mostly applied in antitrust analysis, has the underlying assumption that a price increase above 
the current level by the hypothetical monopolist, e.g. a five to ten per cent increase within a 
year, within the predefined market leads to either a substitution of demand by consumers to 
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other firms’ products or to increasing profits for the firm under consideration. If the firm is 
able to raise prices without incurring losses, this market then constitutes the antitrust market. 
However, this specific approach is not free of criticism either. Baker (2007) points out that 
difficulties exist in defining the starting point of the market definition exercise, i.e. which 
products and locations to include, that the rate of the price increase is only an “arbitrary 
benchmark” (p. 146), and it has to be considered that a market may not only consist of one 
set of products and locations. Another aspect that potentially constrains the reliability of this 
test is the assumption of current prices when investigating a price increase and resulting 
profitability for the firm (“cellophane fallacy”, Motta, 2009:p.105). If the firm is already a 
monopolist, current prices do not reflect the competitive level but already exceed this. A price 
increase might therefore not yield any additional profits for the firm, and the SSNIP test 
implies a market definition which is too large21.  
Other approaches investigating the potential pricing constraint a firm faces are the full 
equilibrium relevant market test (FERM), or the residual demand function approach, which 
has shortly been addressed in Chapter 2.2.1 (see Table 3). The FERM test addresses some of 
the criticism that has been raised in regard to the SSNIP test by also allowing firms which 
are outside the relevant market to respond to price increases by the hypothetical monopolist 
(Ivaldi & Lorinz, 2005). By this, the FERM test also includes supply side substitution in its 
assessment of the relevant market. Ibid. also highlight another difference between the SSNIP 
and the FERM tests, namely that the former compares “the observed industry equilibrium to 
a hypothetical out-of-equilibrium situation [whereas] the FERM test compares the same 
observed equilibrium to another, hypothetical equilibrium” (p. 3). Identifying the relevant 
market is essential for the next steps of assessing a firm’s level of market power. Using wrong 
or misleading assumptions in the market definition exercise may lead to biased results with 
respect to the consecutive steps.  
Having defined the relevant market, antitrust analysis focuses on determining the degree of 
a firm’s market power. In competition policy, as outlined in Chapter 2.2.1, the market 
                                                 
21 In the case of airports, for example, a high share of these is subject to economic regulation such as rate-of-
return or price-cap regulation. In this case, economic regulation has an influence on an airport’s price setting 
behaviour. The use of airport charges as an indicator to assess the level of competition can hence lead to biased 
results. 
2 Theoretical Foundations for the Assessment of Market Power 
39 
structure is analysed using market shares or indices to measure industry concentration. Since 
market shares are more easily obtainable than a firm’s cost function or the demand for certain 
products, these often provide a first good complementary step in the analysis of antitrust 
markets, as does the analysis of industry concentration. To assess the level of industry 
concentration, concentration ratios (e.g. four-firm or n-firm concentration indices), or the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) are applied and as outlined in the previous chapter, 
volume or value of sales provide appropriate measures to be applied here (Church & Ware, 
2000:p.429; Davis & Garcés, 2010:p.287; Motta, 2009:p.124; Carlton & Perloff, 2005:p.225; 
Tirole, 1989:p.221).  
Since the Herfindahl Hirschman Index will be used in the analyses in Chapters 1 and 1, the 
properties, application as well as implications of this indicator are discussed in more detail. 
First, it measures industry concentration by summing up all firms’ squared market shares and 
hence a single aggregated value is obtained:  
𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑠  (3) 
The market share of firm i (i = 1,…, N) is denoted by s, with 𝑠 𝑄 𝑄⁄  and 𝑄 representing 
output, and N is the number of firms in the considered market (Church & Ware, 2000:p.429). 
The HHI can take values between 0 and 1 with the latter representing the monopoly case. An 
increasing HHI value therefore is an indicator for increasing industry concentration. 
Furthermore, if the N firms in the market are of the same size, then HHI = 1/N. This shows 
that the HHI can depend both on the distribution of supply across firms in the market as well 
as the absolute number of firms in the market: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼
1
𝑁
𝑁𝜎  (4) 
with  𝜎  representing the variance of firm size in the market (Bikker & Haaf, 2002); the 
larger the variance the higher the HHI will be, e.g. implying that there might be a dominant 
firm in the market. Considering the number of firms in the market, thus correctly defining 
the relevant market, and firms’ size are therefore important criteria when assessing the HHI 
results.  
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Another important property of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is the direct link to the mark-
up of price over marginal cost, i.e. the Lerner index which “… measures the proportional 
deviation of price at the firm’s profit-maximising output from the firm’s marginal cost of that 
output” (Landes & Posner, 1981:p.239). The link between the Lerner index and the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index is established here by following Cowling & Waterson (1976) 
as well as Church & Ware (2000:p.36). For the derivation of the Lerner index, an 
oligopolistic Cournot market with N firms (i) is assumed (i = 1,…N) in which each firm 
maximises its profits depending on the output decisions of the rival firms. Profits of firm i 
(𝜋  are hence defined as revenue minus cost:  
π 𝑃 𝑄 𝑄 𝐶 𝑄  (5) 
With 𝑃 representing the price, 𝑄  is the output of the individual firm i and 𝐶 𝑄  its cost 
function. From the first order condition of the revenue function, the marginal revenue (MR) 
is derived, yielding:  
𝑀𝑅 𝑄 𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑄
𝑄  (6) 
The profit-maximising output is determined by setting marginal revenues equal to marginal 
cost 
𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑄
𝑄 𝑀𝐶 𝑄  (7) 
By following Church & Ware (2000:p.238) (7) is rewritten as  
𝑃 𝑄 𝑀𝐶 𝑄
𝑑𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑄
𝑄  (8) 
Subsequently, both sides of (8) are divided by the market price P, i.e. the Cournot equilibrium 
price, and the bottom and top terms on the right hand side are each multiplied with industry 
output Q.  
𝑃 𝑄 𝑀𝐶 𝑄
𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑃 𝑄
𝑑𝑄
𝑄
𝑃
𝑄
𝑄
 (9) 
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Rearranging (9) and substituting the price elasticity of demand, defined as 𝜀
%∆
%∆
, yields: 
𝐿
𝑃 𝑄 𝑀𝐶 𝑄
𝑃 𝑄
1
𝜀
𝑄
𝑄
 (10) 
in which 𝑄 𝑄⁄ is the market share 𝑠  of firm i in the market. Now multiplying both sides by 
𝑠  and summing over all firms in the market yields 
𝑠
𝑃 𝑀𝐶 𝑄
𝑃
𝑠
𝜀
 (11) 
This equation shows that the Lerner index is directly linked to the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index in a market (see (3)) and that the price elasticity of demand 𝜀 is inversely related to the 
mark-up of price over marginal cost (see also Cowling & Waterson (1976)). Equation (11) 
shows that a higher HHI, holding the price elasticity of demand constant, leads to a higher 
Lerner index. Hence, in the Cournot model depicting the interaction between firms in the 
market the HHI as well as the price elasticity of demand may give an insight into the conduct 
of a specific market (Church & Ware, 2000:p.240).   
Several studies point to potential inconsistencies in the calculation of this index and propose 
different amendments how these can be properly addressed. Hannan (1997), for example, 
analyses whether the inequality in market shares and the number of competitors in the market 
is adequately reflected. Decomposing the HHI as in (4) and applying it to bank pricing 
behaviour, the results imply that the number of firms in the market should obtain a higher 
weight. Furthermore, if products with different characteristics are included in the definition 
of the relevant market, this may lead to biased results of the assessment of market 
concentration since these products are not perfect substitutes. Lijesen (2004) accounts for 
this potential bias by introducing a weight for product quality to the traditional Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index and thus accounting for close substitutes. In the approach, ibid. analyses a 
market with two firms subject to Cournot competition and exogenously differentiated 
products. For this purpose, a utility function is defined which includes a parameter accounting 
for the quality of products. It is assumed that the utility consumers derive from a product 
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increases with a product’s quality, and that consumers are less price sensitive with regard to 
products of higher quality. An important assumption here is that industry output is constant, 
and thus “…industry profits in markets with close substitutes depend on the sum of squared 
market shares” (Lijesen, 2004:p.127). Adjusting the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for product 
quality therefore results in the squared market shares of each firm being multiplied by a 
weight for quality. Higher quality products are multiplied by a higher weight. In the empirical 
analysis testing the effects of the introduction of a quality indicator, ibid. applies the weighted 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index to the airline industry. Considering different city pairs offered 
by airlines the relative travel time on each serves as an indicator for quality, i.e. the relative 
time is “[…] the ratio of travel time to the shortest travel time on the [origin-destination]-pair 
considered” (p. 131). In order to compare the weighted and unweighted results, ibid. assumes 
that the number of flights per city pair is constant. However, since airlines are likely to adjust 
their supply over time and thus change the level of output, this particular assumption may 
not apply in the medium-run to long-run. The empirical analysis of eight European airlines 
suggests that accounting for the difference in quality provides more accurate results and 
therefore a weighting should be introduced.  
The analysis of market concentration, and the respective application of the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index to measure this, requires the definition of the relevant market as a crucial 
first step. As outlined, methodologies applied in this field may be prone to measurement error 
and therefore lead to biased results. These potential biases have to be kept in mind when 
calculating the degree of market concentration in an industry to infer to the degree of market 
power in this. First, showing that there is a formal link between the Lerner index as a measure 
of market power and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index has been providing the rationale for 
the application of this index in competition policy. However, different studies have pointed 
out potential inconsistencies which require an adjustment of this concentration measure by 
e.g. a weighting indicator in order for results to be more reliable. Furthermore, the assumption 
of specific thresholds with which to define market power is often critical. Therefore, 
observing changes in the degree of industry concentration might provide a more useful tool 
in assessing the degree of a firm’s market power. 
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Summarising, Chapter 2 started with the discussion on natural monopolies and potential entry 
barriers, emphasising the different lines of arguments that developed historically in this 
context, before outlining a range of approaches used to determine the existence and degree 
of market power in an industry. These discussions provide the theoretical foundations to 
assess the prevalence and level of market power in the airport industry, especially (1) to 
analyse airport market structure in terms of exhibiting characteristics of a (natural) monopoly, 
(2) to understand the specifics of the vertical relationship between airports and airlines, and 
(3) to discuss those factors that constrain potential market power, which is the focus of the 
following Chapter 3.    
 

 Market Structure of the Airport 
Industry 
Airports are often assumed to exhibit characteristics of a natural monopoly, due to the 
inherent sunk cost associated with their required infrastructure, which cannot be used for 
alternative purposes in the long-term, and thus represents costs that the operator cannot 
recoup (Reinhold et al., 2010; Müller-Rostin et al., 2010; Pels, Nijkamp & Rietveld, 2003b; 
Lechmann & Niemeier, 2013; Lewisch, 2010; Smyth & Pearce, 2007). This also stems from 
the indivisibilities of airport infrastructure investment such as runways whose capacity 
cannot be increased marginally (Bruinsma, Rietveld & Brons, 2000).  
The existence of a natural monopoly infers that only one firm can produce market output in 
a cost efficient way (see Chapter 2.1.1). Therefore, there has been ongoing controversial 
debate whether several airports are sustainable within a particular region, or whether only 
one airport can produce the required output in an efficient way. Regarding the existence of 
economies of scale in the airport sector, empirical studies have shown that existing airports 
are even operating under diseconomies of scale, suggesting that the former are not the source 
of airport market power (Pels, Nijkamp & Rietveld, 2003b; Müller-Rostin et al., 2010). Pels, 
Nijkamp & Rietveld (2003b) consider both air passenger movements and air transport 
movements as airport output, when assessing airport efficiency in Europe. The findings show 
that the average European airport in their dataset operates under constant returns to scale in 
regard to movements, and under increasing returns to scale in terms of passenger output. 
Contrary to this, Martín & Voltes-Dorta (2011) show that the minimum efficient scale of an 
airport goes beyond 116 million passengers, based on the analysis of 161 airports worldwide, 
thus stating that increasing returns to scale are currently not exhausted. Lechmann & 
Niemeier (2013) confirm these contrary findings in their review of several studies 
investigating the minimum efficient scale at airports, with this ranging from three million to 
more than 100 million passengers. However, as discussed in Chapter 2.1.2, economies of 
scale itself may not pose a barrier to entry for new competitors. For example, assuming a 
setting with two airports in a region, with the first one offering flights and the second one 
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being an old military base not used for commercial traffic. Since the infrastructure is already 
available at the second airport, airlines can start operations here and provide a potential 
substitute for the first airport. By pricing below the airlines at the first airport, airlines at the 
second airport can redirect some demand to their services.  
In terms of economies of scope, Lechmann & Niemeier (2013) highlight that there are only 
few studies in regard to economies of scope in the airport sector. These are assumed to exist 
between the aviation and non-aviation business at an airport, such as the provision of 
terminals for passenger processing, and the establishment of retail services. Furthermore, 
economies of scope may exist between the different traffic segments such as domestic and 
international, or origin-destination and transfer traffic (Martín & Voltes-Dorta, 2011). The 
facilities and infrastructure required for passenger processing may differ slightly, such as the 
degree of border controls, but some of these can be used for all passenger segments. 
Bracaglia, D’Alfonso & Nastasi (2014) discuss the impact on competition in case airports 
are multiproduct companies, particularly in regard to the combined sale of tickets and non-
aviation services such as parking. If competing airports both engage in the complementary 
sale of these products, a negative effect on aviation charges can be observed.  
Airport market power may also stem from a geographic monopoly, i.e. building a new airport 
in a nearby geographical location is often constrained by land scarcity or political restrictions 
(Forsyth, 2010; Niemeier, 2009; Productivity Commission, 2011). This circumstance, in 
combination with the high sunk investment required to set up new airport facilities, therefore 
often prohibits the construction of new airports in the vicinity of existing ones. Furthermore, 
the vertical relationship between the airport operator and its airlines may provide a barrier to 
entry (or exit) since large scale airline investment at the node, as in the case of hub-and-spoke 
operations, prevents these carriers from easily switching to or duplicating their operations at 
other airports.  
As highlighted, these different sources of airport market power are controversially discussed 
in both academia and industry. One view supports the argument that nowadays airports are 
facing increasing constraints for market power, thus rendering economic regulation obsolete. 
Contrasting that is the opinion that airports still possess a significant degree of market power, 
which would result in abusive price setting behaviour in regard to airport charges, for 
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example. Since the focus of this thesis is on the analysis of European hub airports and the 
competitive constraints these face, emphasis is first placed on discussing the specific 
characteristics inherent to these airports, especially in regard to the interaction with their 
dominant airline, the network carrier. Chapter 3.1 hence dicusses the vertical relationship 
between an airport and an airline, with a focus on the benefits and drawbacks of network 
carriers operating a node at hub airports. Focusing on the question who actually engages in 
competition, the airport or the airline, factors affecting the choice for an airport by these two 
stakeholder groups are outlined. Taking up this discussion, Chapter 3.2 highlights current 
approaches to the assessment of market power in the airport industry, and, based on this, 
discusses the approach and research questions within this thesis as well as its contribution to 
the current research landscape22.  
 Airport market structure  
The relationship between hub airports and network carriers has distinct characteristics which 
are discussed within in this chapter in order to get an understanding of the factors potentially 
influencing an airport’s competitive position. Chapter 3.1.1 therefore starts out with a 
discussion of the specifics of the vertical relationship between an airport and its airline(s). 
The interlinkage between these two can be even stronger, if the airline operates a hub-and-
spoke network via the airport, its node. Relating aspects are discussed in Chapter 3.1.2. The 
discussion on airport competition often evolves around who is actually competing, the airport 
or the airlines. Chapter 3.1.3 thus focuses on factors that drive passengers’ or airlines’ choice 
for a particular airport. The discussion in this chapter builds the basis to discuss the approach 
taken in this thesis in assessing the degree of competition faced by European hub airports.  
3.1.1 Vertical relationship between airports and airlines  
There is a strong dependency between network carriers and their respective hub airports, both 
due to the large share in movements this particular carrier has at its node, and the sunk 
investment of the carriers at the airport. Network carriers’ switching potential to other 
                                                 
22 Part of this chapter has been published in: Paul, A. (2015) Theoretical Foundations Relevant for the Analysis 
of Hub Airport Competition, in: Zeitschrift für Verkehrswissenschaft, 86. Jahrgang, 2015, Heft 1, pp. 47-64. 
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airports is hence limited due to financial and organisational investment made in the hub 
airport. However, it is not only the network carrier being dependent on the continuation of 
operations at the same node but also the hub airport relying on the network airline and its 
share of movements in the overall airport traffic, thus creating strong mutual lock-in effects 
between these two parties (Polk & Bilotkach, 2013). Elliot (2016) argues that airline 
countervailing power exists if the airline has a large stake in an airport’s overall traffic, and 
can thus engage in negotiations regarding service levels and charges. An airline with only a 
small share in traffic may not exert this kind of buyer power, since the loss in traffic due to 
this airline switching operations can potentially be compensated by an increase in other 
airlines’ traffic. This chapter therefore focuses on the specifics of and the different forms the 
relationship between airports and airlines can take. 
Table 4 gives an overview of the diverse types of relationship an airport and an airline might 
engage in, with a discussion of each form provided afterwards.  
Table 4: Different forms of vertical relationship between airports and airlines 
Form of relationship Explanation 
Signatory status Airline and airport engage in contractual agreement, according 
to which airlines guarantee the provision of flight services, and 
in return gain some influence in terms of airport planning and 
operations. 
Long-term use contracts Airlines and airports engage in contractual agreement, in which 
airports lease out facilities to airlines over long-period, e.g. ten 
years or more. Airlines can sublease these facilities to other 
carriers.  
Airline ownership of airport 
facilities 
Airline holds shares or owns facilities directly, mutual planning 
of investment and operations as well as profit sharing between 
airport and airline.  
Concession revenue sharing Often related to the signatory status of an airline, long-term 
contracts or airline ownership. For example, airlines receive a 
share of revenues if these exceed a certain threshold, thus 
incentivising them to increase passenger throughput at an 
airport. 
Source: adapted from Fu, Homsombat & Oum (2011) 
First, airlines may obtain a so called signatory status, as outlined by Oum & Fu (2008). The 
airline commits to using the airport to a certain degree and to provide part of the financing of 
operations. In return, it obtains a share of control over certain areas at the airport such as 
relevant infrastructure projects, slot allocation, or facility usage. Long-term usage contracts 
3 Market Structure of the Airport Industry 
49 
depict another option which can often be found between airports and their respective low 
cost carriers. Furthermore, in some cases airlines acquire direct control over certain airport 
facilities or services by investing financially and earning respective revenues from airport 
functions. Resulting from this type of cooperation, both the airline and the airport derive 
benefits such as risk sharing, ensuring investments and generating (additional) revenues. The 
positive demand externalities of the airline-airport relationship are hence intended to be 
internalised (ibid.). 
Fu & Zhang (2010) examine the effects on consumer surplus as well as social welfare, if the 
airport and one or multiple airlines engage in concession revenue sharing. The model 
considers three different airline market structures, namely a monopoly airline as well as a 
symmetric and an asymmetric airline oligopoly. The airport is non-congested and acts as an 
input monopoly. Within this setting, the airport operator offers the involved airlines to 
participate in the sharing of concession revenues, which the airlines can accept or reject (stage 
one of the game). In the second step, airlines engage in Cournot competition, resulting in the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The findings of the model show that there may be an 
increase in social welfare due to the internalisation of demand complementarities on the 
concession revenue side and the elimination of double marginalisation. In the monopoly case, 
both airline and airport profits increase as do consumer surplus and social welfare. If the 
airport engages in revenue sharing with symmetric airlines in an oligopoly, the airport's profit 
as well as social welfare increases. On the contrary, if the airport has an exclusive deal with 
only one airline, the latter increases its output at the expense of its competitors (ibid.). The 
analysis also reveals that the airport operator has an incentive to exert influence on the 
downstream airline market, i.e. it can thus attain additional surplus apart from aviation 
service charges in the form of fixed payments by the airline. An asymmetric airline duopoly 
sets incentives for the dominant carrier and the airport to commit to revenue sharing. In this 
particular case, the position of the dominant airline is further strengthened, which has 
negative effects on competition. Overall, positive effects of revenue sharing include an 
increase in consumer surplus and social welfare, whereas on the negative side increased 
airline market power and an airport's incentive to raise aeronautical charges have to be noted.  
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A development which can be observed at some airports is a closer cooperation between the 
hub airport and the network carrier regarding the provision of aviation and non-aviation 
services, i.e. some form of vertical cooperation. The agreement of long-term contracts, or 
even shared ownership between an airport and an airline often ensure exclusive usage of 
facilities for the respective airline, granting it with the possibility to design its designated 
terminal for the airline’s specific purposes, and also create a value of brand recognition (Fu, 
Homsombat & Oum, 2011).  
A prominent example of a joint venture between a hub airport and a network carrier is the 
partnership between Munich Airport and Lufthansa regarding terminal infrastructure 
development and terminal operations, thus representing the case in which an airline owns 
airport facilities. Within this joint venture, both companies have a stake in the financing, 
construction and operation of Terminal 2, Lufthansa 40 per cent and Munich Airport 60 per 
cent. The intention behind this kind of partnership was the alignment of the terminal layout, 
the various facilities and services with the requirements of a transfer terminal. Achieving a 
minimum connecting time of 30 minutes for transfer passengers and hence providing a 
hassle-free and seamless travel for these by ensuring short waiting and processing times 
within the terminal was one of the main goals (Munich Airport, 2004). Another example of 
mutual ownership of airport facilities is the carrier JetBlue and New York John F. Kennedy 
(JFK) Airport. The airline invested 80 million U.S. dollars in the construction of a new 
terminal and agreed to a 30-year lease of this terminal (The Port Authority of New York & 
New Jersey, 2005).  
Apart from the positive effects of such a cooperation, the market power of airlines can 
increase in this case and it may be subject to more favourable pricing conditions at the airport 
than other airlines (Fu & Zhang, 2010; Barbot, 2009; Barbot, 2001). As will be outlined in 
Chapter 3.1.2, airlines dominating at an airport, in terms of their share in movements or seats 
being offered, are prone to charging a hub premium. Due to this high share of operations at 
an airport, and the potential investment as well as commitment made, though, a carrier cannot 
easily relocate operations to a different airport in the proximity. Especially hub airports and 
their respective network carrier foster the cooperation in order to strengthen their competitive 
position towards other airports and airlines.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2.1.2, different forms of cooperation, or vertical integration, between 
upstream and downstream firms, in this case the airport and the airline, may lead to vertical 
foreclosure, and have negative effects on the competition on a specific market. Potential areas 
affected in the case of vertical integration between airports and airlines may be ticket prices, 
or service quality offered. Basso (2007) and Basso & Zhang (2007) develop a model 
illustrating the vertical structure and competition of congestible facilities and the resulting 
effects on prices and capacities, with an application to the airport sector. Within Basso (2007) 
it is assumed that airports are input providers whose demand is a function of airport charges, 
capacities, and airline market structure. To determine optimal prices and capacity decisions 
it is therefore not only necessary to have information on the airport's cost and demand 
function but also on the respective airline market. Considering different airport objective 
functions, i.e. welfare and profit maximisation, shows that prices are higher and traffic levels 
are lower in a profit-maximising setting. Other cases considered in this paper are the joint 
profit maximisation of an airport and an airline as well as the case of two independent profit-
maximising airports. The first case may help to avoid so called vertical double 
marginalisation, whereas the second one addresses horizontal double marginalisation, which 
occurs when airports' outputs are considered as complements. 
Basso & Zhang (2007) also employ a model which incorporates two rival congestible 
facilities (airports in a multi-airport region) which are input providers for the downstream 
market (airline operators) and hence the final consumers (passengers). The competing 
airports choose prices and capacities for the input they provide for the downstream market. 
Subsequently, the airports' respective carriers compete and the final consumers select one of 
the facilities. The results from competition in terms of welfare are compared with the single 
airport case. The facilities' decisions and the resulting service levels for users depend on the 
nature of the game. In a closed loop game (decisions on prices and capacities are made 
sequentially), as also in De Borger & Van Dender (2006), the duopolists offer a lower service 
quality than the monopolist. In a situation where capacity and pricing decisions are made at 
the same time, the service level under a duopolist regime is the same as in a monopolist 
setting (Basso & Zhang, 2007). 
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Barbot (2009) analyses the incentives for vertical collusion between an airline and an airport 
by considering a three-stage game. The airlines engage in Bertrand competition in a spatial 
setting, which leads to the airport's derived demand function. According to that, the airports 
set the level of aeronautical fares, and in turn both parties decide whether they engage in 
collusion. If there are market and quality asymmetries, the applied model shows that there 
will not be any collusion. However, in the case of market asymmetry and airline vertical 
differentiation, the conditions are suitable for collusion between the airport and the airline. 
Integration of a parameter accounting for the airport's concession revenue does not yield any 
significant changes to the findings. Barbot (2009) therefore concludes that this aspect does 
not make a difference with respect to the collusion decision.  
Barbot (2011) investigates the effects of various types of possible vertical relations. Within 
the analysis, different types of vertical integration between an airport and an airline are 
modelled, assuming that there is a monopolist on the upstream market and imperfect 
competition on the downstream market. The three types of arrangements include joint profit 
maximisation, airline's operative participation in the upstream market (e.g. terminal 
provision), and price discrimination in favour of the dominant airline. In the first two cases 
the author finds anti-competitive behaviour with regard to the downstream market whereas 
price discrimination does not lead to market foreclosure. If the airport and airline jointly 
maximise profits or if there is price discrimination, consumer surplus as well as welfare will 
increase due to the prevention of double marginalisation. The underlying assumption for this 
is linearity of demand in the downstream market. In case the dominant airline engages in the 
upstream market, ibid. finds that there will be a decrease in both consumer surplus and 
welfare which can only be avoided if this interaction leads to an increase in efficiency of the 
operated facilities. The same findings result if Cournot competition in the downstream market 
is assumed.  
D’Alfonso & Nastasi (2012) take up the three arrangements discussed in Barbot (2011) and 
add competition in both the upstream and downstream market. The authors analyse the 
incentives for airlines and airports, and the incentives for social welfare, consumer surplus 
as well as pro-competitiveness. Assumptions of the model are that airports do not compete 
for airlines but for passengers via airlines. In terms of airline market structure in the model, 
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D’Alfonso & Nastasi (2012) assume that there is a leader at each facility which engages in 
Stackelberg competition with its followers. Among themselves, both the leaders and the 
followers engage in Cournot competition. Further assumptions include a spatial competition 
model of an infinite linear city with each airport having spare capacity available and no 
congestion. The findings suggest that vertical collusion and an airline's participation in the 
upstream market are anti-competitive. However, the incentives for the players to engage in 
price discrimination are rather small compared to the incentives for collusion. This finding 
is slightly different to Barbot (2009) since D’Alfonso & Nastasi (2012) assume that the 
market is not fully covered. They outline that regulatory considerations may address the 
arising trade-off between airline competitiveness and welfare as well as the fact how 
incentives have to be designed for the implementation of agreements that maximise social 
welfare. 
This discussion shows that the effects of vertical cooperation or integration between airports 
and airlines are not clear-cut, and strongly depend on the degree of dominance of the airline 
at the airport, in terms of market share, and the type of vertical interaction these players 
engage in. This interaction may hence even lead to an increase in the market power of airlines 
and also airports (Fu & Zhang, 2010). Since especially network carriers and their respective 
hub airports are in a co-dependent relationship, with the airlines organising their network in 
a hub-and-spoke structure, and often engaging in contractual agreements with the hub airport 
in question, the advantages as well as drawbacks of this relationship are discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter. Emphasis will be placed on this particular network structure 
and the resulting benefits and drawbacks for airlines as well as passengers.  
3.1.2 Specifics of airline hub-and-spoke networks 
Airlines derive benefits by structuring their operations in a hub-and-spoke (HS) network as 
opposed to a fully connected or point-to-point network. Carriers operating this type of 
network have the potential to realise economies of scale and scope. Since traffic from 
multiple spokes is bundled in the node, airlines are able to obtain higher load factors on their 
aircraft (Kahn, 1993; Dennis, 1994). Instead of operating a high amount of point-to-point 
connections as is the case in a fully connected network, traffic concentrates on a small 
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number of spokes and in the node (Hansen & Kanafani, 1989). As a result, average costs per 
flight are declining (Huston & Butler, 1993). Another positive effect of traffic bundling is 
the possibility to employ larger aircraft on certain routes (Hansen & Kanafani, 1989; Kahn, 
1993; Dennis, 1994). In addition to this, Caves, Christensen & Tretheway (1984) examine 
the concept of economies of density with regard to specific U.S. airline markets where trunk 
and local carriers operate. The authors find that the level of traffic density within a given 
network accounts for differences in airlines' cost. Economies of scale and density differ since 
the former consider an extension of the network whereas economies of density depict unit 
costs within a given network. Furthermore, Brueckner & Spiller (1991) assume that airlines 
are multi-product firms with cost complementarities which enable them to obtain economies 
of scope with HS network operations. This is achieved by being able to offer different 
products, i.e. types of flights, from a single node (Huston & Butler, 1993). Within the HS 
network the addition of a new destination increases the number of available city-pairs by a 
multiple factor. 
Other benefits gained from HS network operations are an airline's competitive advantage due 
to being able to offer high service frequencies, lower ticket prices at high quality and multiple 
destinations for airline passengers (Dennis, 1994). However, this view is opposed by 
analytical findings that the fares for O&D (origin and destination) passengers in a HS 
network are higher than those in a fully connected network (Brueckner & Zhang, 2001). The 
findings suggest that this is due to the fact that the high flight frequency offered by airlines 
in a HS network induces departure times being closer to passengers' preferred times and 
hence airlines are able to levy higher prices. Dennis (1994) also suggests that network carriers 
benefit from their position in a HS network by gaining more control over available capacities 
and prices. These carriers can use internal cross-subsidies to maintain non-profitable routes 
in order to attract more passengers.  
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Table 5: Hub-and-spoke versus point-to-point networks 
Network  Passengers Airlines 
Hub-and-
spoke 
+ Increasing number of available city 
pairs 
+ High service frequencies 
 Potentially longer travel times 
 Potentially higher fares 
+ Economies of scale, scope and 
density 
+ Spatial and temporal concentration 
of flights 
+ Traffic bundling, higher load factors 
+ Employment of larger aircraft 
 Potential of negative network 
effects 
Point-to-
point 
+ Shorter travel times 
 Low level of interconnected flights 
+ Focus on high volume routes 
+ Incentives for new entrants 
 Unprofitable flights if insufficient 
demand 
Source: own depiction 
Brueckner & Spiller (1991) and Zhang (1996) investigate the so called negative network 
effect (negative externalities) apparent in HS networks. Basically, competition on a particular 
route may have positive effects within this city pair but may cause negative effects on other 
routes within the hub-and-spoke network. Brueckner & Spiller (1991) state that the entry of 
competitors on a previously monopolistic market results in lower fares for passengers. 
However, some passengers now switch to the competitor on the affected spokes which leads 
to reduced traffic volume for the incumbent. Due to economies of density, the incumbent's 
passengers therefore face higher marginal cost, i.e. higher fares, on these routes which might 
be offset by the lower fares in the competitive market. The positive effects such as fare 
reduction do not occur in monopolistic markets within the hub-and-spoke network. These 
markets do, however, experience the negative effects on the spokes induced by competition 
in a different market. Zhang (1996) elaborates further that this particular effect occurs when 
increasing returns to traffic density are strong and that a carrier has to balance its profits, i.e. 
assess the profits gained from entering a market versus the losses incurred in the network 
market. 
Finding the optimal hub-and-spoke network from an airline point of view is the research 
focus by Adler & Berechman (2001). The authors' approach includes the generation of a 
network and consecutively connecting the different hubs via either minimisation of distance 
or of total legs travelled. For the model development it is assumed that the relevant network 
configuration for an airline is determined by the profit maximising objective. Mathematical 
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programming is applied in order to determine the optimal hub-and-spoke network. This 
model is in turn applied to data of the Western European air transport system. In their 
findings, the authors show that the preferable network for an airline consists of an 
international hub and an intra-European, secondary hub. Furthermore, they highlight that the 
airports in question are impacted by the airlines' decisions in regard to their pricing policies 
or strategic capacity planning. Adler (2005) extends this analysis by considering competition 
between hub-and-spoke networks and how this influences an airline's optimal network 
choice. A multinomial logit model is applied to determine airlines' market shares, an 
operations research based program is used to solve the airlines' objective function of profit 
maximisation, and a game theoretic approach enables to depict the competitive situation with 
multiple airlines. These choose their network first and consecutively maximise profits given 
the other airlines' decisions. In the application of this model to the Western European aviation 
market, the author finds that a single, monopolistic subgame perfect equilibrium exists with 
British Airways as the monopolist running a hub-and-spoke network with London Heathrow 
(LHR) and Zurich Airport (ZRH) as their primary and secondary hubs. Conducting a so 
called doubled-demand sensitivity analysis shows that there is sufficient demand to support 
two profitable airline networks within Western Europe.  
Flores-Fillol (2009) investigates the airline network structure under competition in an 
unregulated environment. Welfare implications are assessed by analysing different scenarios 
in an equilibrium analysis. The author applies a duopoly model of schedule competition and 
looks at fully connected (FC) and hub-and-spoke (HS) networks and which conditions have 
to be fulfilled in order for symmetric or asymmetric equilibria to arise. The findings reveal 
that in the presence of low transport cost airlines opt for a HS network structure and with 
high transport cost for a FC network. HS networks are characterised by different effects 
which entail opposing impacts. First, the demand effect occurs, which means that in a HS 
network higher flight frequencies than in a FC network are offered, Second, the cost-saving 
effect results from economies of density. And third, the cost-per-passenger effect, which 
means that passenger costs have to be paid twice by the airline since the airline connect flights 
via its hub airport, and therefore has to be the associated costs for each flight. Providing a 
direct flights lets the airline only incur these passenger costs once. Therefore, in case these 
costs are very high, the airline will incur high costs which can eventually not be offset by the 
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former two effects, and it will hence aim for a FC network. Furthermore, the author states 
that asymmetries may arise, i.e. there might be airlines establishing FC networks and others 
relying on HS networks, without previously having introduced asymmetry in the model.  
The benefits from an airline operating a hub-and-spoke at an airport may induce passengers 
to opt for this particular airport, due to higher frequencies available and more destinations to 
choose from. More insight into this behaviour is given in the following chapter, by outlining 
factors that influence both passengers’ and airlines’ choice of an airport.  
3.1.3 Airline and passenger choice factors 
Airlines and passengers determine an airport's attractiveness by various factors. Hess & Polak 
(2005) outline three different studies concerned with passengers' airport choice factors. The 
studies use either revealed or stated preference data and show that originating passengers 
favour short journey times to their airport of departure. Morrell (2010) states that passengers 
place high importance on the frequency of transport services as well as the associated cost, 
as do Matsumoto, Burghouwt & Veldhuis (2009). However, airport choice factors have to be 
distinguished by passenger type. A long-haul passenger may accept a much higher access 
time to the airport than a passenger traveling to a short-haul destination.  
One way to determine the relevance of different factors is to employ a passenger utility 
function which includes multiple variables. Harvey (1987) differentiates by business and 
leisure passengers in the San Francisco Bay Area. Here, the former place high negative utility 
on airports with no direct flight connections, which is not even offset by superior airport 
access time. Ibid. also states that passengers also do not derive additional benefits from more 
than nine flights per day to a specific destination. Matsumoto, Burghouwt & Veldhuis (2009) 
cite decision making factors such as comfort aspects or airline loyalty. Malina (2010) and 
Strobach (2010) also highlight a range of variables which cause passengers to favour a 
particular airport: the quality of airport access, ticket price, flight availability and frequency, 
or type of aircraft and aircraft size available. A study by Jung & Yoo (2014) investigates 
passenger choice for air or high-speed rail travel on the short-haul route between Seoul and 
Gimpo-Busan. The results of the multinomial and nested logit models indicate that ticket 
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price, access as well as overall journey time significantly affect passenger choice and that 
business passengers are more sensitive to access time changes than leisure travellers.  
Pels, Nijkamp & Rietveld (2001) and Pels, Nijkamp & Rietveld (2003a) conduct case studies 
of airport choice in the San Francisco Bay area with particular regard to passenger 
preferences. The authors apply (nested) logit models to test for the significance of various 
passenger decision-making variables. They find that access time to the airport is very 
important in defining an airport's attractiveness. Suzuki (2007) extends the above model by 
a two-step approach in assuming that passengers make their airport and airline choice jointly 
and then consider a choice set instead of all available alternatives. The airport choice depends 
on the proximity to a passenger’s home and whether the airport has been used before. The 
airline choice is determined by the level of ticket prices, the frequency of services offered as 
well as loyalty programs such as frequent flyer programs. Also placing a focus on the 
metropolitan airport region of San Francisco are Ishii, Jun & Van Dender (2009). However, 
this study specifically focuses on the San Francisco Los Angeles route and finds that both 
leisure and business passengers’ choice is affected by available flight frequency, and that 
business passengers place high importance on punctuality. In addition, the results suggest 
that the hub premium a network carrier earns at its node airport also results from this carrier 
offering more frequencies within the region than competing airlines. An overview of different 
passenger and airline choice factors is given in Table 6.    
Table 6: Passenger and airline decision making factors 
Passengers Airlines 
Duration and quality of airport access Customer preferences 
Frequency of transport services Size of relevant market 
Ticket price Nature of local economy 
Flight availability Geographical location 
Comfort aspects Airport infrastructure and facilities 
Airline loyalty Available capacity 
Type of aircraft and aircraft size Airport charging structure 
Source: own depiction 
Airlines strongly consider customer preferences when making the decision at which airport 
to locate their operations (Starkie, 2010). In addition to this, Huston & Butler (1991) highlight 
the size of the relevant market, the nature of the local economy defined by established 
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industries and business centres, as well as demographic aspects such as population prone to 
travel, or income of relevant groups. The geographical location also plays an important role 
in terms of proximity to the markets served by the airline (Martin & Roman, 2004). Since 
network carriers intend to derive the benefits from hub-and-spoke operations, coordination 
of schedules is a crucial factor. In order to realise this in an efficient way, runway and 
terminal structures have to be designed accordingly and offer sufficient capacities (Dennis, 
1994). Congestion and delays may cause airline services to be less attractive and hence less 
competitive. Available spare capacity and the possibility to expand existing infrastructure 
may therefore exhibit a competitive advantage for an airport (Starkie, 2010). 
Summarising Chapter 3.1, the discussion on the types of vertical relationships between 
airports and airlines, the resulting effects for market power as well as the inherent specifics 
of network carriers and their operation of hub-and-spoke networks, gives an insight into the 
relationship between hub airports and network carriers. This is characterised by a strong 
interdependency, driven by the often apparent dominance of the network carrier at the hub 
airport, which results in a potentially strengthening of these players’ market power. The 
network carrier is able to earn a significant hub premium, for example, and, due to contractual 
long-term agreements with the airport and mutual investment, has the ability to restrict other 
carriers’ access to essential facilities at the airport, thus possibly imposing barriers to entry 
for other carriers (D’Alfonso & Nastasi, 2012). But this relationship between network carrier 
and hub airport may also bear benefits for passengers in terms of higher travel frequencies, 
and more travel destinations available. Furthermore, since network carriers benefit from 
offering transfer connections, this leads to competition with other airports also offering these 
connections. In order to persist in this competitive market, network carriers and hub airports 
may decide to engage in a closer relationship with each other to strengthen their overall 
position.  
Concerning the question, who is actually competing for which customers in this market, the 
discussion outlined several decision making factors important for airlines and passengers 
when selecting a particular airport. Suzuki (2007) assumes that passengers make their 
decision regarding airport and airline choice jointly, especially when it comes to the local 
catchment of an airport, i.e. the origin and destination (O&D) traffic. The Productivity 
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Commission (2011) states that “… airports do not supply services directly to passengers; 
rather, they supply services to airlines” (p.71). Compared to this, D’Alfonso & Nastasi (2012) 
assume in their model of vertical interaction between airports and airlines that the latter are 
locked in with a particular airport, and therefore “…airports do not compete for the airlines 
but compete through airlines to get passengers” (p.995).  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is on the investigation of market power 
of European hub airports, both in the local catchment and on the transfer market. Regarding 
the local market, it is presumed that the availability of close substitutes within the catchment 
imposes constraints on airport market power (Productivity Commission, 2011). In this case, 
substitutes represent other airline-airport choices apart from the hub airport and its respective 
airlines. It can therefore be assumed that airports also compete for passengers in their local 
catchment. In terms of the transfer market at European hub airports, the close linkage 
between the hub airports and their respective network carrier leads to the inference that 
competition between network carriers for passengers on transfer connections also implies 
competition the hub airport is exposed to. Concerning these particular markets which may be 
subject to competition, the following chapter outlines various approaches how competition 
in the airport industry is measured, and discusses the added value of the analysis within this 
thesis to the field of airport competition. 
 Market power assessment in the (European) airport 
industry 
Coming back to the discussion in Chapter 2.2, there are different approaches regarding the 
assessment of market power in the airport industry. With a particular focus on the local 
catchment and the transfer market, these will be highlighted in Chapter 3.2.1. Following that, 
the specific research questions addressed within this thesis are placed into the context of 
current analyses in the field of airport competition (Chapter 3.2.2), both in regard to the added 
value as well contribution to the field of airport competition. 
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3.2.1 Current assessment of market power in the airport industry 
Airports may compete for traffic shares, certain passenger groups or traffic types (Morrell, 
2010; Tretheway & Kincaid, 2010). Airports within the same urban region or those with 
overlapping catchment areas compete for origin-destination (O&D) traffic. Within these 
regional markets passengers may be indifferent regarding airport choice. Thelle et al. (2012) 
highlight the increased amount of airports now available for passengers within certain 
regions. Furthermore, airports may specialise in attracting particular airline business models 
or passenger groups such as low cost carriers or business passengers (Tretheway & Kincaid, 
2010). Hub airports, for example, may compete for transfer traffic (Morrell, 2010). There is 
also competition for services within an airport, e.g. between terminals or between airport 
retail and high street retail shops (ibid.). Picking up this discussion, Table 7 highlights the 
different forms of competition airports may engage in, the different approaches taken to 
measure these, and selected studies investigating these aspects. 
Airport market power can be limited by the power airlines exert in terms of potentially 
switching operations to other airports that offer better conditions. The degree of this 
countervailing power depends on the airline's traffic share and position at the airport (Button, 
2010). Starkie (2012) and Thelle et al. (2012) argue that nowadays there are more airlines 
which can potentially switch operations in case terms and conditions at the respective airport 
do not match their expectations. Starkie (2012) discusses airlines’ increased buyer power 
which results from the establishment of the European single aviation market and other 
developments such as the pervasion of the internet. Airlines operating a point-to-point 
network such as low-cost carriers (LCC) can relocate their relatively mobile aircraft assets 
across European airports and reduce lock-in effects with airports accordingly (Starkie, 2002; 
Button, 2010; Thelle et al., 2012). Carriers operating hub-and-spoke networks, however, 
cannot switch their operations easily due to the inherent network structure and the associated 
investment and costs, as discussed in Chapter 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
The substitution coefficient defined by Malina (2010) calculates the degree to which an 
airline is willing to switch its operations from a particular base airport to another substitute 
airport. Assuming that flight availability and frequency as well as ticket price are determined 
by the airline, feasible German airports are identified according to available infrastructure 
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such as runway length and legal practicality of operations. Then, the study looks at the quality 
of passenger airport accessibility by applying the substitution coefficient. Feasible airport 
access times are differentiated by passenger preferences, e.g. leisure travelers, and the share 
of passengers within a certain catchment area which is willing to travel to the substitute 
airport is calculated.  
Table 7: Different forms of competition between airports 
Type of 
competition 
Explanation Approaches Selected references 
(1) Competition 
for airline 
services 
 Airlines switching 
operations 
between airports 
 Analysis of route churn rates, 
i.e. opening and closing of 
routes 
 Contractual agreements 
between airport and airline, 
leaving airlines with sunk 
investment and thus less 
incentive to switch 
Oxera Consulting, 2017; 
Thelle et al., 2012; 
Button, 2010; Starkie, 
2002; Malina, 2010 
(2) Competition 
for passengers in 
the local 
catchment 
 Passengers are 
switching 
between airports 
in the local 
catchment 
 Availability of 
substitute 
transport modes 
such as rail 
services 
 Definition of the relevant 
market using SSNIP test 
 Analysis of number of airports 
offering the same route 
 Analysis of market 
concentration on the route level, 
applying the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index 
 Analysis of the effect of (high-
speed) rail services on the 
routes offered at an airport 
Adler, Nash & Pels, 
2008; Adler & Nash, 
2004; Thelle et al., 2012; 
Starkie, 2002; Maertens 
& Grimme, 2015; Oum & 
Fu, 2008; Albalate, Bel & 
Fageda, 2015; Behrens & 
Pels, 2009; Adler, 2008; 
Müller et al., 2010; Polk 
& Bilotkach, 2013; 
Bilotkach, Fageda & 
Flores-Fillol, 2013 
(3) Competition 
for passengers on 
the transfer 
market 
 Passengers are 
switching 
between hub 
airports, which 
offer the same 
transfer 
connections 
 Analysis of overlap in transfer 
connections at hub airports 
 Assessment of overlap between 
transfer connections and direct 
connections 
 Calculation of market 
concentration on the transfer 
market using the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index 
 Analysis of self-hubbing, i.e. 
transfer flights are not offered 
by the same airline or within an 
alliance  
Oxera Consulting, 2017; 
Malighetti, Paleari & 
Redondi, 2008; Maertens, 
Pabst & Grimme, 2016; 
Allroggen & Malina, 
2010; Lieshout & 
Burghouwt, 2013; Fichert 
& Klophaus, 2016; 
Redondi & Burghouwt, 
2010; Fageda, Suau-
Sanchez & Mason, 2015; 
Burghouwt & Veldhuis, 
2006 
(4) Airports as 
two-sided 
markets 
 Complementarity 
between aviation 
and non-aviation 
business to limit 
monopolistic 
price-setting 
 Theoretical modelling to test 
assumptions of two-sided 
platforms in the airport context 
Gillen, 2009; Fröhlich, 
2010; Gillen & Mantin, 
2013; Bracaglia, 
D’Alfonso & Nastasi, 
2014 
Source: own depiction 
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The coefficient can take on values between zero and one, with the latter denoting the case 
where the substitute airport exhibits the same or a better quality level, and hence imposes 
competitive pressure on the base airport. Each airport has to be assessed individually. The 
application to the German market shows that the large hub or international airports such as 
Frankfurt Airport (FRA), Munich Airport (MUC), or Hamburg Airport (HAM) have a 
coefficient of zero, and hence it is assumed that airlines have no feasible substitutes available 
regarding the demand for O&D traffic. 
In starting with the assessment of airport market power in the local catchment, the relevant 
market is often defined using the SSNIP test, which was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.2.2 
(Müller et al., 2010; Polk & Bilotkach, 2013; Competition Commission, 2009). Assessing 
the market power of UK airports, and whether common ownership should be prohibited, the 
Competition Commission (2009) states that there is “… no advantage in defining rigid 
geographic markets for airports” (p.36). Relying on passenger surveys for these particular 
airports, the Commission defines district share thresholds in order to assess how willing or 
likely passengers are to switch between different airports. First, if the number of passengers 
from a certain districts exceeds a specific threshold, e.g. 30 per cent of all passengers from 
that district, this district is considered to be in the catchment of the considered airport. 
Second, the same is done for all airports which are potential competitors for the airport in 
question. If these draw their passengers from the same districts as the investigated airport, an 
overlap is assumed which imposes constraints on market power. This approach relies on 
detailed passenger data, and is therefore often difficult to reproduce. In its definition of the 
local catchment area of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (AMS), Müller et al. (2010) focus on 
an area of 200 kilometres as well as a two-hour drive time around the airport. Relying, inter 
alia, on the analysis of the substitution potential between AMS and other airports within its 
catchment, this study finds that AMS has a dominant position in its catchment, thus only 
facing limited competition on the market for O&D passengers.  
A differentiated approach towards overlapping catchment areas is introduced by Wiltshire 
(2013) and Thelle et al. (2012). The latter report finds by means of a passenger choice model 
that the share of European destinations which have an overlap at different airports within two 
hours’ drive has increased in the period from 2002 to 2011. At Frankfurt Airport (FRA), for 
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example, the share of destinations which are also offered at other airports has increased from 
35 per cent to 54 per cent. For airports to exhibit equally ranked substitutes for passengers, 
the price, availability and frequency of flights has to be incorporated as well. The findings of 
Wiltshire (2013) suggest that a one per cent increase in distance decreases passengers’ 
likelihood to travel to a particular airport by four per cent. Yet, a one per cent decrease in 
ticket price would provide the necessary incentive to use the further away airport. 
Competition in the local catchment of airports may also be imposed by other transport modes, 
such as high-speed rail, but is usually constrained to short-haul traffic. The impact of (high-
speed) rail services on air transport is investigated in several studies. Albalate, Bel & Fageda 
(2015), for example, analyse the effect of available rail services on routes offered at airports 
in four European countries. The findings show that air services on a route are reduced if high-
speed rail services are available on this city pair. Behrens & Pels (2009) confirm this result 
for the market between London and Paris, stating that airlines are observed to retreat from 
this market by no longer offer this route. This substitution may also be taking place since rail 
services are acting as a complement for air services by providing feeder services to airports, 
thus replacing short-haul flights, and enlarging an airport’s catchment area (Dobruszkes, 
Lennert & Hamme, 2011; Polk & Bilotkach, 2013).  
The analysis by Allroggen & Malina (2010) looks at the existence and extent of market power 
with regard to hub airports. The cases of joint and independent profit maximisation of an 
airport and an airline are considered. Assumptions of the analytical model are duopolistic 
Bertrand competition for transfer passengers on the downstream market and a monopolistic 
upstream market. Both airlines and airports are considered to be profit maximisers and both 
exhibit symmetric cost structures. An airport's non-aeronautical revenues are not considered 
in the model. Due to the competition on the airline market, the authors find that the market 
power of hub airports is limited and that there are incentives for joint profit maximisation of 
the different players. In this particular case, individual profits for both the airport operator 
and the respective airline are maximised. The theoretical model suggests that independent 
profit maximisation causes a negative impact on social welfare. Considering the benefits of 
the strategic vertical relationship, the paper proposes to consider asymmetric regulation for 
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hub airports, i.e. to restrain regulatory measures to areas other than the transfer passenger 
market. 
Apart from theoretical modelling, the transfer market is often investigated by determining 
the overlap in transfer connections offered at an airport. Since transfer connections are a 
specific feature of an airline operating a hub-and-spoke network (see Chapter 3.1.2), this type 
of potential competition is mainly imposed on hub airports. The degree to which transfer 
connections at hub airports are also offered via other hub airports is calculated using airports’ 
market shares, indices to display the degree of market concentration on a particular route, or 
by assessing the level of demand on a connection, and thus derive conclusions as to the level 
of competition (Lieshout & Burghouwt, 2013; Grosche, Klophaus & Seredynski, 2015; 
Malighetti, Paleari & Redondi, 2008).  
The notion of airports as a business with two distinct, but interrelated markets, the one for 
aviation services and that for non-aviation services, provides a further strand of discussion 
regarding the constraint of airport market power (Gillen & Mantin, 2013). Since airports 
generate an increasing share of total revenues from non-aviation businesses such as retail or 
parking, ensuring the continuity of this source of income is of high importance. In 2015, the 
share of these business activities accounted for almost 40 per cent of total revenues across 
European airports (Airports Council International Europe, 2015). Therefore, it is argued that 
airports have an incentive to attract an increasing customer base using non-aviation facilities 
and services at the airport, thus passengers are becoming direct customers of the airport. In 
regard to the different business areas at an airport, Starkie (2002) and Gillen (2009) raise the 
argument whether the complementarity between aviation and non-aviation revenues 
incentivise airports to set lower charges on the aeronautical side, since the additional demand 
attracted by this will generate ancillary revenues on the non-aviation side, e.g. airport 
parking, shops, restaurants, or real estate. Research on this particular topic is still rather 
limited, though. Furthermore, this particular aspect will not be subject of the analysis in the 
following chapters, and therefore not elaborated in more detail here.  
This overview of the different types of competition an airport may face helps to put the 
research focus of the following chapters in context, and highlight this thesis’ contribution to 
the field of assessing airport competition. The following chapter therefore provides an 
3 Market Structure of the Airport Industry 
66 
overview of the research questions in regard to competition in the European hub airport 
market. 
3.2.2 Research focus and considered dataset of European hub airports 
In line with the above discussion, the research focus in the subsequent Chapters 4 and 5 is 
placed on the assessment of competition for European hub airports in the period from 2000 
to 2016, both in their local catchment and on the transfer market. The methodological 
approach in both chapters will be the same, and it is partly based on the indirect approach to 
the assessment of market power, outlined in Figure 6 in Chapter 2.2. Certain elements of this 
approach are chosen since they provide a useful tool to obtain a detailed overview of the 
considered firms and their position in the market. In the first step in both Chapter 4 and 5, 
the degree of market concentration is determined on each market, the one for origin and 
destination traffic in the local catchment, and the one for transfer traffic passing through the 
hub airports. For this purpose the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is employed, an index widely 
used in competition analysis in different industries, and also in the airport sector (e.g. 
Rodrigues Pacheco, Estrada Braga & Fernandes, 2015; Papatheodorou, 2010; Lieshout & 
Burghouwt, 2013; Givoni & Rietveld, 2009; Albalate, Bel & Fageda, 2015). This analysis 
provides an initial overview of the degree of market concentration each European hub faces. 
Regarding the substitution potential of other airports, in regard to destinations available for 
passengers, this measure is a first approximation to the overlap in destinations between 
airports, and thus the choice passengers have when planning their journey.  
However, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2.2, airport market power cannot be directly 
inferred from a high degree of market concentration on either the origin-destination or 
transfer market. The research in the following chapters therefore provides an extension to the 
methodologies currently applied in airport competition assessment. In the second step of the 
analysis of competition for European hub airports, regression analyses are employed to test 
the effect of market concentration on airport output. As stated by the Productivity 
Commission (2011), “… a monopolist will maximise its profits by reducing the total output 
of goods or services it supplies to the market, in order to increase the price charged” (p.71), 
and depicted in Figure 2.  
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Output in this thesis is represented by the amount of seats offered by an airport to a particular 
destination, with seats being scheduled airline seats. For the analysis here, supply side data, 
instead of actual passenger data or ticket prices, is used for several reasons. First, the analysis 
in Chapters 4 and 5 focuses on individual destinations and their development over time. 
Passenger data on this disaggregated level and across the considered time span was not 
available for this thesis, using supply side data therefore provides an approximation for this. 
Second, the same reasoning applies to ticket data, with no comprehensive database available 
for this thesis, which covers all investigated destinations over the considered time period. 
Third, using supply data for the analysis of airport competition has been part of many studies 
highlighted in Table 7. Albalate, Bel & Fageda (2015), for example, use the number of seats 
offered to a particular destination as dependent variable in their empirical estimation of the 
effects of high-speed rail on air transport services. Also, Burghouwt & Veldhuis (2006) make 
use of supply side data to analyse airports’ competitive position on the aviation market 
between Europe and the United States. Supply side data is also applied as dependent variable 
in the empirical analysis by Givoni & Rietveld (2009), investigating the factors influencing 
the choice of aircraft size. Also relying on this type of data in regard to the analysis of 
competition on the transfer market are Müller et al. (2010). 
The main source of data used in regard to supply side data is the OAG database, which 
provides scheduled airline traffic on a global scale, i.e. those flights are listed in the database 
which have been planned by airlines in advance. This includes the route (airport pair) flown 
as well as the available frequencies and number of seats on this route. It does not include 
actual passenger numbers for each flight or data on ticket prices and airline revenues. 
However, it gives a good overview of overall traffic volumes and the distribution across 
airlines and airports. Table 8 outlines the variables in the OAG database which have been 
used in the subsequent analysis. Due to data availability a period of 16 years, from 2000 to 
2016 in intervals of four years, is considered23. 
                                                 
23 The OAG data for the year 2008 was provided by the Institute of Aircraft Design at the Technical University 
of Munich, which has a cooperation with Bauhaus Luftfahrt.  
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Table 8: Description of variables from OAG database 
Variable name Definition Code defined by 
Carrier1 Carrier code   IATA / OAG (e.g. AA ) 
Carrier1Name Carrier1 name (e.g. American Airlines) 
DepAirport Departure airport code IATA (e.g. JFK) 
ArrAirport Arrival airport code  IATA (e.g. LHR) 
ArrAirportName Arrival airport name (e.g. London Heathrow) 
ArrCity Arrival city code IATA (e.g. LON) 
ArrCityName Arrival city name (e.g. London) 
ArrState State code - unique by country only IATA (e.g. NY) 
ArrIATACtry IATA country code ISO/IATA (e.g. U.S.) 
ArrIATACtryName IATA country name (e.g. United States) 
ArrReg Arrival region code based on IATA 
forecasting regions 
OAG (e.g. NA1) 
Seats Available seat capacity (total) on departure 
aircraft 
OAG (e.g. 420) 
Km Great Circle Distance in kilometres.  The 
summed distance of individual legs 
(stopping) flights 
OAG (e.g. 1325) 
Frequency The number of flights occurring in a specific 
time period 
OAG 
Source: own depiction 
For the purpose of obtaining a detailed overview of the development of the European hub 
airport market and potential competitive constraints, a set of 36 hub airports and their 
respective secondary airports in the catchment are defined. Secondary airports refer to those 
airports which are located in the catchment areas of these hub airports (Table 42 in Appendix 
8.1). A hub is an airport at which an airline and its potential alliance partners offer connecting 
flights between different destinations, as highlighted in Chapter 3.1.2.  
The identification of European hub airports is based on several sources and assumptions. 
First, since a hub airport is the node of an airline operating a hub-and-spoke network, all 
these European airlines are identified and the respective airports included in the database, see 
Table 47 for an outline of these carriers. Further, the Connectivity Report by the Airports 
Council International Europe (2016a), which defines different categories of hub airports 
according to their level of connectivity in 2016, is analysed and respective airports included. 
In addition to this, a range of different studies investigating airport competition and the 
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connectivity of hub airports have been evaluated to complement the above sample of 
European hub airports.  
Table 9: Passenger volume at European hub airports 
Rank Airport 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
1 London Heathrow Airport (LHR) 64.28 67.11 67.06 70.04 75.71 
2 Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 48.25 50.95 60.87 61.61 65.94 
3 Amsterdam Schiphol Airport( AMS) 39.27 42.43 47.43 51.04 63.62 
4 Frankfurt Airport (FRA) 48.96 50.70 53.47 57.52 60.79 
5 Istanbul Atatürk Airport (IST) 14.7 15.6 28.63 45.12 60.01 
6 Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD) 32.71 38.16 50.82 45.18 50.40 
7 Barcelona Airport – El Prat (BCN) 19.44 24.35 30.20 35.13 44.13 
8 London Gatwick Airport (LGW) 31.95 31.39 34.21 34.24 43.14 
9 Munich Airport (MUC) 22.87 26.60 34.53 38.36 42.26 
10 Rome Fiumicino (FCO) n/a 27.16 35.13 36.98 41.74 
11 Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport  (SVO) n/a n/a 15.21 26.19 34.03 
12 Paris Orly Airport (ORY) 25.40 24.05 26.21 27.23 31.24 
13 Istanbul Sabiha Gökcen (SAW) n/a 0.25 4.36 14.84 29.65 
14 Copenhagen Airport (CPH) 18.40 18.89 21.48 23.29 28.99 
15 Moscow Domodedovo Airport (DME) n/a n/a 20.45 28.25 28.50 
16 Dublin Airport (DUB) 13.66 17.03 23.47 19.10 27.92 
17 Zurich Airport (ZRH) 22.68 17.72 22.04 24.75 27.62 
18 Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI) 19.26 20.63 22.83 22.67 26.25 
19 Manchester Airport (MAN) 18.32 20.97 21.41 19.85 25.70 
20 Oslo Airport (OSL) n/a 13.18 19.34 22.08 25.57 
21 Stockholm Arlanda Airport (ARN) n/a 16.47 18.18 19.66 24.72 
22 London Stansted Airport (STN) 11.86 20.91 22.36 17.46 24.29 
23 Düsseldorf  Airport (DUS) 15.91 15.09 18.15 20.83 23.52 
24 Vienna International Airport (VIE) 5.92 14.71 19.75 22.17 23.35 
25 Lisbon Airport (LIS) 9.21 10.39 13.60 15.30 22.45 
26 Brussels Airport (BRU) 21.60 15.45 18.48 18.94 21.79 
27 Berlin Tegel Airport (TXL) 10.24 10.98 14.49 18.16 21.25 
28 Athens International Airport (ATH) 13.35 13.66 16.45 12.86 19.99 
29 Milan Malpensa Airport  (MXP) n/a 18.42 19.22 18.52 19.41 
30 Antalya Airport (AYT) n/a n/a 18.85 25.27 18.91 
31 Helsinki (HEL) 10.00 10.73 13.43 16.42 17.18 
32 Vaclav Havel Airport Prague (PRG) n/a 9.57 12.59 10.77 13.07 
33 Warsaw (WAW) n/a n/a 9.46 9.59 12.80 
34 Budapest (BUD) n/a 6.38 8.43 8.43 11.44 
35 Lyons Airport (LYS) 5.92 6.12 7.80 8.36 9.50 
36 Keflavik (KEF) 1.46 1.89 2.24 2.74 6.82 
Sources: (Airports Council International Europe, 2016a, 2016b; Groupe ADP, 2017; Ataturk Airport, 2017; 
Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen International Airport, 2017; Copenhagen Airports AS, n.d.; Zurich Airport, 2004, 
2000; Eurostat, 2016; Helsinki Airport, 2016; Keflavik Airport, 2017; Budapest Airport, n.d.; Warsaw Chopin 
Airport, 2016; VINCI Airports, 2017; Vaclac Havel Airport Prague, 2016)  
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These include Burghouwt (2007), with an outline of European network carriers which are all 
included in the analysis here, and also Burghouwt, Mendes de Leon & De Wit (2015); 
Lieshout & Burghouwt (2013); Veldhuis (1997); Malighetti, Paleari & Redondi (2008); 
Grosche & Klophaus (2015); Grosche, Klophaus & Seredynski (2015); Dennis (1994, 1999). 
Airports which are considered as hubs and investigated within these studies include 
Basel/Mulhouse (BSL), Clermont-Ferrand (CFE), Nice (NCE), Luxembourg (LUX), 
Cologne-Bonn (CGN), Malaga (AGP). These are, however, not considered here due to their 
size and current non-hub focus. Having analysed this market and identified feasible hub 
airports, a dataset of 36 airports results, which includes both the largest airports in Europe in 
terms of passenger volume in 2016 (Airports Council International Europe, 2016b) as well 
as those airports which classify as hub airports.  
Table 9 depicts the considered airport sample in descending order of 2016’s passenger 
volume. The motivation to include large and small hub airports in the dataset is to analyse 
potential differences in the level of market concentration these various airport types are 
facing. Based on the above assumptions, these European hub airports and the level of 
competition they face, both in terms of the origin-destination market in their local catchments 
as well as on the transfer market, are analysed in Chapter 4 and 5, focusing on the following 
research questions.  
In Chapter 4, the analysis focuses on hub airports and their secondary counterparts in the 
local catchment, and how the increased offer of flights and seats at the latter impacts the 
traffic development of European hub airports. This chapter therefore contributes a detailed 
analysis of the origin and destination (O&D) markets of the 36 largest European hub airports 
and their respective secondary airports in the catchment or hinterland. The first part of this 
chapter analyses the degree of market concentration in the local catchment, followed by an 
empirical estimation of this level on the output supplied at the hub airport in the second part. 
The following research questions are being investigated: 
(1) How concentrated is the origin-destination market in the local catchment of European 
hub airports, and has there been a development to a less concentrated one in between 
2000 and 2016 (Chapter 4.1 and 4.2)? 
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(2) What is the impact of market concentration on the output decisions, in terms of seats 
offered to a particular destination, at the European hub airports? As a measure for 
market concentration, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is employed as explanatory 
variable in the regression analysis (Chapter 4.3.3). 
(3) As discussed earlier, low cost carriers are presumed to have an impact on the rising 
constraints on hub airports’ market power, since these particular airlines are often 
believed to locate their operations at smaller airports with spare capacity, i.e. those 
secondary airports within a hub airport’s catchment, see, for example, Dobruszkes, 
Givoni & Vowles (2017). The third research question within this chapter therefore 
assesses the impact of low cost carrier presence on the output provided at hub airports 
(Chapter 4.3.4).  
(4)  Furthermore, potential competition from other modes of transport, such as (high-
speed) rail, might constrain the market power of hub airports. The fourth research 
question therefore focuses on the evaluation of the effect of (high-speed) rail services 
on the seats offered at European hub airports (Chapter 4.3.5).  
A similar structure can also be found in Chapter 5, here the focus is placed on the assessment 
of competition on the transfer market at European hub airports. This market in particular is 
characterised by a close interlinkage between a hub airport and its respective network carrier. 
The latter are those offering transfer connections for passengers via the hub airport. When 
assessing market concentration on the transfer market, the connections offered by network 
carriers and their alliance partner are thus taken into consideration. Based on this assumption, 
the chapter starts with a detailed analysis of the degree of market concentration, and the 
respective development over time, for the European hub airports in the dataset. Following 
this, the effects of a high degree of market concentration on the transfer connections offered 
via the hub are assessed empirically in the second part of the chapter. 
(5) How concentrated is the transfer market, measured in the number of transfer 
connections and the capacities offered at each European hub airport, and has there 
been a development to a less concentrated market in between 2000 and 2016 
(Chapters 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3)? 
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(6) What is the impact of market concentration on the output decisions, in terms of seats 
offered on a transfer connection, at European hub airports? A transfer connection is 
a route offered from origin A to destination B via a hub airport H. As a measure for 
market concentration, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for each available transfer 
connection is employed as explanatory variable in the regression analysis (Chapter 
5.4).  
Chapter 3 provided a discussion of the characteristics of the airport market, with a particular 
focus on the relationship between hub airports and their network carriers, and on the current 
approaches to assess the degree of airport competition. This puts the specific research 
questions addressed within this thesis in context, and shows the overall added value. 
Concerning the latter, the dataset of European hub airports comprises more airports than 
previous studies in this field, which mostly focus on a smaller subset of these airports. 
Furthermore, the time span observed within the analysis in the following chapters covers a 
longer period than most previous studies. Therefore, the research in this thesis provides a 
comprehensive analysis of European hub airports and the level of potential competition these 
face. In addition to this, different factors, which are assumed to influence the degree of 
competition an airport faces, are tested empirically, using disaggregated data on the route 
level in order to obtain a detailed insight into the effects. In line with this, Chapter 4 starts 
with the analysis of the local catchment of the hub airport, and Chapter 5 continues with the 
assessment of the transfer market.  
 
 Competition in the Local Catchment of 
European Hub Airports 
With both the liberalisation of the European aviation market and strong growth in the overall 
demand for air travel in the past decades new airline business models emerged, absorbing 
traffic growth and imposing competition on the existing carriers in the market (Morrison, 
2001; Dobruszkes, Givoni & Vowles, 2017). Some of these new carriers, such as Ryanair, 
have been focusing their operations mainly at secondary24 airports, which have hence been 
experiencing an increase in passenger volume and aircraft movements. Providing a greater 
array of possibilities for European passengers in terms of airports and destinations they can 
choose from, this development has been raising the question whether European hub airports 
are nowadays subject to a more competitive environment than a couple of decades ago.  
Following this line of discussion, the research questions within this chapter focus on hub 
airports and their secondary counterparts in the local catchment, and how the increased offer 
of flights at the latter impacts the traffic development of the European hub airports. This 
chapter therefore contributes a detailed analysis of the origin and destination (O&D) markets 
of the 36 largest European hub airports and their respective secondary airports in the 
catchment or hinterland. 
For this purpose, the traffic development at all considered hub and secondary airports is 
considered in the period from 2000 to 2016. This includes a depiction of overall traffic 
volume at the different airport types, the analysis of growth rates ascribed to different airline 
business models – full service carrier (FSC) and low cost carrier (LCC) – and the 
development of these over the considered period (Chapter 4.1). Following that, as proposed 
by Polk & Bilotkach (2013), one main line of airport market power assessment focuses on 
the degree of overlap of destinations between hub and secondary airports within a catchment. 
This degree of overlap between these is considered both at an aggregated as well as 
disaggregated level in Chapter 4.2, addressing research question (1) introduced in Chapter 1. 
                                                 
24 In this thesis, secondary airports are those which are considered as potentially imposing constraints on market 
power at the hub airports in the respective catchment. 
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The Herfindahl Hirschman Index serves as a measure to determine the degree of overlap, or 
the level of market concentration, in a hub airport’s catchment. On the aggregated level, the 
total scheduled airline seats offered at each airport in a catchment are used as basis for 
calculation. The disaggregated analysis focuses on the analysis of market concentration on 
the route level, i.e. investigating the degree of overlap between airports on a particular route, 
or to a specific destination (HHIroute). Furthermore, as an extension to the latter analysis, the 
distance-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHIdist) is introduced. This modified index 
advances the current application of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index by accounting for the 
size of the catchment area and the geographical location of substitute airports within it. This 
modified index takes account of the fact that airports which are located further away from 
the hub airport, thus imposing higher access times on passengers, are considered as less 
attractive substitutes.   
Building on the analysis of market concentration in the catchment areas of European hub 
airports, Chapter 4.3 estimates the effect that the degree of market concentration has on the 
amount of scheduled airline services at each hub airport, addressing research question (2). 
Within the empirical models, it is controlled for a time-specific effect, covering the period 
from 2000 to 2016 in four-year intervals. The disaggregated Herfindahl Hirschman Indices 
are introduced as explanatory variables in order to assess the impact on the hub airports’ 
output on a particular route. Furthermore, since low cost carriers have been playing an 
essential role in the growth of the European air transport market, the effect of the increasing 
presence of this business model in the hub airports’ catchments is also investigated as well 
as the effect of potentially competing rail services on the short-haul market, thus focusing on 
research questions (3) and (4). Chapter 4.4 discusses the overall findings and concludes the 
chapter. 
 European hub airports and their local catchment 
This chapter focuses on the determination of relevant catchment areas for all European hub 
airports considered in this thesis (Chapter 4.1.1). This approach is in line with the different 
steps conducted in the assessment of market power in an industry, including the definition of 
the relevant market, and as discussed in Chapter 2.2.2. Based on the identification of the 
relevant catchment area for each hub airport, Chapter 4.1.2 analyses the development of 
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European hub airports and their counterparts in the catchment area in the period from 2000 
to 2016. A particular focus is placed on the distinct growth of full service carriers (FSC) and 
low cost carriers (LCC), and whether this is different across hub and secondary airports.  
4.1.1 Definition of relevant catchment areas 
When defining the relevant market for an airport it is important to differentiate between an 
airport’s catchment area and the geographic market served. The Civil Aviation Authority 
(2010) highlights that the catchment area denotes the area surrounding the airport, which 
outbound and inbound passenger at the airport travel to or originate from. The catchment for 
an airport is therefore often defined by a certain time threshold passengers have to travel to 
access the airport. The geographic market comprises the destinations offered at the airport, 
i.e. airport pairs. As a first step, the catchment areas of the selected hub airports, and hence 
their potential substitute airports are determined by considering drive-time isochrones. The 
extent of isochrones can be distinguished by passenger type, time period, or airport access 
modes. According to passenger surveys conducted by ibid. in the UK, the benchmark for 
leisure passengers is at two hours and for business passengers at one hour driving time.  
Detailed demographic information helps to obtain a comprehensive picture of the potential 
catchment area. Mandel (2014) emphasises that for each passenger segment and trip purpose 
as well as route a unique catchment area exists which has to be taken into consideration. It is 
also not just the catchment area of the hub airport itself but the overlap with other airports 
that determines the level of competition. Various studies (Table 10) investigate the size of 
and shift in airport catchment areas in more detail by accounting for traveller type, airport 
access, or airline product quality such as flight frequency and price.  
Staub (2014) analyses a range of criteria influencing airport and airline choice in a predefined 
area in Germany, and applies the output of the model to identify catchment areas for those 
airports in the study. The results show that catchment areas deviate from the two-hour driving 
isochrones assumed in a range of other studies.  
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Table 10: Overview of definitions of airport catchment area 
Study Definition catchment area 
ACI (2013) Passenger point of view: considering the drive time (2hrs) and the potential 
amount of airports to be reached within this time 
Boonekamp & 
Zuidberg (2016) 
Airport catchment area: assignment of population on NUTS-2 level within 100km 
radius around selected airports 
Competition 
Commission 
(2009) 
Hypothetical monopoly test (SSNIP) employed to determine airport-specific 
catchment area 
Civil Aviation 
Authority (2010) 
Airport catchment area: (1) isochrones approach considering different driving 
times (congestion-free) and transport modes; depending on passenger willing to 
travel (e.g. depending on route and passenger type); rather used as ‘benchmarks’; 
overlapping between catchments, and (2) historical usage patterns (using 
passenger survey data or airline booking patterns) 
Civil Aviation 
Authority (2016) 
Estimating the geographic area from which a large proportion of an airport’s 
outbound passengers originate; catchment areas do not incorporate passenger 
price sensitivity and hence may overestimate competitive constraint 
Hypothetical monopoly test (SSNIP) employed to determine airport-specific 
catchment area 
Fuellhart (2007) Airport catchment defined as the radius of 75 miles surrounding the specific 
airports 
Lieshout (2012) Consideration of dynamic airport catchment areas: size determined by access 
time, flight frequency and/or air fares 
Maertens (2012) Airport catchment area: NUTS-3 level regions located within 100km by car from 
the relevant airport; presence of low cost carriers can increase catchment 
Mandel (2014) Airport catchment area variation according to passenger segment, trip purpose and 
routes; overlap with other airports determines the level of competition 
Marcucci & 
Gatta (2011) 
Airport catchment area: consideration of people within a two-hour-driving radius 
around the airport 
Postorino (2010) Airport catchment area: all users and passengers of an airport, application of 
accessibility indices to determine size of catchment; consideration of prefixed 
time value such as 2 hours for European airports; differentiation of primary and 
secondary catchment area (affected by e.g.  income, population, employment) 
Staub (2014) Airport catchment area: differentiation by passenger type and route choice, static 
value cannot be assumed. 
Starkie (2010) Airport attractiveness determined by its relation to market demand (population 
density, income level, business activity, international trade links, tourism 
potential, quality of transport links - airport access time); differentiation of access 
time by passenger type; overlap of catchment areas: geographical segmentation of 
customer not possible 
Thelle et al. 
(2012) 
Airport catchment area: assuming "normal transport time": at least either 100 km 
or 1h drive time (airports argue that catchment areas exceed this limit), 
differentiation by passenger segment; overlap of routes as important factor 
Source: own depiction 
Lieshout (2012) further shows that the size of the catchment area and hence the potential 
competition differs across offered destinations. In this study, the access costs, airlines’ 
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airfares as well as airside time costs are considered. The model is tested for Amsterdam 
Airport (AMS) and shows that especially long-haul connections have a large catchment area 
and a different potentially competitive airport set than many short-haul connections. 
Destinations can be further differentiated according to their main travel purpose such as 
holiday locations. This approach to the definition of airport catchment areas yields a more 
dynamic picture compared to the static one resulting from the two-hour driving radius. 
Dobruszkes, Lennert & Hamme (2011) state that the accurate catchment area size can only 
be determined by conducting detailed analysis and surveys of the socio-demographic 
characteristics and choice criteria of potential passengers in the area surrounding the relevant 
airport. Since no comprehensive data on all the considered European hub airports in regard 
to the socio-economic characteristics of the passengers in the catchment is available for the 
purpose of this thesis, catchment areas are determined using both a one-hour and two-hour 
driving radius for each of the hub airports. For this purpose, the fastest free-flow driving time 
between a hub airport and each of its respective secondary airports is determined using 
Google (2017); toll roads are included if they represent the fastest route. Figure 8 and Figure 
9 illustrate the examples of London Heathrow Airport (LHR) and Frankfurt Airport (FRA) 
and the respective airports within the catchment area. 
 
Figure 8: Local catchment of London Heathrow Airport  
Source: own depiction, drive times from Google (2017) 
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Frankfurt Airport, for example, faces only one potential competitor within a one-hour driving 
radius whereas it is five airports for London Heathrow. Considering a two-hour radius, there 
are eight additional airports exhibiting potential competition for Frankfurt Airport and five 
more for London Heathrow Airport.  
 
Figure 9: Local catchment of Frankfurt Airport 
Source: own depiction, drive times extracted from Google (2017) 
The airports in the local catchment for all hub airports are depicted in Table 42, ranked 
according to their passenger volume in 2016. Those airports within the local catchment of an 
airport have been selected that have scheduled passenger traffic according to the OAG 
database25.  
Hence, no explicit differentiation is made between passenger types and time of day. 
However, considering a one- and a two-hour catchment might provide a proxy for different 
passenger groups’ willingness to drive to the airport. Furthermore, especially for short-haul 
connections passengers have the possibility to switch to other transport modes such as (high-
speed) rail in order to get from A to B. The potential impact of this particular mode may have 
                                                 
25 Not within the scope of the analysis within this thesis but an indication for future research is the consideration 
of catchment areas at each arrival airport. This means that in the determination of overlap between routes not 
only flights from the catchment area of Frankfurt Airport (FRA) to particularly London Heathrow Airport 
(LHR), for example, are considered but flights to all airports within the catchment of LHR.  
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an effect on the short-haul routes offered at an airport and will therefore be considered in 
more detail in Chapter 4.3.5 
 
Figure 10: Secondary airports within catchment of European hub airports  
Source: own depiction, drive times extracted from Google (2017) 
4.1.2 Development of European hub airports within their catchment 
This chapter provides an insight into the traffic development at both hub airports and their 
respective secondary airports (see Table 42), with a particular focus on both the growth of 
low cost traffic and its distribution across the different airport types.  
Figure 11 depicts the aggregated number of seats offered at each airport type in the period 
from 2000 to 2016. The seats per year offered by each airport are depicted in logarithms in 
the figure to provide a better comparison between the different airports, the following 
discussion regarding the change in these over time refers to the actual amount of seats. Hence, 
considering total seats offered within each catchment, European hub airports’ market share 
amounts to above 80 per cent in each period. In terms of overall size, the latter are hence 
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dominating the market within their catchment. However, secondary airports have been 
experiencing faster growth within the considered period, with an increase in seats from 2000 
to 2016 of more than 110 per cent, compared to an increase of almost 60 per cent at hub 
airports. In order to gain a better understanding of the factors driving this growth, and how 
this may affect the competitive constraints imposed on hub airports, the development of low 
cost carrier (LCC) and full service carrier (FSC) within this period is analysed. 
 
Figure 11: Development of seats offered at hub and secondary airports 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
For this purpose, Table 11 shows the aggregated number of seats and frequencies in 2000 
and 2016 for both full service and low cost carriers26 for all the considered hub airports and 
those secondary airports within their catchment. The absolute number of seats and 
frequencies offered by full service carriers (FSC) exceeds that of low cost carriers (LCC) in 
both years. However, LCC traffic has been increasing by more than 600 per cent (seats), and 
more than 500 per cent (frequencies). FSC have also increased their seats within that period, 
but only by 28 per cent; frequencies, however, have declined by 2 per cent, rationed by the 
                                                 
26 An overview of low cost carriers within each region and year can be found in Appendix 8.3, all remaining 
airlines are considered as full service carriers within this analysis. 
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use of larger aircraft with a mean of 122 seats per flight in 2000, compared to 159 seats per 
flight in 2016.  
Table 11: Change in seats and frequencies offered by LCC and FSC (2000 and 2016) 
 LCC 2000 LCC 2016 FSC 2000 FSC 2016 
Seats p.a. (in million) 29.55 227.41 484.18 620.97 
Frequency p.a. (in thousands) 209 1332 3982 3904 
Mean seats per flight 141 171 122 159 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
To see how the growth of LCC and FSC is distributed across the considered hub airports and 
their respective competitors in the catchment, the development of respective aggregated seats 
and frequencies across these airports is analysed. Table 12 shows the seats and frequencies 
per year as well as the mean seats per flight for the years 2000 and 2016. Here, it is 
distinguished between the type of carrier (FSC and LCC) and the type of airport (Hub and 
Secondary). Hub airports refer to all airports in the considered data set in Table 9, and 
secondary airports include all those airports in the respective catchment areas as outlined in 
Table 42.  
Table 12: Change in offered seats and frequencies by airport type (2000 and 2016) 
  Hub Secondary 
 Carrier 2000 2016 Change  2000 2016 Change  
Seats p.a. (in 
million) 
FSC 426.36 559.23 31% 57.82 61.74 7% 
LCC 18.86 142.31 559% 10.69 85.10 696% 
Frequency p.a. 
(in thousands) 
FSC 3226 3387 5% 757 518 -32% 
LCC 135 814 503% 74 519 601% 
Mean seats per 
flight 
FSC 132 165 25% 76 119 57% 
LCC 139 175 26% 145 164 13% 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
At the hub airports, the number of seats offered by LCC has been growing from less than 20 
million in 2000 to more than 140 million in 2016. At the seondary airports, seats have been 
increasing from about eleven million in 2000 to about 85 million in 2016. The same holds 
for offered frequencies by LCC at both airport types. Compared to this, FSC have been 
experiencing much lower growth rates in regard to seats offered per year within this period, 
which is also depicted in Figure 12. Dobruszkes (2013) points out that low cost carriers are 
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more focused on short-haul routes, and hence on the European market, whereas full service 
carriers offer both short-haul and long-destinations.  
However, low cost carrier traffic at secondary airports experienced a slight drop in seats and 
frequencies after 2008. At hub airports, a slowdown rather than a drop in growth can be 
observed at this point in time. This might imply that low cost carriers at secondary airports 
(LCC secondary airport) have been affected more severely by the financial crisis in 
2008/2009 than those at hub airports (LCC hub airport). Or that in a time of economic 
downturn, low cost carriers have been focusing their operations more strongly on hub airports 
due to sufficient demand at these nodes.  
 
Figure 12: Distribution of seats across hub and secondary airports 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
Another development to be observed in this market is the change in the mean number of seats 
offered per flight. Based on the aggregated volume of traffic by full service carriers, seats per 
flight rose by more than 20 per cent and about 60 per cent at hub and secondary airports, 
respectively. The mean seats per flight can be raised by either employing larger aircarft or 
increasing seat density for the existing aircraft. In the empirical analysis in Chapter 4.3, the 
impact of market concentration in a hub airport’s catchment as well as the potential 
competition by low cost carrier is investigated in more detail. Furthermore, the initial analysis 
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in this chapter shows that both hub and secondary airports in Europe have been experiencing 
growth in terms of total offered seats in the period between 2000 and 2016. Low cost carrier 
traffic growth is not concentrated at secondary airports, but has been spread across the 
different types of airports. In terms of competition, hub airports may have reacted to 
increasing low cost carrier presence by providing capacities for these particular airlines, and 
thus meeting the growth of these airlines at secondary airports in the catchment. In order to 
obtain a more detailed insight into the effects of these developments on the behaviour of hub 
airports, the following chapter analyses the level of market concentration hub airports face. 
 Analysis of market concentration at European hub airports 
The analysis of the European airport market shows an increase in offered seats both at hub 
and secondary airports, which is mainly driven by low cost carriers. Since hub airports are, 
on average, still significantly larger than the airports within their catchment, the degree of 
market concentration in each catchment as well as the respective development over time will 
be analysed in more detail. Applying the Herfindahl Hirschman Index as a measure for 
market concentration therefore yields further insight into the level of potential substitution 
between a hub airport and its secondary airports in the catchment. Hence, in a first step, the 
development of market concentration at European airports in the period between 2000 and 
2016 is outlined (Chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). Following the discussion of the properties of the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index and potential inconsistencies of this index in Chapter 2.2.2, a 
weighting factor is introduced in Chapter 4.2.3, which accounts for the distance of each 
secondary airport from the hub airport in the respective catchment area. This implies that 
secondary airports closer to the hub airport have a higher substitution potential for passengers 
than those further away.  
4.2.1 Development of aggregated market concentration  
One line of argument in academia and industry highlights the growth of additional airports 
in the catchment area of European hub airports, resulting in an increased choice for 
passengers where to depart from (and arrive at) and thus decreasing market power in the 
airport industry. Within this chapter the focus is therefore on the development of market 
concentration in each of the European hub airport’s catchment areas. To analyse this, the 
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Herfindahl Hirschman Index is applied using each airport’s total seats offered per year as a 
share of overall offered seats within the respective catchment (HHIaggr):  
𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑠 ,  (12) 
Where 𝑠 , 𝑄 , 𝑄⁄  represents the share of airport i’s total output Qaggr,i in total 
output in the catchment (Qaggr). Calculating the HHIaggr therefore yields a single aggregated 
value for each hub airport catchment. Comparing the changes in this index over the 
considered time period from 2000 to 2016 provides a first insight in which catchment areas 
the degree of market concentration changed significantly, either positively or negatively. 
Table 13 shows the HHIaggr for each airport in 2000. For each of the following years the delta 
to the previous year is depicted, here the airports are sorted in descending order of passenger 
volume in 2016. From the discussion in Chapter 2.2, it can be seen that there is no clear 
definition of a specific threshold of the value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index at which an 
industry or a market is considered to exhibit low concentration or, alternatively, a high level 
of competition. Most often, changes in concentration indices over time are considered in 
order to evaluate whether an industry has been exposed to increasing levels of competition. 
A similar approach will be followed within this analysis, in which (1) the change in the 
HHIaggr for all European hub airports in the dataset will be considered, and (2) the level of 
this value will be further investigated. 
In this first part of the analysis, i.e. observing changes in the HHIaggr over time, several 
observations can be made from the calculation of the aggregated Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
(HHIaggr) and its development for each European hub airport over time (Table 13):  
(1) hub airports with a HHIaggr value of 1 over the entire observed period, 
(2) airports with slightly fluctuating values but rather remaining at the same HHIaggr 
level, 
(3) those airports with increasing HHIaggr values, and  
(4) those with a decreasing HHIaggr over time.  
The first category contains those airports with no competitors offering scheduled airline 
services in their catchment area, including PMI, LIS, ATH, and BUD (as can also be seen in 
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Table 42 in Appendix 8.1). Furthermore, MAD and KEF are within this category since the 
airports within their catchments either only offer a very small amount of seats or no scheduled 
seats at all during this period, which results in a constant HHIaggr of 1 from 2000 up to 2016.  
Table 13: HHIaggr for European airports 
  Change in HHIaggr 
Hub airport 2000 
2000-
2004 
2004-
2008 
2008-
2012 
2012-
2016 
LHR 0.38 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 
CDG 0.55 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
AMS 0.35 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
FRA 0.41 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
IST 1.00 -0.01 -0.15 -0.18 -0.10 
MAD 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BCN 0.94 -0.15 -0.08 0.10 0.08 
LGW 0.40 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 
MUC 0.48 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 
FCO 0.98 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 
SVO 0.52 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 
ORY 0.55 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
SAW 0.00 0.99 -0.15 -0.18 -0.10 
CPH 0.78 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
DME 0.52 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 
DUB 0.60 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 
ZRH 0.44 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
PMI 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MAN 0.34 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.03 
OSL 0.90 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.08 
ARN 0.82 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 
STN 0.45 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 
DUS 0.25 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
VIE 0.79 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 
LIS 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BRU 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
TXL 0.51 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
ATH 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MXP 0.41 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
AYT 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
HEL 0.89 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
PRG 0.63 0.12 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
WAW 1.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.20 -0.06 
BUD 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LYS 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 
KEF 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
In the second category, there is only a small number of airports with a rather constant HHIaggr 
over time, meaning that the respective values in 2000 and 2016 are the same, including DUS, 
AYT, and VIE. The latter exhibits a high level of fluctuation over time, with a drop in the 
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HHIaggr level up to 2008 and an increase up to 2016 again. Three airports within this 
catchment experienced a decline in scheduled airline seats between 2008 and 2012, with 
Bratislava Airport (BTS) having the steepest decline with seats dropping by more than 70 
per cent (see Figure 13). VIE, on the contrary, saw an increase in offered seats within this 
period. Therefore, an increase in market concentration within this particular period can be 
observed.  
 
Figure 13: Development of scheduled seats at airports in VIE catchment 
Source: Own calculation using OAG data 
The third category incorporates those airports whose HHIaggr in the catchment has been 
increasing over time: MUC, CPH, DUB, HEL, PRG, and LYS. The highest increase in 
market concentration can be found in the catchment area of PRG, with an observed increase 
in HHIaggr of 0.12 from 2000 to 2004. Within this catchment, PRG is the largest airports, 
followed by Dresden Airport (DRS), with about half the number of seats offered in 2000 
(own calculation based on OAG data). PRG almost doubled its offered seats between 2000 
and 2004, whereas DRS only grew by two per cent in this period. Since the third airport in 
this catchment, Karlovy Vary Airport (KLV), is less than one per cent in terms of size 
compared to PRG, it does not have a significant impact on the degree of market 
concentration. MUC, as one of the largest European hub airports, has also seen an increase 
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in the HHIaggr in its catchment. Although with five additional airports representing a relatively 
high amount of competitors in the catchment, all these are rather small in terms of seats 
offered per year compared to MUC (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14: Development of scheduled seats at airports in MUC catchment 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
In the fourth category, three airports within the dataset are subject to a decrease in market 
concentration in each consecutive year: IST, SAW, and WAW. The decrease in market 
concentration at IST is due to an increasing number of airports offering scheduled services, 
namely SAW in 2004, and Cengiz Topel Airport (KCO) in 2008 and onwards. The same 
applies to WAW, which was the only airport operating in its catchment in 2000. From 2004 
onwards, Lodz Airport (LCJ) started offering scheduled airline services, and from 2012 
onwards also Nowy Dwor Mazowiecki Airport (WMI). The entrance of WMI into the market 
contributed to the steep decrease of 0.20 in the HHIaggr in the period between 2008 and 2012. 
With 18 European hub airports, the highest share of airports has seen a decrease in the HHIaggr 
in the period between 2000 and 2016, including seven of the ten largest airports in Europe: 
LHR, CDG, AMS, FRA, BCN, LGW, FCO, SVO, ORY, DME, ZRH, MAN, OSL, ARN, 
STN, BRU, TXL, MXP. Airports that stand out in regard to the absolute decrease in HHIaggr 
are the London airports LHR, LGW, and STN, the two airports in Moscow SVO and DME 
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as well  as ARN, FCO, and MXP. Taking LHR as an example of the development of market 
concentration for the London airports, the HHIaggr has been decreasing by 0.12 in between 
2000 and 2016, from 0.38 to 0.25. Figure 15 illustrates the development of the index over 
time, showing a slight increase in the period from 2008 to 2012. During this period, STN 
experienced a steep decrease in total seats offered, with about 18 per cent of the seats LHR 
offered in 2008, and less than ten per cent of these in 2012. In the following period from 2012 
to 2016 a decrease in the HHIaggr can be observed again, the growth of STN being one 
contributing factor.  
 
Figure 15: Development of HHIaggr in the LHR catchment 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
Adding to these observations, in the second part of the analysis, the overall level of the 
HHIaggr has to be considered. As discussed in Chapter 2.2 there are no fixed thresholds for 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index, or market shares in general, at which an industry or firm is 
implied to have market power. To obtain an indication how the level of the HHIaggr developed 
across the European hub airport dataset, Table 14 depicts the mean, minimum and maximum 
values as well as the standard deviation of the index, averaged across airports and over time.  
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Table 14: Development of HHIaggr for all European hub airports and over time 
HHIaggr 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Mean  0.67 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.62 
Standard deviation 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 
Minimum 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.24 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Median 0.60 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.57 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
It shows that the mean value of the HHIaggr is above 0.60 across the entire observed period 
and that the value does not fall below 0.25 in this time. The mean HHIaggr over time for each 
European hub airport is illustrated in Figure 16, comparing these to the mean as well as 
minimum Herfindahl Hirschman Index values across the dataset.  
The dark shaded blocks in this figure highlight those airports which have been facing a 
decreasing HHIaggr over the observed period. The majority of European hub airports in this 
category are well below the mean HHIaggr of the dataset. 
 
Figure 16: Mean HHIaggr for European hub airports (2000-2016) 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
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However, in order to derive a statement on the degree of aggregated market concentration 
for each airport, the number of competitors in each market has to be considered as well. As 
can be seen from (4) in Chapter 2.2.2, the number of firms is inversely related to the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index, and the lowest value this index can take is determined by 1/N, 
assuming firms of equal size in the market (Bikker & Haaf, 2002). For example, if there are 
ten competitors in the market with equal market shares, the lowest value the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index can take is 0.10. On the contrary, if there are only two firms of equal size 
in the market, the lowest value of the index is 0.50. Figure 17 depicts this specific relationship 
using the data for the European hub airports, i.e. the HHIaggr decreases with the number of 
competing airports in the catchment, and thus the more firms there are in the market, the 
lower is the HHIaggr. 
 
Figure 17: Correlation between HHIaggr and number of airports in the catchment 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
Taking this correlation into account, it is interesting to consider the minimum value the 
HHIaggr can attain for each airport and each year and compare the actual values to these. For 
example, in the catchment area of Amsterdam Airport (AMS) the number of airports rose 
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from five in 2000 to eight in 2016, thus arriving at minimum attainable values of 0.20 and 
0.13, respectively. The actual HHIaggr values for AMS in these years are 0.35 and 0.34, 
respectively. This implies that the variance in firm size is larger in 2016 than in 2000, i.e. it 
can be assumed that although new competitors entered the market, these are rather small in 
terms of size compared to the largest airport AMS in the catchment. Looking at the 45 degree 
line in Figure 18 shows that no hub catchment has an HHIaggr which is at the minimum 
attainable level. 
 
Figure 18: Comparison of actual HHIaggr to minimum attainable value 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
One hub airport catchment can be observed, though, which faced a decreasing HHIaggr over 
time and is moving close to its minimum attainable value, this includes the airports SVO and 
DME in Moscow. In this market, there are three firms (see Table 42), SVO, DME and 
Vnukovo Airport (VKO), thus leading to a minimum attainable HHIaggr of 0.33. The actual 
value of 0.37 in 2016 implies that seats within this catchment are rather evenly distributed 
across the three airports.  
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Giving a high-level insight into the development of market concentration in the catchment 
areas of European hub airports, it can be observed that almost 60 per cent of these have seen 
a decrease in the HHIaggr over the observed period between 2000 up to 2016. This 
development indicates that secondary airports within the catchment of hub airports have 
either started offering scheduled airline services, or extended their flight schedules within 
this period. Coming back to the initial argument outlined in Chapter 4.1, that European (hub) 
airports face an increasing level of competition due to smaller airports extending their 
services, the analysis here supports the argument of increased scheduled airline services at 
airports besides the hubs. However, from this initial analysis it cannot be concluded that 
European hub airports face an increasing level of competition from their counterparts in the 
catchment. The aggregated Herfindahl Hirschman Index here uses the total seats per year 
offered by each airport in a catchment. It therefore tells something about the distribution of 
size across the airports within a catchment, it does not, however, give insight into the overlap 
between destinations, and hence potential competition, these airports face from one another. 
Chapter 4.2.2 therefore focuses on the analysis of market concentration on the destination or 
route-level. This means that the degree of market concentration for each route or destination 
offered at the hub airports in the dataset is determined, taking into consideration the airports 
within the catchment. Investigating the overlap between offered destinations within a 
catchment thus yields insight into the substitution potential passengers have when wanting 
to travel to a specific destination.  
4.2.2 Analysis of market concentration on the route-level  
Continuing with the analysis of market concentration in the local catchment of European hub 
airports, this chapter focuses on the calculation and consecutive analysis of the disaggregated 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHIroute). The intention of this detailed approach is to 
determine the degree of overlap between routes that are offered at a hub airport and its 
secondary airports within the catchment. Figure 19 illustrates this approach in more detail:  
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Figure 19: Calculation of HHIroute for European hub airports 
Source: own depiction 
The left-hand side of the figure comprises all airports in a hub airport’s catchment (i, with i 
= 1, …, N), which all offer seats on a particular route r (or to a destination), with r = 1, …, 
M. Therefore, the total seats offered on route r (𝑄  per year are the sum of seats by all 
airports i in the catchment (𝑄 ,  in this year. The disaggregated Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
(HHIroute) is thus calculated as follows:  
𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝑠 ,  (13) 
Where 𝑠 , 𝑄 , 𝑄⁄  represents the share of airport i’s output 𝑄 ,  in total output in the 
catchment (𝑄 ) on route r. Calculating the HHIroute therefore yields a single value for each 
route offered at the hub airport. As in Chapter 4.2.1, the subsequent analysis of the HHIroute 
focuses on (1) the change of this index over time for different routes and by hub airport, as 
well as (2) the level across airports and the potential implications.  
In order to observe the change of the HHIroute for all European hub airports in the dataset, 
each route is analysed individually in terms of changes in its HHIroute value over time. This 
approach is illustrated in more detail by employing Frankfurt Airport (FRA) as an example. 
Figure 20 depicts the delta in a HHIroute between two consecutive periods, including all years 
in the dataset.  
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Figure 20: Development of HHIroute over time at Frankfurt Airport (FRA) 
Source: own depiction 
For example, the route from Frankfurt to New York John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) had a 
HHIroute value of 0.79 in 2012 and a value of 0.65 in 2016, thus leading to a delta of -0.14, as 
can be seen in the figure. The amount of seats offered on this particular route in 2016 
accounted for about 0.30 per cent of total seats offered at FRA in this year. Therefore, the 
observed decrease in concentration on this particular route adds to the total decrease in route 
concentration of 42 per cent at FRA over the entire observed period from 2000 to 2016. For 
FRA, 36 per cent of the offered seats over the entire period experienced an increase in market 
concentration, whereas 20 per cent of seats remained at the same level. Furthermore, two per 
cent of the routes in the period from 2000 to 2016 were offered within one period only. For 
FRA, it can thus be seen that the share of seats which experienced a decrease in market 
concentration exceeds that with an increase in the concentration level, suggesting a move 
towards a less concentrated catchment.  
4 Competition in the Local Catchment of European Hub Airports 
95 
 
Figure 21: Development of HHIroute over time at London Heathrow Airport (LHR) 
Source: own depiction 
Another example is LHR, which shows a similar pattern in terms of changes in route 
concentration as FRA, with 43 per cent of total seats offered between 2000 and 2016 being 
subject to a decrease in the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. Therefore, the decrease in route 
concentration also exceeds the increase, which applies to 33 per cent of total seats in LHR’s 
catchment in the years from 2000 to 2016. The route with the highest decrease in the HHIroute 
between two periods is LHR to Kos Airport (KGS) in Greece, with a value of 1 in 2012 and 
0.25 in 2016. This means that LHR was the only provider of this particular route in 2012, 
whereas at least three more airports in the catchment started offering this destination in the 
period after that. 
4 Competition in the Local Catchment of European Hub Airports 
96 
Table 15: Change in HHIroute at European hub airports over time 
 Share of total airport seats in a year 
Hub 
airport 
increase in 
HHIroute 
decrease in 
HHIroute 
stable 
HHIroute 
Only offered 
once 
MUC 44% 37% 16% 3% 
MAN 44% 40% 11% 6% 
DUS 43% 53% 0% 3% 
LYS 43% 44% 8% 5% 
ZRH 39% 40% 19% 2% 
AMS 39% 42% 17% 3% 
TXL 38% 46% 12% 4% 
BRU 38% 55% 3% 4% 
FRA 36% 42% 20% 2% 
DUB 34% 31% 29% 7% 
LHR 33% 43% 21% 2% 
ORY 32% 54% 8% 6% 
LGW 32% 56% 8% 4% 
VIE 28% 24% 44% 4% 
DME 28% 53% 8% 11% 
SVO 28% 48% 21% 3% 
OSL 27% 26% 45% 3% 
MXP 27% 47% 23% 4% 
BCN 26% 19% 51% 4% 
CDG 24% 33% 40% 3% 
STN 24% 43% 19% 14% 
ARN 18% 28% 52% 3% 
PRG 17% 15% 60% 8% 
HEL 16% 10% 70% 5% 
SAW 13% 60% 3% 24% 
CPH 12% 10% 74% 4% 
FCO 9% 12% 76% 3% 
AYT 8% 18% 67% 6% 
MAD 7% 9% 81% 3% 
WAW 7% 14% 71% 8% 
IST 6% 50% 37% 7% 
KEF 0% 0% 85% 15% 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
For all airports and each year, the following four categories of route development can be 
observed: 
(1) Increase in HHIroute: An increase in market concentration between two consecutive 
periods can be observed. 
(2) Decrease in HHIroute: A decrease in market concentration between two consecutive 
periods can be observed. 
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(3) Stable HHIroute: The level of market concentration remained the same between two 
consecutive periods.  
(4) A fourth category does not depict changes in the Herfindahl Hirschman Index but 
denotes those routes which have only been offered once at a hub airport.  
Table 15 shows these developments for all European hub airports across the observed period, 
airports are ranked in descending order of the increase in the HHIroute. 
At MXP, for example, 47 per cent of offered seats were subject to a decreasing HHIroute, 
compared to 27 per cent of routes experiencing an increase in the level of concentration. One 
reason for this might be the entry in 2002, and opening of a basis in 2003 of Ryanair at 
Bergamo Airport (BGY) (Orio al Serio International Airport, 2017). Following that, the 
airline has been expanding its operations quickly and has hence been imposing increasing 
competition on MXP. The same effect might apply for the case of BRU which saw increasing 
concentration for 38 per cent of offered seats but a decrease in concentration for 55 per cent 
of seats. Ryanair also opened a base at a nearby airport (CRL) in 2001 (Brussels South 
Charleroi Airport, 2017) and has been expanding operations quickly. 
Taking the airports of London as another example, LHR, LGW, and STN have been subject 
to a decreasing HHIroute for a high share of their routes in the period between 2000 and 2016, 
with 43 per cent for both LHR and STN, and with 56 per cent for LGW. In addition, at STN 
there is a high share of seats scheduled per year which are only offered once, i.e. certain 
routes are only offered during one year across the considered period27. This implies that STN 
has experienced more fluctuation in routes than the other London airports. As can be seen in 
Figure 15, STN experienced a drop in total seats in between 2008 and 2012, potentially 
resulting from the economic crisis of 2008/09, inducing airlines to focus on high-demand 
routes and cutting back the amount of scheduled services.  
Moving on from the level of change in market concentration the European hub airports have 
been facing over time, within the second part of the analysis an initial overview is obtained 
                                                 
27 However, since four-year intervals are considered in this analysis, a route may have been offered in 
consecutive years, but is not offered in consecutive periods, which represent the covered intervals.  
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by considering the mean value of the HHIroute across all routes by hub airport. The resulting 
values are reported in Table 16 and sorted in ascending order of the mean value.  
Table 16: Development of mean HHIroute for all European hub airports (all years)28 
Hub 
airport 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
DUS 0.42 0.35 0.11 1.00 0.22 
BRU 0.51 0.43 0.14 1.00 0.25 
LGW 0.65 0.58 0.18 1.00 0.27 
MAN 0.66 0.59 0.17 1.00 0.29 
AMS 0.67 0.60 0.16 1.00 0.27 
STN 0.70 0.64 0.22 1.00 0.26 
LHR 0.71 0.74 0.15 1.00 0.29 
FRA 0.71 0.72 0.17 1.00 0.29 
LYS 0.72 0.66 0.28 1.00 0.21 
SAW 0.73 0.68 0.48 1.00 0.19 
SVO 0.74 0.72 0.33 1.00 0.25 
DME 0.74 0.72 0.33 1.00 0.24 
ZRH 0.74 0.80 0.26 1.00 0.26 
TXL 0.76 0.89 0.23 1.00 0.26 
MUC 0.77 0.89 0.20 1.00 0.25 
ORY 0.78 0.81 0.34 1.00 0.20 
MXP 0.80 1.00 0.21 1.00 0.26 
DUB 0.87 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.21 
CDG 0.88 1.00 0.34 1.00 0.18 
IST 0.92 1.00 0.48 1.00 0.16 
VIE 0.92 1.00 0.29 1.00 0.16 
ARN 0.93 1.00 0.39 1.00 0.16 
PRG 0.93 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.15 
BCN 0.94 1.00 0.31 1.00 0.16 
OSL 0.94 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.15 
WAW 0.95 1.00 0.34 1.00 0.15 
FCO 0.96 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.11 
CPH 0.97 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.11 
HEL 0.99 1.00 0.52 1.00 0.06 
AYT 1.00 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.02 
MAD 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.00 
KEF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
ATH 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
BUD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
LIS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
PMI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
This mean HHIroute value across years and routes for each European hub airport is higher than 
the mean HHIaggr, which is depicted in Figure 16, for all airports but SAW. MXP, for 
example, has a mean HHIaggr of 0.30 but a mean HHIroute of 0.80, resulting in a delta of 0.50 
                                                 
28 The mean HHIroute for each hub airport and each year is included in Appendix 8.2. 
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depicted in Figure 22, thus having very different implications for the level of market 
concentration apparent in the catchment area of MXP. While the mean HHIaggr suggests that 
scheduled airline seats are rather evenly distributed across the airports in the MXP catchment, 
the mean HHIroute implies a rather high market concentration in the catchment, or 
alternatively, a low degree of overlap between airports in terms of routes offered. Figure 22 
outlines the difference in the mean values of the HHIroute and the HHIaggr for all European 
hub airports.  
 
Figure 22: Difference between HHIroute and HHIaggr 
Source: own depiction based on OAG data 
This overview outlines a high degree of deviation between the two Herfindahl Hirschman 
Indices for a high share of airports in the dataset. For the airports KEF, ATH, BUD, LIS, 
PMI, MAD, and AYT, there is either no or hardly any difference between the two average 
values. This is due to the fact that within the catchment of these airports no or only very 
small, in terms of scheduled airline services, other airports apart from the hubs are present. 
The deviation apparent for the other airports stems from the different aggregation level of the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Indices being compared. Whereas the aggregated index, HHIaggr, uses 
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the total seats per year offered at the airports as basis of calculation, the disaggregated one, 
HHIroute, takes the seats on the route level. Therefore, the latter draws a more accurate picture 
of the degree of overlap, or market concentration, a hub airports faces on its offered routes, 
and will therefore be applied as a reference to compare the degree of market concentration 
across European hub airports. Figure 23 sets the HHIroute (y-axis) in relation to the share of 
seats which saw a decrease in market concentration (in the HHIroute) over the examined period 
(x-axis).  
 
Figure 23: Mean HHIroute and level of decrease in market concentration 
Source: own depiction 
Based on this overview, European hub airports can be classified into different categories 
regarding the development of market concentration within their catchment, with these 
boundaries not being a strict division, but rather an indication which airports have been facing 
particular developments: 
I. Airports with a high value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index  (> 0.90) and a low 
share of seats with decreasing market concentration (< 30 per cent), including KEF, 
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CPH, MAD, HEL, WAW, AYT, FCO, PRG, BCN, VIE, ARN, OSL, and also those 
airports that do not have secondary airports within their catchment, PMI, LIS, BUD, 
ATH, and are hence not displayed here. 
II. Airports with a rather high value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (> 0.80) but a 
higher share of seats with decreasing market concentration (> 30 per cent), including: 
CDG, DUB. 
III. Airports with a high value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (> 0.8), but at the same 
time a high share of seats with decreasing market concentration (> 50 per cent), 
including IST.  
IV. Airports with a Herfindahl Hirschman Index value of less than 0.80 and above 0.60, 
and with the share of seats with decreasing market concentration between 30 per cent 
and 50 per cent, including MXP, MUC, TXL, ZRH, SVO, LYS, LHR, STN, MAN, 
AMS, FRA.  
V. Airports with a Herfindahl Hirschman Index value of less than 0.80 and above 0.60, 
and with the share of seats with decreasing market concentration and with a high 
share of seats with decreasing market concentration (> 50 per cent), including ORY, 
DME, SAW, LGW.  
VI. Airports with a Herfindahl Hirschman Index value of 0.50 or less and with a high 
share of seats with decreasing market concentration (> 50 per cent), including BRU 
and DUS.  
The threshold of 0.50 has been selected since this is the minimum attainable value of the 
HHIroute if there are two firms of equal size in the market. With more firms, this minimum 
attainable value is decreasing (as also discussed in the previous chapter). Being above this 
threshold therefore indicates that the overlap between the hub airport and its competitors in 
the catchment is only limited. 
Based on this analysis, it becomes apparent that about half of the European hub airports 
investigated in this sample (categories I and II), face a high degree of market concentration 
in their respective catchment, indicated by the level of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index as 
well as its change over time. Almost another 50 per cent of the European hub airports also 
exhibits a relatively high value in terms of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (Categories III, 
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IV, V), but the share of seats which has been subject to a decrease in market concentration is 
higher, and thus points to a continuous shift towards a less concentrated catchment of these 
hub airports. Only two airports (category I) within the considered airport dataset have 
relatively low Herfindahl Hirschman Index values, and at the same time a high share of seats 
with decreasing market concentration, implying a high and increasing route overlap within 
the catchments of these airports. Assuming that a high route overlap indicates more choice 
for passengers departing from and arriving at this catchment area, then the latter two airports 
BRU and DUS face increasing competition from their counterparts in the respective 
catchment areas.  
4.2.3 Adjusting the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for distance 
An extension to the previous route-based analysis of market concentration in the catchment 
areas of European hub airports is the consideration of different airport access times within 
this area. It is assumed that the attractiveness of a secondary airport decreases with increasing 
distance from the hub airport. Wiltshire (2013) finds that a one per cent increase in distance, 
or access time, to an airport, leads to a decrease in passengers’ likelihood to travel to this 
airport by four per cent. This decreasing substitution potential of further away secondary 
airports is hence accounted for by calculating the distance-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index (HHIdist). The weight within this index accounts for the distance, or driving time, 
between each secondary airport and the hub airport, and hence for variation in access times.  
Considering the application of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, the incorporation of 
weighting factors has been introduced before, such as by Hannan (1997) and Lijesen (2004) 
(see Chapter 2.2.2 for a detailed discussion of this approach). Ibid. introduces a quality factor 
accounting for a better flight connection in terms of overall flight time. This quality factor is 
represented in the following analysis by the time it takes to access a particular airport within 
the hub airport’s catchment. The adjustment of the route-level Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
HHIroute is therefore conducted in line with these previous approaches and elaborated in more 
detail in this chapter. This includes (1) the calculation of the weight being introduced as well 
as (2) the outline of differences in regard to the previously applied HHIroute.  
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In order to obtain the weighting factor 𝑤  the driving time in minutes from each secondary 
airport i to the hub airport within a catchment area is determined (14). Since for each hub 
airport’s catchment a maximum threshold of 120 minutes has been assumed (see Chapter 
4.1.1), the individual drive time for each secondary airport (𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ) is divided by this. 
𝑤 1 0.7
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
120 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠
 (14) 
Furthermore, a threshold of 0.3029 is introduced in order to avoid that the weight of the 
secondary airport tends towards zero, i.e. the weight of an airport cannot be less than 0.3030. 
This accounts for the fact that there is always a particular share of passengers willing to 
substitute to a secondary airport within the catchment. The introduction of the weighting 
factor 𝑤  to the calculation of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index therefore yields: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝑠 , 𝑤  (15) 
Table 17 provides an example of the application of the HHIdist in a hub airport’s catchment. 
The second column shows the number of seats per year offered on a particular route.  
Table 17: Example of the calculation of HHIdist 
Airport 
Seats per 
year 
HHIroute 
DriveTimei 
(in minutes) 
DriveTimej/120 wdi HHIdist 
Hub 55000 0.076 0 0 1.00 0.076    
Secondary 1 20000 0.01 40 0.33    0.77    0.008    
Secondary 2 15000 0.006 80 0.67    0.53    0.003    
Secondary 3 110000 0.303 110 0.92    0.36    0.109    
Sum 200,000 0.395       0.195    
Source: own depiction 
                                                 
29 Appendix 8.4 provides a sensitivity analysis of the variation of the defined threshold. Selecting a rather high 
threshold with 0.30 is due to the assumption that passengers travelling for private or leisure reasons are more 
willing to travel longer distances, as discussed in Chapter 4.1.1, and this particular group constitutes a high 
share of overall travellers. 
30 The airport Secondary 3, for example, has a distance of 110 minutes’ drive time from the hub airport. Dividing 
this by the total distance yields a distance share of 92 per cent. Multiplying this with the threshold factor and 
applying (14), yields a weighting factor of 0.36. Thus, instead of this airport having the same weight as those 
airports closer to the hub, it obtains a lower weight since it is further away and is hence a less attractive 
substitute.    
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Within the catchment, four different airports have scheduled airline services to this 
destination, each with distinct amount of seats. The HHIroute is then calculated using these 
and arriving at a value of 0.395 for this route. As can be seen from the example, the Secondary 
3 airport is the one with the most seats on this route within this catchment. However, since 
this airport is furthest away from the hub airport, passengers may be less willing to substitute 
this for the services offered at the hub airport. Coming back to the example in Table 17, the 
HHIdist is lower than the HHIroute with a value of 0.195, and thus representing the degree of 
overlap on this route faced by the hub airport in this catchment. 
Table 18 outlines the results for the HHIdist for all European hub airports over time. 
Comparing these results with those of the HHIroute shows that the mean value of the distance-
weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Index is either higher or at the same level than those values 
for the HHIroute. The airports of DUS, BRU, and LYS have the highest delta in relation to the 
two indices. Adjusting for the distance within the catchment therefore reveals that routes are 
more concentrated at these airports than the HHIroute initially implied. This might be due to 
the fact that, considering the route-level, other secondary airports in the catchment, which 
are rather far away from the considered hub airport, are offering seats. Therefore, the 
potential degree of competition imposed by these secondary airports is not as strong as 
suggested by the HHIroute.  
These two indices, the HHIroute and the HHIdist are both included as variables in the empirical 
analyses in Chapter 4.3.3 in order to assess the impact of market concentration on the seat 
capacities offered at European hub airports, and to investigate the potentially different effect 
of a distance-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Index. 
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Table 18: Development of HHIdist for all European hub airports over time 
Hub airport Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
DUS 0.24 0.16 0.06 1.00 0.28 
BRU 0.33 0.22 0.07 1.00 0.31 
AMS 0.58 0.45 0.10 1.00 0.29 
LGW 0.58 0.48 0.12 1.00 0.28 
LYS 0.60 0.48 0.17 1.00 0.24 
STN 0.60 0.47 0.16 1.00 0.28 
MAN 0.62 0.53 0.10 1.00 0.30 
FRA 0.66 0.69 0.09 1.00 0.29 
DME 0.66 0.56 0.23 1.00 0.25 
SAW 0.66 0.59 0.44 1.00 0.20 
SVO 0.67 0.60 0.23 1.00 0.26 
ZRH 0.67 0.76 0.12 1.00 0.27 
LHR 0.68 0.72 0.10 1.00 0.29 
TXL 0.72 0.82 0.13 1.00 0.27 
MUC 0.72 0.88 0.12 1.00 0.26 
ORY 0.73 0.68 0.24 1.00 0.21 
MXP 0.77 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.26 
CDG 0.86 1.00 0.27 1.00 0.19 
DUB 0.87 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.21 
PRG 0.91 1.00 0.23 1.00 0.15 
VIE 0.91 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.16 
IST 0.92 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.16 
ARN 0.92 1.00 0.32 1.00 0.16 
BCN 0.93 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.16 
OSL 0.93 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.15 
WAW 0.94 1.00 0.22 1.00 0.15 
FCO 0.95 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.11 
CPH 0.96 1.00 0.31 1.00 0.11 
HEL 0.98 1.00 0.28 1.00 0.06 
AYT 1.00 1.00 0.30 1.00 0.02 
KEF 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.00 
MAD 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.00 
ATH 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
BUD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
LIS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
PMI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
Building on the analysis of market concentration in the catchment of European hub airports 
in Chapter 4.2, the following chapter focuses on the assessment of the impact of this on output 
decisions at the respective hub airports. As elaborated in Chapter 2.2, merely assessing the 
degree of market concentration does not give comprehensive evidence whether a firm 
possesses and subsequently abuses market power. In this chapter a detailed insight into the 
degree and change of market concentration at European hub airports was given. Investigating 
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the effect of market concentration on the output, i.e. seat capacities, offered at these airports 
gives further insight whether abusive behaviour due to market power can be assumed.  
 Empirical analysis 
In order to gain more insight into the effects of market concentration, this chapter conducts 
an empirical analysis to investigate the following research questions, as outlined in Chapter 
1:  
(2) What is the impact of market concentration on the output decisions, in terms of seats 
offered to a particular destination, at European hub airports? As a measure for market 
concentration, both the route-level (HHIroute) and the distance-weighted Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHIdist) will be employed as explanatory variables in the 
regression analysis. 
(3) As discussed in Chapter 4.1.2, low cost carriers are presumed to have an impact on 
the rising constraints on hub airports’ market power since these particular airlines are 
often believed to locate their operations at smaller airports with spare capacity, i.e. 
those secondary airports within a hub airport’s catchment. The second research 
question within this chapter therefore assesses the impact of low cost carrier presence 
on the output decisions on the route level at hub airports.  
(4) Furthermore, Chapter 3.2.1 highlighted the potential competition from other modes 
of transport, such as (high-speed) rail, which might constrain the potential market 
power of hub airports. The third research question therefore focuses on the evaluation 
of the effect of (high-speed) rail services on the seats offered per route at European 
hub airports. Since these particular transport services are assumed to be only 
competitive with aviation up to a certain range, measured in terms of journey time, 
only a particular market segment will be considered for the analysis.  
According to these research questions, this chapter is structured into five main parts. The first 
part (Chapter 4.3.1) introduces and describes the variables employed in the empirical models, 
which in turn are introduced and discussed in Chapter 4.3.2. The application of these models 
can be found in Chapter 4.3.3, focusing on the effect of market concentration, Chapter 4.3.4, 
investigating the impact of low cost carrier, and Chapter 4.3.5 with the findings on the 
implications of competition from rail services. 
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4.3.1 Selection of variables  
Since the previously stated research questions address the impact of market concentration, 
low cost carrier presence in the catchment areas of European hub airports, and implications 
of rail competition on the output of these airports, the dependent variables in the empirical 
estimations will be specified to represent this investigated causality. Hence these are reflected 
by the total seats (Seats) offered on a route r per year, the mean seats per flight on this route 
r (MeanSeats), and the mean number of flights per week (Frequency). The data to calculate 
these variables is extracted from the OAG database, which reports scheduled airline traffic, 
and includes the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, all these variables are in logarithmic 
format. The reasoning is given in Chapter 4.3.2. 
These dependent as well as the different explanatory variables are outlined in Table 19. 
Population and gross domestic product per capita, often used as a proxy for the income level, 
are outlined by various studies as the main drivers determining the level of air transport 
demand in a country (Dobruszkes, Lennert & Hamme, 2011; Kluge et al., 2017). Therefore, 
within the estimation it is accounted for the level of potential demand on a particular route 
by including the size of the urban region at the destination in terms of population (log(Pop)) 
(United Nations / Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2014). Furthermore, a variable 
is included which presents the average gross domestic product per capita of the arrival 
country (log(Gdp)) (The World Bank, 2017). Since demand is expected to be higher to 
destinations with both a higher total population and GDP per capita, the coefficients for these 
explanatory variables are presumed to be positive.  
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Table 19: Variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Description 
log(Seats) The number of seats offered at hub airport to a specific destination (route) per 
year, dependent variable (logarithmic variable). 
log(MeanSeats) The mean number of seats per flight offered at the hub airport on a particular 
route, dependent variable (logarithmic variable). 
log(Frequency) The number of flights per week offered to a particular destination, dependent 
variable (logarithmic variable). 
log(Pop) The population in the urban area at destination, measured in ‘000 persons 
living in a particular urban region (logarithmic variable) 
log(Gdp) The gross domestic product per capita in the arrival country (logarithmic 
variable). 
Network The route is operated by the network carrier of the hub airport, dummy 
variable which is 1 if the network carrier operates on a specific route. 
HHIroute The Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the route level (i.e. for each destination 
offered at the hub airport), calculated by summing the square of each airport’s 
seat share in total seats on a route in the catchment. 
HHIdist The distance-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the route level (i.e. for 
each destination offered at the hub airport). 
log(Distance) Distance of the route, i.e. from origin to destination, in kilometres. 
Year Categorical variable indicating the year of the observation (reference year = 
2000). 
Ownership Variable indicating the number of airports within the catchment which are 
under the same ownership structure. 
Lcc Variable indicating the number of low cost carrier in the catchment operating 
the same routes as the airlines at the hub 
Hsr Variable representing the ratio between the rail kilometres in a country to the 
total size of the country (measured in square kilometres) 
Source: own depiction 
Furthermore, a variable is included which accounts for the operation of a network carrier at 
the hub airport (Network). Since the main focus of this thesis is on hub airports, the respective 
network carriers operating a hub-and-spoke network via these airports play an essential role 
in determining the level of competition imposed by other airports. For example, a route may 
appear to be competitive, since it is offered by other airports in the catchment as well. If the 
network carrier at the hub airport offers a large share of seats on this particular route, the 
node character of the airport may imply that a large share of passengers might be transferring 
from this route to another flight and hence cannot substitute to another airport in the 
catchment. With this underlying assumption, the effect on the overall output on a route in the 
presence of the network carrier will be tested. The respective network carriers operating at 
each European hub airport considered in the dataset is outlined in Table 47 in Appendix 8.5. 
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In the empirical analysis, a dummy variable is applied which is equal to one if the route is 
offered by the according network carrier. Since the network carrier at European hub airports 
usually make up a high share of the total seats offered at these (Table 48), the sign of this 
variable’s coefficient is expected to be positive.  
As further explanatory variable and a proxy for the level of market concentration on a route 
both the route-level (HHIroute) and distance-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Indices (HHIdist) 
are included in the estimation, respectively. These two indices have been elaborated in detail 
in Chapters 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. According to the theory on (natural) monopoly discussed in 
Chapter 2.1.1, a negative coefficient of these variables is expected due to the assumption that 
a monopolistic market, represented by high market concentration, leads to a restriction of 
output in that particular market. Other studies have been integrating the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index as an explanatory variable in a regression analysis to account for effects 
induced by competition. Fageda (2013), for example, focuses on the analysis of the Spanish 
airline market and whether liberalisation had an effect on the level of competition on thin 
routes. The empirical model tests the effect of increasing competition on prices and 
frequencies, including as explanatory variables instruments for demand (population, gross 
domestic product, and the number of tourists) and for route concentration, using the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index. The results show that an increase in concentration at the airport 
level leads to a decrease in frequencies offered. Accounting for the effect of market 
concentration or competition on a particular route has previously also been applied by Givoni 
& Rietveld (2009), Fageda (2013), or Albalate, Bel & Fageda (2015). 
Another explanatory variable is included which accounts for the distance between the 
departure and the arrival airport (log(Distance)), i.e. the distance on the route, and is 
measured in kilometres. The distance between two points is reported in the OAG database. 
It is expected that the number of seats offered as well as the mean frequencies per week on a 
route decrease with distance, thus the coefficient of these variables is presumed to be 
negative. However, in case of mean seats per flight (log(MeanSeats)) as dependent variable, 
a positive coefficient is expected. This variable represents a proxy for aircraft size, and long-
haul destinations are served by larger aircraft such as the Airbus A340 or the Boeing 777 
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whereas short-haul traffic is usually covered by aircraft types such as Airbus A320 or Boeing 
737. 
A categorical variable is also introduced for each year (Year), with the year 2000 being the 
reference year, and thus the effect of each individual year can be measured. This allows for 
the incorporation of year-specific developments such as the financial crisis in the years 2008 
and 2009, for example.   
The ownership structure of airports within the same catchment and the effect on competition 
has been discussed in the case of different airports. For example, the ownership of several 
UK airports, especially in south-east England and lowland Scotland, by the company BAA 
Limited induced the Competition Commission (2009) to analyse in detail the potential 
adverse effects on competition of this common ownership. The evaluation revealed negative 
effects for competition, and thus lead to a divestiture of Stansted Airport (STN) and Gatwick 
Airport (LGW) to different owners. Furthermore, the report concluded that also Edinburgh 
Airport (EDI) and Glasgow Airport (GLA) need to be assigned to separate ownership in order 
to foster competition in the particular catchment. To include this aspect in the empirical 
estimations in the following chapters, a variable is included which accounts for the number 
of airports in the catchment area which are under the same ownership as the hub airport. See 
Table 49 in Appendix 8.6 for an outline of the common ownership across airports within a 
catchment. Since the effect of common ownership on the output offered at the hub airports 
is measured, a negative coefficient is expected: An adverse effect of common ownership is 
the restriction of competition on aspects such as price, service, or innovation, or the 
restriction of an overlap between routes offered at the different airports. If a route at the hub 
airport is also offered by another airport in the catchment which has the same owner, it would 
be expected that this leads to a reduction of output offered at the hub airport.  
The effect of low cost carrier presence (Lcc) will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4.3.4, 
which also includes a detailed description of this variable. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4.3.5 investigates the impact of available rail services (Hsr) on the 
seats offered at the hub airport. Since rail is competitive with air services only up to a 
particular distance in terms of overall journey time, only a subset of the data will be 
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considered for this particular analysis. This parameter is elaborated in detail in the respective 
chapter.  
Table 20: Descriptive statistics of variables (values at the route level) 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Seats 24909 103709 174561 8 3718962 
MeanSeats 24909 165.09 72.51 5 582 
Frequency 24909 13.59 21.58 0.02 441 
Pop 16926 3371 4874 141 38140 
Gdp 24466 28986 16207 411 141543 
Network 24909 0.47 0.50 0 1 
HHIroute 24909 0.79 0.26 0.11 1 
HHIdist 24909 0.75 0.32 0.06 1 
Distance 24909 2526 2483 100 11883 
Ownership 24909 0.19 0.47 0 3 
Lcc 24909 0.37 1.03 0 14 
Source: own depiction 
Table 20 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables considered in the empirical 
analysis. It shows that over a period of 16 years, 24,909 routes are considered. Population 
and GDP data is, however, only available for 16,926 and 24,466 of the considered routes, 
respectively. The number of seats per route is measured on an annual basis and these range 
from a minimum of 8 to a maximum of 3,718,962 seats per year. Market concentration on 
the route level, represented by HHIroute, has a mean value of 0.79, and the distance-weighted 
adjustment of this index, HHIdist, a value of 0.74.   
4.3.2 Model specification 
In the following empirical analysis, panel data, or longitudinal data, is applied which means 
that both time-series as well as cross-sectional data is considered. In the cross-sectional case, 
the individual routes offered across the European hub airport sample are considered as the 
entities whereas the time-series dimension includes data for the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 
2012, and 2016. Panel data is often applied to address the omitted variable bias in simple 
regression since with this approach changes in the dependent variable are observed over time 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 420; Stock and Watson, 2007, p. 349). In the analysis here, both an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as well as models including time fixed effects are 
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estimated. The models applied to each specific research question, and the respective 
estimation results are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Based on the first research question in this chapter, i.e. the effect of market concentration on 
the amount of seats offered at a hub airport on a particular route r, the following models are 
estimated in Chapter 4.3.3. Here, the hub airport’s total number of scheduled airline seats, 
log(Seats), the mean seats per flight, log(MeanSeats), and the mean frequency per week 
log(Frequency), on a particular route r are used as dependent variables, the respective 
equations are displayed in brackets: 
1. OLS estimation for each year separately, testing for the effect of market concentration 
[(16) – (18); results in Chapter 4.3.3] 
2. OLS estimation combining observations for all years, introducing a time fixed effect 
for each year, testing for the effect of market concentration [(19); results in Chapter 
4.3.3] 
As outlined, in the first step, a multiple regression is estimated by OLS for each year 
separately, based on the following equations, starting with the total seats on a route, 
log(Seats), as the dependent variable: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑑𝑝
𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑢  
(16) 
With r representing the route, r = 1, …, M, and and 𝑢  is the error term. Continuing with the 
mean seats per flight, log(MeanSeats), as dependent variable:   
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠
𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑑𝑝
𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑢  
(17) 
And the same equation with frequency per week, log(Frequency), as dependent variable: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑑𝑝
𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑢  
(18) 
The results are displayed in Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25 in Chapter 4.3.3. 
In the second model employed in this chapter, panel data including all routes over the 
observed period from 2000 to 2016 is applied to estimate the impact of market concentration 
on airport output. Since a relatively short time period with a high number of routes is 
considered, this is referred to as a short panel. Furthermore, a balanced panel is used, which 
means that only those routes are considered that are offered in each time period. Within this 
model, a time fixed effect is considered, which allows controlling for variables that are 
constant over routes but vary over time.  
The purpose of employing this particular model is to observe the time fixed effects, i.e. to 
account for developments which took place in the observed periods, but which are not 
included in the model, and thus accounting for omitted variable bias. Therefore, in model 
(19), 𝛾  is treated as the unknown intercept which is to be estimated for each time period, 
with 𝑡 ∈  2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 . In the estimation, the first of these binary 
variables is omitted to prohibit perfect multicollinearity. The model can be estimated using 
OLS regression since the time fixed effects model represent a variation of the multiple 
regression model, also called Least Squares Dummy Variables Estimator (LSDV) (Stock & 
Watson, 2007:p.363; Wooldridge, 2010:p.308) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑑𝑝
𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝛾
𝑢  
(19) 
Here, the model will also be applied for all three dependent variables specified in (16), (17), 
and (18). The results are displayed in Table 26 in Chapter 4.3.3 for the 𝐻𝐻𝐼  as well as 
for the 𝐻𝐻𝐼  in Table 27.  
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The same model as in (19) is applied to test for the effect of low cost carrier presence in the 
catchment of European hub airports. Therefore, continuing the outline of the models 
employed in the following chapters, the variable Lcc is included in the following way. 
3. OLS estimation combining observations for all years, introducing a time fixed effect 
for each year, testing for the effect of low cost carrier presence in the catchment [(20); 
results in Chapter 4.3.4]:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑑𝑝
𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝛽 𝐿𝑐𝑐 𝛾 𝑢  
(20) 
The model is also tested for the dependent variables log(MeanSeats) and log(Frequency). 
The results are displayed in Chapter 4.3.4 in Table 28. 
As a last step in the analysis of potential competition for European hub airports within their 
catchment, the effect of rail services on the capacities offered at hub airports is considered in 
model (21). 
4. OLS estimation combining observations for all years, introducing a time fixed effect 
for each year, testing for the effect of rail services presence in the catchment [(21); 
results in Chapter 4.3.5]: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑑𝑝
𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝛽 𝐿𝑐𝑐 𝛽 𝐻𝑠𝑟 𝛾 𝑢  
(21) 
As above, the model is also tested for the dependent variables log(MeanSeats) and 
log(Frequency). Since this last model only considers a subset of the data which is considered 
in the other models the descriptive statistics are outlined in the respective chapter.  
The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the strength of a linear relationship between 
two variables (Fahrmeier et al., 2011:p.138). It can take values between -1 and 1, with these 
extrema representing a perfect linear relationship between two variables. In case this 
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coefficient takes on the value 0, there is no relationship between the considered variables. In 
Table 21, only continuous variables are considered in order to detect the functional 
relationship between these.  
Table 21: Pearson correlation coefficient for selected variables 
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log(Seats) 1.00              
Seats 0.64 1.00             
log(MeanSeats) 0.08 0.09 1.00            
MeanSeats 0.05 0.06 0.93 1.00           
log(Frequency) 0.96 0.61 -0.21 -0.22 1.00          
Frequency 0.64 0.94 -0.12 -0.16 0.66 1.00         
log(Pop) 0.22 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.11 0.05 1.00        
Pop 0.17 0.11 0.34 0.38 0.07 0.01 0.84 1.00       
log(Gdp) 0.19 0.18 -0.15 -0.16 0.23 0.20 -0.06 -0.06 1.00      
Gdp 0.19 0.17 -0.06 -0.05 0.20 0.17 -0.04 -0.06 0.88 1.00     
HHIroute -0.19 -0.14 0.03 0.09 -0.19 -0.16 0.12 0.13 0.12 -0.02 1.00    
HHIdist -0.10 -0.08 0.04 0.09 -0.11 -0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.01 0.97 1.00   
log(Distance) -0.13 -0.18 0.71 0.77 -0.33 -0.36 0.42 0.39 0.30 -0.18 0.18 0.16 1.00  
Distance -0.04 -0.09 0.65 -0.05 -0.23 -0.26 0.46 0.46 -0.25 -0.13 0.22 0.20 0.90 1.00 
Source: own depiction 
In regard to these continuous variables in the model, a non-linear relationship is expected. 
For example, considering the correlation between seats per capita and the income level, 
measured in GDP per capita, Figure 24 depicts the non-linear relationship between these two 
variables. An increase in the GDP per capita, shown in ‘000 U.S. dollar, thus is assumed to 
have a smaller effect on the seats per capita at high levels of income than it does at the lower 
end of the income scale.  
A similar relationship is assumed between the dependent variables and the explanatory 
variables Pop and Distance. Therefore, the dependent variables as well as Gdp, Pop and 
Distance are measured in logarithms. 
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Figure 24: Airline seats per capita (log-scale) versus GDP per capita, by country (2014) 
Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation (2014) 
In a non-linear model the coefficients are interpreted in a different way than in a linear model, 
depending whether either the dependent or independent or both variables are in logarithmic 
form, the interpretation of the respective coefficient is displayed in Table 22.  
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Table 22: Interpretation of the coefficients in logarithmic regression 
Case Regression specification Interpretation of coefficient of coefficient of independent 
variable (β) 
I The independent variable is 
in logarithmic format (linear-
log model) 
A 1% change in the independent variable is associated 
with a change in the dependent variable of 0.01 times the 
coefficient of the independent variable (β). 
II The dependent variable is in 
logarithmic format (log-
linear model) 
A change in the independent variable by one unit is 
associated with a change in the dependent variable of 
100 times the coefficient of the independent variable in 
per cent (β%).  
III Both the dependent and the 
independent variable are in 
logarithmic format (log-log 
model) 
A one per cent change in the independent variable is 
associated with a change in the dependent variable in the 
magnitude of the coefficient, so the coefficient β is the 
elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the 
independent variable.  
Source: adapted from Stock & Watson (2007:p.273) 
Having defined the different models, the following chapters will each address one of the 
research questions highlighted at the beginning of Chapter 4.3 and discuss the respective 
findings. 
4.3.3 Effects of market concentration on airport output 
The empirical estimation in this chapter looks into the potential competition a hub airport 
faces from its secondary airports in the catchment. In this case, the level of competition is 
approximated by applying the Herfindahl Hirschman Index as a measure for market 
concentration. The output of the hub airports is measured in terms of seats per year, 
log(Seats), the mean seats per flight, log(MeanSeats), and the mean number of flights per 
week, log(Frequency).  The impact of market concentration on these is then assessed using 
both the route-level (HHIroute) and the distance-weighted Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
(HHIdist). The initial assumption is that the output at the hub airports decreases with 
increasing market concentration on a route, reflected by an increasing Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index. Therefore, a negative impact of the explanatory variables HHIroute and HHIdist on the 
seats offered to a destination is expected. The chapter starts with the discussion of the results 
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for the OLS estimation, as outlined in (16), (17), and (18), before continuing with a further 
specification of the empirical models and the comparison of respective results.  
Table 23 shows the results of the regression using the seats offered per year on a particular 
route as dependent variable. In a first step, the following aspects are considered in assessing 
the validity of the results, see Stock & Watson (2007:pp.200–204): 
 The standard error of the regression (SER), which estimates the standard deviation of 
the error term ɛ, i.e. it measures the spread of the distribution of the dependent 
variable around the regression line. A smaller value indicates that observations are 
closer to this line. It is reported in each for each specified model. 
 The R2 gives information on the fit of the model, i.e. it shows the fraction of the 
sample variance of the dependent variable which is explained by the explanatory 
variables. 
 Ensuring no perfect multicollinearity.  
 Standard error for each OLS estimator (displayed in parentheses under the respective 
coefficients), which estimates the standard deviation of the sampling distribution of 
β. A smaller standard error implies a more precise estimation.  
 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity; the models are adjusted to account 
for heteroskedasticity, since it is assumed that the variance of the conditional 
distribution of the error term (ur) is not constant for r = 1, …, M, with r being the 
observations in the sample, i.e. the routes.  
 The significance probability, the p-value, is reported for each estimated coefficient. 
The estimation results for the dependent variable log(Seats) imply that the OLS estimate of 
the multiple regression line fit the data well. The SER is low for all models in Table 23, 
suggesting a low distribution of the error term around the regression line. The R2 values for 
the different models are between 0.33 and 0.38, which denotes that between 33 per cent and 
38 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the selected variables. 
Low values of R2 are not inherently bad, but it is rather important to assess the coefficient 
estimates and the distribution of residuals. An approach to deal with the potential presence 
of heteroskedasticity in a model is the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, as 
indicated in the table. Furthermore, it is important to exclude the existence of perfect 
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multicollinearity. The statistical software Stata®, which is used for the empirical analysis in 
this thesis, provides a test for the existence of multicollinearity, which is applied to the 
estimation results here (Stata, n.d.). This test calculates the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
and tolerances for each explanatory variable. Multicollinearity exists if the largest VIF value 
is larger than 10 (or larger than 30 in other studies, ibid.), and the mean of all the VIFs is 
considerably larger than 1. These respective results for models (1a) to (1e) suggest that the 
explanatory variables are no perfect linear combination of the other independent variables, 
i.e. it says that no perfect multicollinearity exists between the variables. However, as 
Wooldridge (2009:p.99) points out, “… such statistics are of questionable value because they 
might reveal a “problem” simply because two control variables, …, are highly correlated”. 
Since the main interest in this chapter is in the causal effect of market concentration on the 
seat capacities offered at the hub airport, the VIFs of other coefficient might not be as 
important. The standard errors as well as the significance for each estimator are outlined in 
the respective tables and discussed accordingly. 
Assessing the results for the dependent variable log(Seats) across all considered time periods, 
it shows a positive coefficient for both the population and the gross domestic product per 
capita variables, both being statistically significant in each model. Since both the dependent 
and the independent variables are in log-format, a one per cent increase in population 
log(Pop) leads to a 0.47 per cent increase in seats offered in the year 2016. In the previous 
time periods this effect is slightly lower. For the GDP per capita, log(Gdp), a one per cent 
increase in this variable means that total seats offered on a route per year increase by 0.40 
per cent in 2016. This result confirms the assumption that higher demand on a route leads to 
more seats being offered on this.  
The Network variable is also statistically significant across all five models in Table 23, and 
it has a positive coefficient as expected in the initial assumptions in Chapter 4.3.1. It implies 
that the presence of a network carrier on a particular route leads to an increase in seats offered 
per year by 137 per cent (in 2016).  
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Table 23: Results OLS estimation with log(Seats) as dependent variable (per year) 
Variable (1a) 2000 (1b) 2004 (1c) 2008 (1d) 2012 (1e) 2016 
log(Pop) 0.33*** 
(0.03) 
0.33*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.02) 
0.41*** 
(0.02) 
0.47*** 
(0.02) 
log(Gdp) 0.44*** 
(0.03) 
0.37*** 
(0.03) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
0.38*** 
(0.03) 
0.40*** 
(0.03) 
HHIroute -1.09*** 
(0.11) 
-0.99*** 
(0.11) 
-0.73*** 
(0.10) 
-1.11*** 
(0.10) 
-1.55*** 
(0.10) 
Network 1.28*** 
(0.06) 
1.45*** 
(0.05) 
1.26*** 
(0.05) 
1.27*** 
(0.04) 
1.37*** 
(0.05) 
log(Distance) -0.19*** 
(0.05) 
-0.13*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24 
(0.03) 
-0.16*** 
(0.11) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
Ownership 0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.33*** 
(0.05) 
0.28*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
Intercept 5.62*** 
(0.39) 
5.65*** 
(0.41) 
6.31*** 
(0.37) 
5.30*** 
(0.39) 
5.37*** 
(0.42) 
Observations 2740 2976 3419 3692 3928 
R2 0.3782 0.3764 0.3535 0.3388 0.3463 
SER 1.2818 1.2848 1.2654 1.3123 1.4185 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
In regard to the Ownership variable, a positive coefficient for all observed time periods can 
be observed, with all being statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level. The positive 
effect of this specific variable is contrary to the expectation that an overlap in ownership 
between airports in the same catchment leads to a reduction in seats offered per year. It can 
be seen that the existence of an additional airport with the same ownership as the hub airport 
leads to an increase of seats at the latter by 22 per cent in 2016. This result is contrary to the 
assumption in Chapter 4.3.1, which expected a negative coefficient. Looking at Table 49 in 
Appendix 8.6 shows that the common ownership between a hub airport and its secondary 
airports is mainly with smaller airports in the catchment. Therefore routes offered at these 
smaller airports may be duplicated at the hub airport instead of each airport focusing on a 
particular segment, and thus yielding the positive coefficient for this variable. 
Another control variable, log(Distance), shows the expected sign in all models in Table 23: 
with an increase in distance by one per cent a decrease in offered seats by 0.21 per cent can 
be observed. This implies that a higher focus is placed on short-haul to medium-haul 
distances at the hub airports. 
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The main causal effect investigated in this chapter is that of market concentration, 
represented by the route-level Herfindahl Hirschman Index, on the output offered at the hub 
airports. Considering the variable log(Seats), the independent variable HHIroute is statistically 
significant at the 99.9 per cent level across all considered time periods. Furthermore, it shows 
a negative coefficient as was expected in Chapter 4.3.1. This means that an increase in the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index leads to a decrease in the seats offered on a route at the hub 
airport in 2016, for example. These findings confirm the assumption that an increase in 
market concentration in the catchment leads to a decrease of the output, in this case the 
number of seats offered on a route in a year, and thus represents a potential abusive behaviour 
due to limited competition.  
Considering the dependent variable log(meanSeats), which serves as a proxy for the aircraft 
size employed on a particular route, the models outlined in Table 24 are less significant than 
those for log(Seats) as dependent variable. All models exhibit no multicollinearity and 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Both explanatory variables accounting for 
the level of demand on a particular route have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the mean number of seats offered per flight. A one per cent increase in the population in the 
urban region of the destination airport leads to a 0.04 per cent increase in the mean number 
of seats per flight in 2016, for example.  
Contrary to models (1a) to (1e), the Network variable in Table 24 is only statistically 
significant in 2000 and 2008, with opposing signs of the respective coefficients. In 2000, the 
presence of a network carrier on a particular route has a positive effect on the mean seats 
offered per flight, whereas this effect is negative in 2008. Furthermore, the standard errors 
for the estimators are rather high compared to the value of the coefficient, which implies a 
high spread around the regression line.  
The log(Distance) variable is statistically significant and exhibits the expected sign. As 
previously outlined, an increase in mean seats per flight with increasing distance was 
assumed. This is due to larger aircraft being employed on long-haul routes compared to those 
being operated on short-haul destinations.  
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Regarding the Ownership variable similar observations as in Table 23 can be made, with it 
being statistically significant across all observed time periods, and an increase by one unit 
leading to a positive percentage change of the dependent variable. 
Table 24: Results OLS estimation with log(MeanSeats) as dependent variable (per year) 
Variable (2a) 2000 (2b) 2004 (2c) 2008 (2d) 2012 (2e) 2016 
log(Pop) 0.06*** 
(0.006) 
0.06*** 
(0.006) 
0.04*** 
(0.005) 
0.05*** 
(0.004) 
0.04*** 
(0.004) 
log(Gdp) 0.02** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.02** 
(0.006) 
0.03*** 
(0.006) 
0.04*** 
(0.006) 
HHIroute -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Network 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
log(Distance) 0.41*** 
(0.008) 
0.37*** 
(0.009) 
0.34*** 
(0.008) 
0.31*** 
(0.007) 
0.28*** 
(0.007) 
Ownership 0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Intercept 1.37*** 
(0.09) 
1.52*** 
(0.10) 
2.05*** 
(0.10) 
2.15*** 
(0.09) 
2.37*** 
(0.10) 
Observations 2740 2976 3419 3692 3928 
R2 0.6235 0.5470 0.5226 0.5141 0.5004 
SER 0.3366 0.3541 0.3217 0.2957 0.2731 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction  
The level of market concentration, HHIroute, is only statistically significant within three of the 
five observed time periods (2000, 2012, 2016), and has a negative coefficient. This implies 
that an increase in the route-level Herfindahl Hirschman Index leads to a decrease in aircraft 
size, represented by mean seats per flight. An increase in route concentration by one unit thus 
results in a decrease of aircraft size by 7 per cent in 2016, for example. Less output is 
therefore offered on these routes by employing smaller aircraft. 
Considering the dependent variable log(Frequency), the respective models are outlined in 
Table 25. All models exhibit no multicollinearity and standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. The explanatory variables and the respective coefficients are all 
statistically significant and exhibit the same signs as for the dependent variable log(Seats). 
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Table 25: Results OLS estimation with log(Frequency) as dependent variable (per year) 
Variable (3a) 2000 (3b) 2004 (3c) 2008 (3d) 2012 (3e) 2016 
log(Pop) 0.27*** 
(0.03) 
0.27*** 
(0.03) 
0.32*** 
(0.02) 
0.36*** 
(0.02) 
0.43*** 
(0.02) 
log(Gdp) 0.42*** 
(0.03) 
0.34*** 
(0.03) 
0.33*** 
(0.03) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
0.35*** 
(0.03) 
HHIroute -0.91*** 
(0.11) 
-0.99*** 
(0.11) 
-0.73*** 
(0.09) 
-1.06*** 
(0.09) 
-1.48*** 
(0.09) 
Network 1.22*** 
(0.06) 
1.47*** 
(0.06) 
1.28*** 
(0.05) 
1.28*** 
(0.04) 
1.37*** 
(0.04) 
log(Distance) -0.60*** 
(0.03) 
-0.50*** 
(0.04) 
-0.58*** 
(0.03) 
-0.46*** 
(0.03) 
-0.49*** 
(0.03) 
Ownership 0.08 
(0.05) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.04) 
0.18** 
(0.06) 
0.17** 
(0.06) 
Intercept 0.30 
(0.39) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.31 
(0.36) 
-0.80* 
(0.38) 
-0.95* 
(0.40) 
Observations 2740 2976 3419 3692 3928 
R2 0.4616 0.4429 0.4271 0.3832 0.3760 
SER 1.2282 1.2535 1.2258 1.2702 1.3878 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
The effect of market concentration, HHIroute, on the route is negative across all years, 
implying that an increase in the Herfindahl Hirschman Index leads to a decrease of mean 
frequencies per week in 2016, for example. Here, the previous results are confirmed that 
increased market concentration results in a restriction of output. 
Within the next step, Equation (19) from Chapter 4.3.2 is applied. Here, the entire 
observations across all considered years are applied in the regression analysis. A time fixed 
effect is included that controls for variables which are constant across entities, i.e. routes, but 
vary over time. The use of panel data and fixed effects in regression analysis is a way of 
controlling for omitted variable bias, by accounting for changes in variables that evolve over 
the considered time periods. Furthermore, within this estimation a balanced panel is 
employed, which means that only those routes are included which are offered within each 
time period. For example, the route from Amsterdam Airport (AMS) to New York John F. 
Kennedy Airport (JFK) is offered within each of the five time periods and therefore included 
in the panel data. The results of this estimation are displayed in Table 26, all models exhibit 
no multicollinearity and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 26: Results OLS estimation with time fixed effects 
Variable (4a) log(Seats) (4b) log(MeanSeats) (4c) log(Frequency) 
log(Pop) 0.30*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.002) 
0.26*** 
(0.01) 
log(Gdp) 0.39*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.004) 
0.37*** 
(0.01) 
HHIroute -0.45*** 
(0.04) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.39*** 
(0.04) 
Network 0.92*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.007) 
0.91*** 
(0.02) 
log(Distance) -0.20*** 
(0.01) 
0.34*** 
(0.004) 
-0.54*** 
(0.01) 
Ownership 0.33*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.006) 
0.22*** 
(0.02) 
Year2004 0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Year2008 0.11** 
(0.03) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Year2012 0.16*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
Year2016 0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
Intercept 6.36*** 
(0.18) 
1.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.50** 
(0.17) 
Observations 9510 9510 9510 
R2 0.3542 0.6030 0.4629 
SER 0.9647 0.2856 0.8872 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
In terms of the dependent variable log(Seats), the coefficient for the HHIroute variable is 
statistically significant and exhibits a negative sign. However, the coefficient is lower than 
in the estimations for each year in Table 23, with a one unit increase in the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index resulting in a 45 per cent reduction in the total seats being offered on that 
route per year. In regard to the time fixed effect, the year 2000 is omitted to avoid 
multicollinearity. Interpreting this coefficient means that a unit increase, here an increase by 
one time period, leads to a positive change in total seats offered. This means that total seats 
have been increasing by 26 per cent in 2016, by 16 per cent in 2012, and 11 per cent in 2008. 
The coefficient for the year 2004 is not statistically significant in any of the three models in 
Table 26, and therefore no statement can be made regarding the effect of this particular year 
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on the different dependent variables. The same ranking for the different years also applies to 
models (4b) and (4c), with 2016 exhibiting the highest growth, and 2008 with the lower (or 
the same) coefficients as the year 2012.  
For the dependent variable log(MeanSeats) a negative and statistically significant effect of 
HHIroute can also be observed, meaning that an increase in the level of market concentration 
leads to a decrease in the mean number of seats offered per flight, i.e. smaller aircraft are 
employed on routes with higher market concentration. Thus, an increase in HHIroute by one 
unit leads to a decrease in mean seats per flight by five per cent. In line with the results in 
Table 23 to Table 25, the coefficient of the log(Distance) variable is positive and statistically 
significant. With increasing distance, the aircraft size also increases with a one per cent 
increase in distance leading to a 0.34 per cent increase in mean seats per flight.  
Table 27 shows the results for the estimation employing HHIdist instead of HHIroute as 
explanatory variable. The former represents the Herfindahl Hirschman Index which has been 
adjusted for distance in the catchment of European hub airports, and which was discussed in 
Chapter 4.2.3. The coefficient of the variable accounting for market concentration on a route 
is only statistically significant for the dependent variables log(Seats) and log(Frequency), 
with a one-unit increase in the adjusted Herfindahl Hirschman Index resulting in a 12 per 
cent decrease in both the total seats per year and the mean weekly frequency offered on a 
route. The effect of this adjusted index is hence smaller than the original one HHIroute.  
The other coefficients are of the same magnitude as in the model with HHIroute as explanatory 
variable. However, the results in Table 27 show that the coefficients for 2008 and 2016 are 
also not statistically significant, therefore no valid statement can be made in regard to this 
particular effect.  
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Table 27: Results OLS estimation with time fixed effects, HHIdist as independent variable 
Variable (5a) log(Seats) (5b) log(MeanSeats) (5c) log(Frequency) 
log(Pop) 0.30*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.003) 
0.26*** 
(0.01) 
log(Gdp) 0.39*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.004) 
0.37*** 
(0.01) 
HHIdist -0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Network 0.91*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.007) 
0.90*** 
(0.02) 
log(Distance) -0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.34*** 
(0.004) 
-0.55*** 
(0.01) 
Ownership 0.39*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.006) 
0.27*** 
(0.02) 
Year2004 0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Year2008 0.12 
(0.03) 
0.03*** 
(0.009) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
Year2012 0.18** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.009) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
Year2016 0.28 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.009) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Intercept 6.20*** 
(0.18) 
1.88*** 
(0.05) 
0.36* 
(0.17) 
Observations 9510 9510 9510 
R2 0.3471 0.6022 0.4577 
SER 0.9699 0.2858 0.8915 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
Building on these results, the model is extended in the following chapter to account for the 
presence of low cost carriers in the catchment of European hub airports.  
4.3.4 Impact of low cost carrier presence in the catchment area 
Since the increase in low cost airlines has been driving a high share of growth of the European 
airport market, the effect of these carriers on the output provided at the hub airport will be 
investigated further in this chapter. It has been argued that the increasing presence of this 
airline business model has significantly raised the degree of constraints for market power at 
(European) hub airports (Thelle et al., 2012; Morrison, 2001). To investigate this particular 
effect, an additional variable is introduced to the estimations discussed in Chapter 4.3.3. For 
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this purpose, the number of low cost carriers in the local catchment that offer seats to the 
same destinations as the hub airport is identified. The approach in determining whether a 
particular route is offered by a potentially competing carrier is exemplified in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25: Low cost carrier competition in the primary airport’s catchment 
Source: own depiction 
At the hub airport (Hub) a full service carrier (FSC) offers seats to destination r (FSC1), as 
does a low cost carrier (LCC1). At another airport in the catchment (Secondary1), a different 
full service carrier (FSC2) offers seats to the same destination, as does a different low cost 
carrier (LCC2). There is also another secondary airport in the catchment (Secondary2) that 
offers seats to destination r, in this case by two low cost carriers (LCC1 and LCC3), with LCC1 
being the same carrier operating at the hub airport. In this particular example, the explanatory 
variable Lcc has a value of 3, i.e. each low cost carrier offering seats at different airports in 
the catchment is counted. As the discussion showed, the presence of low cost carriers in the 
catchment is expected to increase competition for the hub airport, which is why a positive 
coefficient is presumed. Table 28 displays the results of the estimation in model (20), and 
thus the effect of low cost carrier presence in the catchment of European hub airports. All 
models exhibit no multicollinearity and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
FSC1
Destination rLCC1
FSC2
LCC2
LCC3
LCC1
Secondary1
Secondary2
Hub
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 Table 28: OLS estimation with time fixed effects and with Lcc as explanatory variable 
Variable (6a) log(Seats) (6b) log(MeanSeats) (6c) log(Frequency) 
log(Pop) 0.31*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.003) 
0.26*** 
(0.01) 
log(Gdp) 0.39*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.004) 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
HHIroute -0.36*** 
(0.05) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.34*** 
(0.04) 
Network 0.93*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.007) 
0.91*** 
(0.02) 
log(Distance) -0.20*** 
(0.01) 
0.34*** 
(0.004) 
-0.54*** 
(0.01) 
Ownership 0.31*** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.006) 
0.21*** 
(0.02) 
Lcc 0.05*** 
(0.009) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.03*** 
(0.009) 
Year2004 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Year2008 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.009) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Year2012 0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.009) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
Year2016 0.23*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.009) 
0.08* 
(0.03) 
Intercept 6.26*** 
(0.18) 
1.86*** 
(0.05) 
0.45** 
(0.17) 
Observations 9510 9510 9510 
R2 0.3560 0.6058 0.4635 
SER 0.9633 0.2846 0.8869 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
The results imply that the presence of low cost carriers at secondary airports in the catchment 
on a particular route increases the amount of seats offered by the airlines at the hub airport. 
Considering models (6a) to (6c) an increase in Lcc by one, i.e. one more low cost carrier is 
offering seats to destination r, leads to an increase of total seats per year by five per cent, an 
increase in mean seats per flight by two per cent, and an increase of frequency per week of 
three per cent. The coefficients are all statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level. 
Airlines at the hub airports therefore react to low cost carrier presence in the catchment by 
increasing seat capacities on respective routes. Since low cost carriers are mainly focusing 
on the passenger segment of the private or leisure traveller, airlines at the hub airport might 
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be reacting to an increased supply of flights and seats at the secondary airports on these 
particular routes in order to provide an attractive offer for all passenger groups. In addition 
to this, a positive and statistically significant effect can also be observed across the different 
time periods, with 2016 again being the period of highest growth. 
As discussed earlier, another constraint for hub airports’ market power can potentially be 
imposed by available rail services within a country. The following chapter therefore places 
particular focus on this aspect and how it affects the seat capacities offered at hub airports.  
4.3.5 Impact of rail services on the short-haul segment  
As highlighted in Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, rail services can impose competition for air services 
in terms of faster journey times. However, this only applies up to a certain distance. The 
Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (2010) states that up to a distance of 400 
kilometres conventional rail services can compete with air services in terms of journey time. 
High-speed rail services are even competitive up to a distance of 800 kilometres. Therefore, 
for the analysis in this chapter only a specific distance segment is considered, and destinations 
with a distance of more than 800 kilometres are excluded from the observations.  
The variable Hsr accounts for the density of the rail network in a particular country, and 
hence serves as a proxy for the potential to substitute to this transport mode instead of using 
air services. It is calculated by dividing the total rail kilometres in a country by the overall 
country size, which is measured in square kilometres. Data on both parameters are extracted 
from The World Bank (2017). It thus depicts the available rail kilometres per square 
kilometre in a country. It is assumed that a higher ratio is an indicator for a more connected 
rail network, and hence a higher degree of potential competition for air services, i.e. the 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative since better rail connections are 
assumed to lead to less air services being offered, see also Albalate, Bel & Fageda (2015). 
Table 29 reports the descriptive statistics for the different variables considered in this 
analysis. As can be seen, the number of observations is lower than in the estimations in the 
previous chapters, due to only a subset of the short-haul market being considered here.  
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics of variables (values at the route level) 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Seats 5972 174549 266580 21 3718962 
MeanSeats 5972 105 50 5 400 
Frequency 5972 28 33 0.02 441 
Pop 3760 1829 2489 251 16187 
Gdp 5971 34160 12293 1840 103838 
Network 5972 0.60 0.49 0 1 
HHIroute 5972 0.76 0.27 0.15 1 
HHIdist 5972 0.70 0.32 0.07 1 
Distance 5972 492 175 32 800 
Ownership 5972 0.25 0.56 0 3 
Lcc 5972 0.48 1.07 0 10 
Hsr 5673 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.25 
Source: own depiction 
Applying model (21) from Chapter 4.3.2 yields the results displayed in Table 30, for all three 
dependent variables considered throughout Chapter 4.3. All models exhibit no 
multicollinearity and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The results in Table 30 show the expected negative sign for the variable Hsr, the coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level. An increase in the ratio of rail kilometres 
to total country size, Hsr, leads to a decrease in total seats, mean seats per flight, and flight 
frequency offered on a particular route. Concerning total seats and frequencies, Albalate, Bel 
& Fageda (2015), employing a dummy variable to account for the availability of high-speed 
rail services, confirm that competition from this transport mode leads to a reduction in the 
amount of seats being offered on a route: An increase in the coverage of the high-speed rail 
network (Hsr) hence leads to a decrease in total offered seats, in mean seats per flight, and in 
flight frequency per week. 
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Table 30: OLS estimation with time fixed effects and with Hsr as explanatory variable 
Variable (7a) log(Seats) (7b) log(MeanSeats) (7c) log(Frequency) 
log(Pop) 0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.008) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
log(Gdp) 0.65*** 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
HHIroute -0.37*** 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.32*** 
(0.09) 
Network 1.15*** 
(0.06) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
1.03*** 
(0.06) 
log(Distance) -0.05 
(0.06) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.05) 
Ownership 0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
Lcc 0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.006) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
Hsr -4.33*** 
(0.39) 
-1.84*** 
(0.14) 
-2.49*** 
(0.32) 
Year2004 -0.17** 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.14** 
(0.05) 
Year2008 -0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.05) 
Year2012 -0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.14*** 
(0.02) 
-0.35*** 
(0.06) 
Year2016 -0.13 
(0.07) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
-0.39*** 
(0.06) 
Intercept 3.33*** 
(0.61) 
2.87*** 
(0.22) 
-3.49*** 
(0.54) 
Observations 2570 2570 2570 
R2 0.3349 0.2619 0.3124 
SER 0.9789 0.3556 0.8442 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
These results can be interpreted in two ways. First, a well-connected rail network may 
represent a good alternative for passengers, inducing less demand for air services, and hence 
a reduction in offered seats on affected routes. Second, a reduction in seats offered may be 
observed since rail services act as complement for flights at the hub airport. Depending on 
the direct connection to the latter, rail may provide feeder services to an airport, and thus 
replace flights on a particular route. Since the analysis in this chapter does not distinguish 
between high speed rail and conventional rail services, no statement can be made regarding 
the specific impact of high speed rail. However, what can be concluded is that the presence 
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of this transport mode does have a negative effect on the capacities offered at European hub 
airports. Therefore, attention has to be paid to this particular transport mode, when assessing 
the competition faced by airports in general, with the focus being placed on the short-haul 
market. 
In addition to this specific observation, the coefficient of the log(Distance) variable behaves 
in the same way as in the previous estimations in this chapter. Considering the short-haul 
market up to 800 kilometres, the coefficient of this variable is only statistically significant 
for the dependent variables log(MeanSeats) and log(Frequency), though. A one per cent 
increase in distance leads to an increase in mean seats by 0.15 per cent, and a decrease in 
frequency by 0.20 per cent, a smaller impact than can be observed for the dataset including 
all range segments. This observation is intuitive, since very short distances face additional 
competition from road and bus services, thus being less attractive routes for airlines to offer. 
Also, aircraft size, with mean seats per flight being a proxy for this, increases with distance 
as elaborated in Chapter 4.3.1.   
The different findings in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3 regarding the level of market concentration in 
the local catchment of European hub airports and the respective impact of this on the seat 
capacities offered at European hub airports are summarised and discussed in Chapter 4.4. 
 Assessing potential competition in the catchment of 
European hub airports 
The constraints imposed on hub airports’ market power by their counterparts within the local 
catchment has been the main focus of this chapter. Starting off with a detailed analysis of the 
market concentration in the local catchment of the considered European hub airports, the 
chapter proceeded to empirically assess the impact of various factors, which are believed to 
either constrain an airport’s market power or contribute to this. These include the presence 
of low cost carriers within a catchment, the availability of rail services, and the degree to 
which routes offered at hub airports overlap with other airports.  
In terms of low cost carriers potentially exposing hub airports to an increased level of 
competition by offering the same routes at secondary airports, and thus providing a substitute 
for passengers, two main findings can be derived from the analysis in this chapter. First, low 
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cost carrier growth has been rather evenly distributed across hub airports and secondary 
airports, therefore disproving the argument that low cost carriers are often focusing only on 
secondary, smaller airports. A current example of this development can be observed between 
the low cost carrier Ryanair and the hub airport Frankfurt (FRA). From summer 2017 
onwards, Ryanair started to offer flights on different routes, which are mostly considered as 
holiday destinations (Frankfurt Airport, n.d.). Flights between Munich Airport (MUC) and 
Dublin Airport (DUB) were also initiated by this carrier in 2017 (Munich Airport, n.d.). Low 
cost carriers have been, however, the drivers of growth at both hub and secondary airports, 
compared to full service carriers. The further growth of low cost carrier operations at hub 
airports strongly depends on available capacities at these in the future, though. 
The second finding refers to the empirical analysis within this chapter, estimating the effect 
of low cost carrier presence in the catchment on the operations at hub airports. The 
statistically significant results show that in case a route is offered by low cost carriers in the 
hinterland of European hubs an increase in seats offered at the hub airport can be observed. 
Both total seats and weekly flight frequencies are higher in case a route is also operated by a 
low cost carrier in the catchment. It seems that hub airports and their carriers are hence 
incentivised to react to developments in the catchment in order to keep providing attractive 
products to their passengers, and prevent these from substituting to other, secondary airports.  
In addition to this, short-haul routes at hub airports are assumed to be exposed to competition 
from rail services. To assess this relationship, a variable accounting for the quality of the rail 
network in a country was introduced to the regression analysis in this chapter. Testing for the 
effect on seat capacities offered on routes at hub airports shows that an increasing quality of 
the rail network results in less seats being offered on a route. The reasoning for this may be 
twofold, with competitive rail services, in times of overall journey time, being an attractive 
substitute for passengers, thus reducing demand for air services. Furthermore, if a hub airport 
is well connected to the rail network, the latter may act as a complement for air services. 
Short-haul feeder routes at hub airports may thus be replaced by rail connections.  
Complementing these analyses, the degree of market concentration in the catchment of the 
considered European hubs is assessed by applying the Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the 
individual route level. It cannot be assumed that a hub airport faces competition from another 
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airport in the catchment if both merely offer the same route. The seat capacities offered at 
each airport make the difference for passengers deciding which airport to depart from or 
arrive at. The analysis of market concentration therefore contributes to assessing the degree 
of route overlap hub airports face on each of their individual destinations.  
As the discussion in Chapter 2 showed, market power cannot be inferred directly from the 
degree of market concentration in an industry, and there is no predefined threshold at which 
an industry seems to be more or less concentrated. Analysing the level of and change in the 
above mentioned route-level Herfindahl Hirschman Index, however, provides a first good 
insight how European hub airports are positioned within their respective catchment areas. 
First, if hub airports experience a higher overlap, thus facing less market concentration, on 
the routes they offer over time, this implies that passenger may have more alternatives to 
choose from, thus contributing to the degree of competition different airports engage in. 
Applying this assumption, the majority of European hub airports experienced, to a small 
degree at least, a decrease in the level of market concentration within the catchment over the 
considered period from 2000 to 2016 (Table 43).  
Regarding the level of market concentration, however, for most of these airports a rather high 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index can be observed. If firms in a market are of equal size, the 
minimum value this index can take is the inverse of the number of firms. Thus, assuming that 
there are two equally sized firms in a market, the lowest attainable value will be 0.50, more 
firms imply a lower minimum attainable value. Comparing the route-level Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index at European hub airports against this 0.50 threshold, reveals that most 
airports face a rather high degree of market concentration (Figure 26).  
Bringing together these two interpretations of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, a high-level 
indication in regard to market concentration for each hub airport can be obtained. Brussels 
Airport and Dusseldorf Airport, for example, both face a relatively low degree of market 
concentration in their catchment, which has also been decreasing over time. On the other side 
of the scale are Madrid Airport and Helsinki Airport with hardly any overlap in regard to 
their offered routes, and no observed decrease in this market concentration over time. Other 
major European hubs, including Amsterdam Airport, Frankfurt Airport, and London 
Heathrow Airport, all exhibit a mean route-level Herfindahl Hirschman Index between 0.60 
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and 0.70 in 2016, but with an observed decrease in this value over time. The market position 
of Paris Charles de Gaulle in its catchment is even more pronounced with a mean HHIroute 
value of almost 0.90. Potential competitors within this airport’s catchment are scarce, and 
seem to focus on different market segments. Paris Orly Airport, for example, is within this 
catchment, and also exhibits a relatively high degree of market concentration. Potential 
overlap in routes between these two is on routes with high demand, apart from that the 
airports are focusing on distinct segments.  
 
Figure 26: Development of market concentration in the local catchment 
Source: own depiction 
Complementing these results are the findings from the empirical assessment of the impact of 
market concentration on the hub airports’ seat capacities. Here, the statistically significant 
outcomes show that an increase in the Herfindahl Hirschman Index on a route leads to a 
decrease in seats offered by the hub airport, thus implying a limitation of output on routes 
with high market concentration. Translating this to the analysis of market concentration in 
the catchment of European hub airports suggests that a high amount of routes at these airports 
may be subject to output restrictions, in the form of frequency reductions and/ or decreases 
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in aircraft size. How these reductions in output affect the prices charged to passengers cannot 
be definitely concluded, relying on monopoly theory, though, implies that a reduction in the 
amount of goods and services by a firm enables this to increase prices. This is also confirmed 
by Fageda (2013), who estimates the effect of market concentration on a route on both the 
number of frequencies offered and the ticket prices to this particular destination. The results 
show that an increase in the Herfindahl Hirschman Index on a route leads a decrease in 
frequencies and an increase in ticket prices, thus confirming the results of the analysis within 
this chapter. Paying careful attention to the degree of route concentration at hub airports, 
observing this development over time, and considering additional developments in the 
catchment of European hub airports that impose competitive constraints on these, such as the 
presence of low cost carrier and (high-speed) rail networks, therefore provides a 
comprehensive approach to the investigation of airport competition.  
The focus on different market segments by European hub airports and their secondary 
counterparts in the catchment, resulting in a limited overlap between routes, may therefore 
only provide little constraints for market power.  However, since one particular characteristic 
of a hub airport is the functioning as a node for airlines operating a hub-and-spoke network, 
the transfer market and the respective competition airports face here has to be considered 
along with the local catchment. The following chapter hence analyses this particular market 
at each of the European hub airports in the dataset in more detail. 
 Competition for Transfer Traffic at 
European Hub Airports 
Regarding the discussion on airport competition, supporting arguments highlight the 
increasing competition especially on the transfer market, and that this is restraining large hub 
airports from abusing their market power (Thelle et al., 2012; Lieshout & Burghouwt, 2013; 
Pavlyuk, 2012; Bruinsma, Rietveld & Brons, 2000; Forsyth, 2010). This chapter therefore 
focuses on this particular market segment at European hub airports31, in order to assess the 
degree of constraints potentially imposed on airports’ market power. The market segment of 
transfer traffic is not inherent to every airport but mostly to hub airports. The latter’s distinct 
characteristic is that an airline designs its network in a way that flights are both temporally 
as well as spatially concentrated at these airports. This allows airlines to bundle traffic on 
different flights, hence to offer a larger network of destinations to its passengers, and to 
exhaust economies of density (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001; Burghouwt, 2007). Dennis (1994) 
defines a hub as “an integrated interchange point where one or two specific airlines operate 
waves of flights” (p. 211).  
These definitions already highlight the close relationship between the network airline and its 
hub airport. Since airlines are customers of airports, the competition imposed on these airlines 
also affects the airport, as discussed in Chapter 3. As depicted in Figure 27, transfer 
passengers are, inter alia, the customers of an airline, since they select their most feasible 
connection in terms of overall travel time, price or other relevant choice factors. This airline 
operates its node at one or more airports within its network to which the passengers are then 
assigned. Within the analysis in the following chapters, the flights of network carriers as well 
as their respective alliance partners are considered, when identifying the degree of market 
concentration European hub airports face on the transfer market. Addressing the degree of 
competition on this market is hence referring to the competition between network carriers, 
and airline alliance partner, via their respective hub airports. 
                                                 
31 Within this section the same sample of European airports as outlined in Table 9 is considered.  
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Figure 27: Airline and airport market structure  
Source: Allroggen & Malina (2010) 
In Chapter 5 the focus is thus placed on the assessment of competition on the transfer market 
at European hub airport by assessing market concentration on this market, the respective 
development over time, and the empirical estimation of the effects of a high degree of market 
concentration on the transfer connections offered via the hub.  
Since the close relationship between network carrier and hub airports is essential in assessing 
the degree of market concentration the latter face on the transfer market, Chapter 5 starts out 
with an overview of this relationship for the considered European hub airports (Chapter 5.1). 
The intention of this chapter is to show how close each of the considered European hub 
airports is interlinked with its respective network carrier. The subsequent Chapter 5.2 
provides both an overview of different methodologies that are applied to determine the 
amount of transfer connections offered by network carriers at hub airports, and outlines the 
current state of research in this regard.  
Building on these approaches, Chapter 5.3 determines the available transfer connections at 
each of the European hub airports in the dataset, and analyses the degree of overlap between 
these and other hub airports. For this purpose, the degree of market concentration is assessed 
by using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the individual transfer connection level, hence 
referring to research question (5) outlined in Chapter 1. Whether high market concentration 
has an effect on the number of seats offered on an individual transfer connection is analysed 
in Chapter 5.4, addressing research question (6). Here, an empirical model is estimated, 
employing the Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the individual transfer connection level as 
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explanatory variable. Chapter 5.5 brings together the different strands of analyses in this 
chapter and discusses the implications regarding the competition on the transfer market at 
European hub airports. 
 Network carrier share at European hub airports 
Hub airports are, inter alia, characterised by the specific relationship with their network 
carrier, which organises its network in a hub-and-spoke structure. This particular structure 
implies that the carrier bundles its flights within the node, the hub airport, in order to derive 
benefits (see Chapter 3.1.2 for a detailed discussion). Due to this, most of this carrier’s flights 
are directed via the hub airport, thus potentially generating a high amount of the traffic at this 
airport. The dominance of this carrier may enable it to charge a hub premium, thus abusing 
the market power it gained due its high market share at the airport. The network carrier is 
also the one, often in cooperation with several airline alliance partners, which offers transfer 
connections to passengers, and thus constitutes the transfer market at a hub airport. Since this 
transfer market is the focus of the analysis in Chapter 5, evaluating the dominance of the 
network carrier at the hub airport is an initial step in understanding the importance of this 
market for the hub airport.  
For this purpose, the share of these airlines at their respective hub airports, in terms of their 
share in total seats offered at the respective airports, is determined and outlined in Figure 28. 
The designated network carrier at each hub airport as well as their share in the hub airports’ 
operations across all five years are depicted in Table 47 and Table 48 in Appendix 8.5. Here 
the development of these shares from 2000 to 2016 can be observed, with some hub airports 
experiencing major changes in terms of their network carrier relationship. Figure 28 only 
shows the years 2000 and 2016 in order to observe the change over the entire period. The 45° 
line separates the hub airports into those which saw an increase in its network carrier’s share, 
and those that did not. Most hub airports in the dataset experienced a decreasing share of 
network carrier operations. One reason for this might be the steep low cost carrier growth in 
the period between 2000 and 2016, as discussed in Chapter 4. These particular carriers have 
been picking up operations at European hub airports, and therefore taking up shares of total 
seats being offered. The observed decrease in network carrier operations thus does not 
necessarily have to be due to the network carrier cutting back on operations. 
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Figure 28: Share of network carrier in total seats offered at European hub airports 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
Hub airports which saw an increase in the network carrier’s share include some of the largest 
airports in Europe, in terms of total passenger numbers. At Frankfurt Airport (FRA), for 
example, the share of its network carrier Lufthansa in total aircraft seats offered has been 
increasing from 60 per cent in 2000 to about 65 per cent in 2016. Next to this increase, the 
share is rather high, which implies that the hub airport strongly depends on the continuation 
of the network carrier’s operations, since replacing these amount of seats by other carriers 
probably takes several years, if even possible at all. At Istanbul Airport (IST), the network 
carrier Turkish Airlines (TK) also increased its share in total seats offered from 2000 to 2016, 
from less than 70 per cent to about 75 per cent. Another strong increase in carrier dominance 
took place at Moscow Sheremetyevo (SVO), with the share of Aeroflot (SU) rising from less 
than 50 per cent in 2000 to about 90 per cent in 2016. These developments, shortly outlined 
here, play an important role when determining the amount of transfer connections offered at 
each hub airport in the considered time period (Chapter 5.3).  
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In addition to understanding the magnitude of network carrier operations at a specific hub 
airport, the distribution of these carriers’ operations across their entire network is an 
important criterion to assess the dependency between airport and airline. Addressing the 
distribution across an airline network means to identify the share of network carrier’s seats 
at each airport in the network. An approach to bring these two elements together is proposed 
by Maertens (2012), the countervailing power of an airline (CVP): 
𝐶𝑉𝑃 / 𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝑀𝑆 / 1 𝑀𝑆 /  (22) 
With C depicting the carrier and A the airport. The market share of an airline at a particular 
airport is expressed by MSA/C, and MSC/A depicts the share of the airport within the airline’s 
total network, both are measured in percentage. These respective market shares have been 
calculated using the inbound and outbound scheduled seats listed in the OAG database for 
the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. In order to account for different types of carriers, 
i.e. business models, and the associated relationship with the airport, an indicator (sc) is 
included, which accounts for the level of sunk cost a carrier incurs at an airport, and described 
in more detail in Table 31. 
Table 31: Interpretation of indicator accounting for sunk cost 
Level of sunk 
cost (sc) 
Application case 
0.2 Carrier C is a network carrier and has its hub at airport A 
0.5 Carrier C is a network carrier and no important hub at airport A 
0.8 Carrier C is a low cost carrier and has its base at airport A  
1 Carrier C is a low cost carrier and has no aircraft based at airport A 
Source: Maertens (2012) 
Since the analysis in this chapter focuses on the relationship between a hub airport and its 
network carrier, sc is equal to 0.2, meaning that carriers have a high amount of sunk cost at 
these airports, which may prohibit them from switching operations easily. Figure 29 depicts 
the results for this index for the year 2000 and 2016, Table 50 in Appendix 8.7 shows the 
results for all years.  
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Figure 29: Countervailing Power Index for network carriers at European hub airports 
Source: own depiction 
According to Maertens (2012), a higher percentage represents a higher degree of 
countervailing power by the network carrier, i.e. the network carrier has more power over 
the hub airport in negotiating terms and conditions of its operations. As Figure 29 shows, 
overall, the CVP is rather low for network carriers at their respective hubs. In the analysis by 
Maertens (2012), Bergamo (BGY), for example, faces a CVP of about 55 per cent for its 
largest carrier Ryanair. Here, airports with the highest index are London Stansted (STN), and 
Antalya (AYT). This implies that the respective network carriers operating at these airports, 
British Airways (BA) and Turkish Airlines (BA), respectively, have a high degree of 
bargaining power over these airports. Both these carriers do not have their node at these 
airports, but contribute a high share of overall operations. Therefore, relocating operations to 
another airport may be easier than in case these were their nodes.  
Those airlines with a multi-hub strategy are also further at the right end of the scale, including 
Lufthansa at FRA and MUC, for example, implying that this carrier can exercise some buyer 
power in negotiating service levels and airport charges, since it is able to switch operations 
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between hub airports to some degree. However, keeping in mind the argument by Elliot 
(2016) that a dominant airline at an airport has the means to exercise some degree of buyer 
power, also those airlines with a very high share of operations at their respective hub airports 
may be able to successfully negotiate operating conditions. 
According to the analysis in this chapter, a high-level overview of the relationship between 
European hub airports and their respective network carrier can be obtained. It shows, in 
general, that network carriers are in a dominant position at the hub airports they are operating 
at. But these carriers also depend on the hub airports by having established their node at these, 
which cannot be easily relocated to another airport. The importance of this node in terms of 
participating in the competition on the transfer market will be analysed in the subsequent 
chapters. A carrier with a high share of seats offered at the hub is also assumed to provide a 
high amount of transfer connections, thus contributing to this market playing an important 
role in the competitive position of the hub airport. As a next step, the following chapter 
outlines the methodology which is applied to determine the amount of transfer connections 
at each European hub airport in the dataset.  
 Methodological approaches to measure connectivity 
The transfer market at a hub airport is defined as the passenger segment that switches between 
flights at the hub airport (H), in order to get from the origin (A) to the desired destination 
(B), and is exemplified in Figure 30. To denote this concept the term transfer connection is 
employed in the subsequent chapters. The amount and quality of transfer connections 
passengers can choose from are determined for each of the considered European hub airports.  
 
Figure 30: Definition of transfer and direct connections 
Source: own depiction 
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Nowadays, the concept of self-hubbing is gaining popularity among passengers, enabled by 
both new airline business models and online platforms, which facilitate the matching of 
flights that do not belong to the same airline group, alliance, or have code share agreements 
(Malighetti, Paleari & Redondi, 2008; Fageda, Suau-Sanchez & Mason, 2015; Fichert & 
Klophaus, 2016; Maertens, Pabst & Grimme, 2016). However, this particular form of 
connecting between flights at an airport will not be in the focus of the analysis, and only 
those flights are considered which are between the same airline, airline group or airline 
alliance.  
Chapter 5.2.1 outlines different methodological approaches to identify transfer connections 
at hub airports, including a discussion on the feasibility of the different indicators for the 
analysis here. Chapter 5.2.2 provides an insight how these measures are currently applied to 
identify the number and capacities of transfer connections provided at an airport. It also gives 
a first overview of the degree of overlap between these connections across different European 
airports. 
5.2.1 Overview of methodologies to measure transfer connections 
A range of measures to determine transfer connections exists, which are shortly outlined in 
order to identify the approach or different elements most suited for the analysis in the 
following chapters. Table 32 gives an overview of the different models and their 
specifications, which are subsequently discussed in more detail.  
The Bootsma connectivty determines the number of connections at an airport. In this case a 
transfer connection between two direct flights at a hub airports exists if there is a minimum 
amount of time (60 minutes) between these as well as a maximum time above which 
connections are no longer feasible. The maximum connecting time differs by the stage length 
of the two direct connections (Burghouwt & Redondi, 2013).  
Veldhuis (1997) introduces the Netscan model and applies it to measure the degree of 
competition between airline networks in Western Europe, by comparing the level of 
connectivity offered at the different hub airports. For this purpose, an index is introduced 
which measures the “connectivity units (CNU)” (p. 182) at each airport. It incorporates the 
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number of frequencies on a destination pair, including both direct and indirect connections, 
the overall travel time as well as a factor accounting for the potential transfer time a passenger 
faces, when making a connection at the hub airport. Further, ibid. distinguishes between 
onward and hub connectivity. The former denotes the number of connections a passenger can 
access at destination B when flying from hub airport H, hub connectivity denotes the concept 
of transfer connections explained above. The analysis finds that connectivity growth is taking 
place at hubs, i.e. via hub connectivity, and not via direct connections excluding the hub 
airports, using data for 1994 and 1996. 
Table 32: Overview of measures with an application to aviation 
Model Definition 
Bootsma connectivity Calculates the number of connections, indirect connections meet 
predefined minimum and maximum connecting (waiting) time, 
connections are classified according to connecting time. 
Netscan Connectivity Units Measures the number of direct and indirect connections, weighted 
by their quality in terms of transfer and detour time relative to a 
theoretical direct flight.  
Weighted connectivity Measures the number of direct and indirect connections, weighted 
by their quality in terms of transfer and detour time, based on 
Netscan Connectivity Units and Bootsma connectivity. 
Shortest path length (SPL) Number of connections lying on shortest O&D path; the shortest 
path is the path involving the minimum number of steps from 
origin to destination. 
Quickest path length (QPL) Number of connections lying on quickest O&D path; the quickest 
path is the path involving the lowest travel time from origin to 
destination. 
Source: Burghouwt & Redondi (2013:p.38) 
Burghouwt & De Wit (2005) introduce the weighted connectivity index, which is based on 
both the methodology by Veldhuis (1997) and on the Bootsma connectivity. In order to obtain 
the weighted indirect connectivity of an airline network, the index accounts for the transfer 
time and quality of an indirect connection compared to a direct one, by incorporating factors 
accounting for the inconvenience caused for passengers. An aggregated index is calculated 
by summing the weighted connectivity indices for all possible flight combinations on the 
individual airport level for the years 1990 and 1999. Burghouwt & De Wit (2005) use the 
results to group the considered European airline hubs into different categories such as 
European hubs or directional/ hourglass hubs. The study also finds that airline networks are 
increasingly concentrated in regard to their temporal dimension since the deregulation of the 
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European airline market. As this model also uses scheduled airline data to calculate its index, 
the methodology provides a feasible option for application in the following sections. 
In general, the shortest path length (SPL) approach determines the shortest path, in terms of 
the number of steps involved, between two points. All feasible connections via an airport are 
compared to this and ranked accordingly. The quickest path length approach, on the contrary, 
determines the quickest path by determining the shortest travel time between two points. 
Malighetti, Paleari & Redondi (2008) apply the SPL approach to determine the centrality of 
an airport, i.e. how well is this airport connected to the overall network. The minimum path 
length of this particular airport to all other airports in the network is calculated. The level of 
centrality of an airport is defined by its degree of betweenness. This term is introduced by 
ibid. to denote the amount of minimum paths available from the specific airport, i.e. the more 
minimum paths available from a particular airport, the higher the betweenness and thus the 
more central an airport is within the overall network. 
Nieße & Grimme (2013) also apply the shortest path length to the air transport sector. Here, 
the quality of a connection is determined by introducing a frequency factor, i.e. by accounting 
for the number of flights offered at the hub airport between an origin and destination pair 
within a predefined time period, and also for the frequency of respective return flights. For 
this purpose, the average shortest travel time and the average highest path velocity are 
calculated. The first index takes into account the total flight time and, incorporating 
frequency, the time the passenger has to wait until the next available flight to the same 
destination in case a connection is missed. The second concept covers the average speed from 
the origin to the destination point, including potential transfer times and accounting for the 
times of departure and arrival. The latter addresses the case if these slots are at rather 
inconvenient times for passengers and are therefore less attractive. In a case study including 
all global airports with available data in 2012, the European hub airports perform best in 
terms of the average shortest travel time and for the second indicator, it is those airports with 
a high share of long-haul destinations ranking first.  
Based on these different approaches, the analysis in the following chapter will focus on the 
calculation of the amount of transfer connections at European hub airports, and the potential 
competition an airport faces on each of these connected airport pairs. Therefore, requirements 
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for the applied methodology rely on the following assumptions, as outlined by Burghouwt & 
Redondi (2013):  
 The accessibility vs. centrality of an airport, which addresses the difference between 
indirect and hub connectivity; in this case hub connectivity denotes the concept of 
transfer connections outlined above. 
 The temporal coordination of a network which addresses the potential transfer time 
passengers are facing at a hub airport; the analysis in Chapter 5.3.1 will refer to the 
eligible transfer times applied in current models on hub connectivity.  
 The routing factor which is the ratio of the actual time it takes to get from the origin 
to the destination airport and the theoretical distance between these two points; the 
analysis in Chapter 5.3.1 will apply a routing factor currently used in models on hub 
connectivity/ transfer connections. 
 The maximum number of steps allowed on a passenger journey from origin (A) to 
destination (B); since Chapter 5 focuses on the competition hub airports face on the 
transfer passenger segment, the analysis will be limited to only including two-step 
connections, i.e. from the origin to the hub airport (step 1), and from the hub airport 
to the destination (step 2). 
 Local vs. global models with local models focusing on a particular airport and global 
models focusing on a particular connection; here, the focus will be on the application 
of a local model since European hub airports are at the centre of investigation, and 
not a particular connection between two airports.  
Based on these assumptions, the methodology to determine feasible transfer connections at 
the considered European hub airports is outlined in Chapter 5.3.1, relying on the current 
application of connectivity measures in the airport sector. Before moving to this, a short 
overview is given in the next chapter on how these measures are currently applied.  
5.2.2 Current assessment of the transfer market at airports 
These approaches to determine the amount of transfer connections, or the level of 
connectivity, as denoted by different authors, have been applied to different European 
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airports in order to see how well these are connected to various regions, or to determine the 
overlap between transfer connections among particular hub airports. A range of these studies, 
and their respective approach as well as resulting findings are outlined in this chapter. The 
intention of this is to obtain an overview of the research landscape in terms of competition 
on the transfer market for European hub airports.  
In his analysis on airline hub operations in Europe, Dennis (1994) highlights that the 
competitive position of European hub airports depends on the geographical location of an 
airport, enabling the connection of destinations across different regions, and on relevant 
facilities and infrastructure, which provide sufficient capacities to facilitate minimum 
connecting times between flights. Based on these assumptions, the performance of European 
network carriers is compared in terms of the quality of transfer connections provided for 
passengers, using data for 1992. The extent of hubbing, i.e. the amount of transfer 
connections, is measured by the connectivity ratio, which is the relationship between the 
number of actually achieved connections to the number of connections to be expected. A 
high value therefore indicates a well-connected and integrated network. In the analysis, 
Lufthansa at Frankfurt Airport, KLM at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, and Sabena at Brussels 
Airport perform best. Dennis (1999) also applies this connectivity ratio, and, in addition, 
calculates the hub potential of several European hub airports by multiplying a hub airport’s 
European frequencies with the frequencies offered to a particular region (e.g. North 
America). The product represents the market share of each airport in the total offered seats 
across all considered airports. The overall picture shows that the European transfer market is 
dominated by London Heathrow Airport, followed by Frankfurt Airport, Paris Charles de 
Gaulle Airport, and Amsterdam Schiphol Airport.  
Burghouwt & Veldhuis (2006) apply the Netscan model32 to analyse the competitiveness of 
connections on the transatlantic market, i.e. analysing flight connections between Northwest 
Europe and U.S. airports, and using data for the period between 2003 and 2005. An extension 
to the analysis by Veldhuis (1997) is the assessment of market concentration on the 
considered market. For this purpose, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is calculated on the 
                                                 
32 This particular model introduces a quality index which is 1 if a flight is a direct connection and hence 
considers both the quantity (frequency) and quality of a connection (Burghouwt & Veldhuis, 2006). 
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route (airport-pair) level by determining the shares of each alliance in the total capacity 
offered on this route, the same approach is also applied in Lieshout et al. (2016). Since 
concentration might be high on routes with low demand, Burghouwt, Lieshout & Veldhuis 
(2008) account for demand effects between two points in assessing the competitive positition 
of transfer traffic at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. The demand on a route via the hub (H) is 
estimated by incorporating the total seat capacities at both the origin and destination airports 
as well as the distance between these two points in a simple gravity model. Passenger choice 
between alternative transfer routes is then determined by applying a generalised cost 
function, which integrates attributes such as travel and transfer time as well as ticket price. 
According to the attractiveness of each alternative, the share of each alliance on a particular 
route is calculated. Resulting from that, the study shows that the main competitors for AMS 
are oneworld at LHR, and Star Alliance at Frankfurt Airport. Hub airports in the U.S. also 
impose some degree of constraint on AMS, especially Newark Airport (EWR), or Chicago 
O’Hare Airport (ORD). Ibid. also distinguish Amsterdam Schiphol Airport’s competitors by 
geographical market served. Hence, on routes to and from Asia/Pacific, Europe, the Middle 
East, or Africa, Frankfurt Airport and the Star Alliance are the main competitors for the 
airline network out of AMS.  
Another application of the model by Veldhuis (1997) can be found in Matsumoto, Burghouwt 
& Veldhuis (2009) for hub airports in the East and Southeast Asian market. Lieshout & 
Burghouwt (2013) also apply the Netscan model in order to determine the level of 
competition hub airports face on the transfer passenger market. The degree of competition is 
identified by assessing the level of concentration of transfer connections offered at the 13 
largest European hubs in 2008, using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. London Heathrow 
Airport (LHR) and Zurich Airport (ZRH) are those airports with the lowest concentration 
levels, indicating a higher level of competition for these airports than the others in the sample. 
Furthermore, ibid. differentiate the concentration of transfer connections by geographical 
market and identify the main competitors for each considered hub airport. Concerning 
geographical markets, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Madrid Airport and Lisbon Airport 
exhibit a high Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the Latin American market. On the market to 
Middle Eastern destinations, Lisbon Airport faces the highest degree of market 
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concentration. Furthermore, Frankfurt Airport, Paris Charles de Gaulle and London 
Heathrow all constitute each other’s main competitors.  
The Netscan model is also applied by the Airports Council International Europe (2016a),  
which outlines a range of developments concerning the change in the amount of transfer 
connections in the European air transport market, i.e. determining connectivity levels for 
different airports. As already addressed in Chapter 3.2.1, the report distinguishes European 
airports according to their connectivity levels, and outlines the changes in these across the 
different hubs, with the two Istanbul airports IST and SAW having the highest growth in 
connections offered in the considered period from 2006 to 2016.  
In order to investigate the competition faced by four major European hubs – London 
Heathrow Airport (LHR), Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG), Amsterdam Schiphol 
Airport (AMS), and Frankfurt Airport (FRA) – in 1998, Bruinsma, Rietveld & Brons (2000) 
apply a generalised cost function approach to determine passenger choice in regard to transfer 
flights. The function includes the ticket price for a travel alternative, the total travel time and 
a variable determining the rescheduling costs, which account for the time a passenger has to 
wait in case a connecting flight is missed. Within the analysis, the authors differentiate 
between passenger types and find that AMS has the most competitive offer in economy class, 
regarding an average trip between a European and an intercontinental destination. The most 
competitive offer in business class can be found via CDG airport.  
Malighetti, Paleari & Redondi (2008) apply the shortest path length approach to assess the 
connectivity of the European air transport network, with a particular focus on the self-
hubbing potential, and identify the best connected airports in Europe in terms of average 
minimum travels times in 2007. Since not only flights of the same airline, alliances or code 
share agreements are taken into account, airports other apart from the main European hubs 
are ranking highest: Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Munich Airport, Copenhagen Airport, and 
Brussels Airport. Redondi, Malighetti & Paleari (2011) build on this analysis, and focus on 
the evaluation of the degree of competition between hub airports on a global scale. In their 
analysis they concentrate on total travel times, including transfer times. Travel times for all 
potential airport pairs are determined, referring to both direct and transfer connections and 
the related total travel times. For this purpose, the authors select an off-peak period since 
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they argue that flights which are added during peak periods to meet increasing demand may 
bias the outcome regarding the evaluation of competitiveness of a hub airport. The quickest 
alternative plus 20 per cent is considered to be the maximum feasible travel time a passenger 
would accept. Furthermore, an airport counts as a hub if one of its connecting flights does 
not exceed the 20 per cent threshold of the quickest alternative of this connection. The results 
show that Frankfurt Airport (FRA) covers 34.1 per cent of all considered airport pairs in 2008 
compared to London Heathrow Airport (LHR) with a coverage of 33.6 per cent. Furthermore, 
the assessment includes the level of overlap in these connections with other hubs. The main 
competitor of FRA is CDG, and of LHR it is FRA.  
Grosche & Klophaus (2015) also analyse the competitive position of different European hubs 
in terms of transfer connections, particularly in regard to the emerging Gulf airports. 
Similarly to the previously outlined studies, the authors classify a connection as feasible if it 
is in the range of a predefined minimum and maximum connecting time, and if it does not 
exceed a specific detour factor which is based on the direct connection of an airport pair33. 
Further, there has to be a return trip for the considered airport pair and the connections have 
to be offered by the same airline, alliance or supported by a codeshare agreement. Similar to 
Nieße & Grimme (2013), this study also considers the convenience of departure and arrival 
times of connections, and benchmarks these with a pre-defined reference connection, which 
exhibits a feasible alternative for passengers. Due to the type and availability of data (2009 
and 2012), this study also concentrates on the supply side, and derives conclusions from this 
in terms of the level of competition European hub airports face. The findings are interesting 
in that they show, as also confirmed in Redondi, Malighetti & Paleari (2011) and Lieshout 
& Burghouwt (2013), competition is strongest amongst European hubs, especially among 
CDG, FRA, and LHR. The Gulf airports considered here – Abu Dhabi Airport (AUH), Dubai 
International Airport (DXB), and Doha Airport (DOH) – are not yet posing a competitive 
constraint in terms of the overlap in connections they have with the major European hubs. 
More hub airports across a wider time span (2009 to 2015) are considered by Grosche, 
Klophaus & Seredynski (2015). Real booking data is applied to identify those connections 
                                                 
33 The maximum connecting time is the minimum connecting time plus 120 minutes for destinations below 
5000 kilometres and minimum connecting time plus 180 minutes for destinations above 5000 kilometres. The 
detour factor for the first category is 1.5 and for the latter it is 1.3.  
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which are actually being offered, and not just hypothetically being able due to airline 
scheduling. The study employs passenger data by Amadeus to determine whether monopoly 
routes are those with low passenger demand. At London Heathrow, for example, monopoly 
routes on the transfer market account for one per cent of overall passenger demand, the same 
applies to Frankfurt Airport. For CDG this figure amounts to two per cent. Origin-destination 
markets with more than five alternative transfer connections constitute more than 80 per cent 
of passenger volume at CDG, FRA and LHR. These numbers imply that hub airports are 
exposed to competition on the transfer market. Again, looking at the main competitors for 
each airport in the dataset, it shows that LHR, FRA, and CDG are in each other’s top ranks, 
and that the emerging hubs in the Middle East are not (yet) the ones imposing the highest 
competition. Further, the constraints for European hub airports are higher than for Middle 
Eastern hubs. The approach applied in this paper constitutes a development of previous 
analyses by integrating the demand side into the assessment. However, due to data non-
availability on passenger numbers on individual origin-destination markets, this aspect will 
not be considered in the further analysis in this chapter.  
The transfer market between Europe and Asia, and the respective level of competition for 
European hub airports is the focus by Seredynski (2016). The findings shows that Dubai 
Airport (DXB) is the leading provider, followed by Doha Airport (DOH), of transfer 
connections on this market segment, which can be attributed to their better geographical 
location compared to the European hubs. The analysis with data for the year 2014 shows that 
hub airports only have a very small share of connecting routes where they have a monopoly, 
e.g. Frankfurt Airport (FRA) has a monopoly for three per cent of its hub transfer traffic. In 
addition to the paper by Grosche, Klophaus & Seredynski (2015), this analysis also focuses 
on the degree of competition imposed by direct connections. It shows that at FRA, LHR, and 
CDG, for example, 17, 16, and 13 per cent, respectively, of the transfer connections are also 
offered by direct connections on the origin-destination market. Seredynski (2016) also 
examines the potential shift in market share, if the quality of a connection via a competing 
hub is increased. This shows that FRA and LHR, for example, have their main competitor in 
Dubai Airport since they are prone to lose most of their traffic to this airport. Furthermore, 
competition for European hub airports has been increasing over the investigated time period 
(2009 to 2014).  
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This overview shows that there are a range of studies investigating the transfer market, and 
potential implications for European hub airports over time. However, these studies consider 
only a subset of the airports considered within this thesis, and the analysis often only refers 
to one or two time periods. The analysis in the following chapters analyses a larger dataset 
of European hub airports and across a wider timespan, from 2000 to 2016. The assessment 
of the level and change of transfer connections as well as the degree of overlap between these 
for the considered European hub airports is therefore the focus of Chapter 5.3.  
 Market concentration on the transfer market  
Drawing from the discussion in the previous chapter, Chapter 5.3.1 discusses the applied 
methodology to determine transfer connections at airports, and subsequently transfer 
connections for each European hub airport in the dataset are calculated. The overlap of 
transfer connections across hub airports is discussed in Chapter 5.3.2, by applying the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index to this particular market. 
5.3.1 The market for transfer connections at European hub airports 
Based on the previously outlined approaches to determine the amount and quality of transfer 
connections via airport nodes, this chapter focuses on the assessment of amount and quality 
of transfer connections at the selected European hub airports (Table 9). These transfer 
connections are calculated by using the OAG database for the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 
and 2016, which yields scheduled airline traffic for an entire year (see Table 8). By using 
scheduled airline data, the potentially available transfer connections at a hub airport are 
determined. Having identified a connection therefore does not give an indication to the level 
of actual demand on this particular connection. Calculating the particular amount of seats 
being offered on this connection provides an approximation to the potential demand on a 
transfer connection.  
In order to identify viable flight connections at each of the considered hub airports a set of 
assumptions is applied to the data (see also Figure 31): 
1. Only flights by network carrier and their respective alliance partners are considered, 
these are outlined in Appendix 8.5. 
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2. Definition of maximum and minimum connecting times between flights, based on the 
outline in Burghouwt & Redondi (2013): 
 Short-haul connection: minimum waiting time of 60 minutes; maximum 
waiting time of 180 minutes 
 Short-haul to long-haul connection: minimum waiting time of 60 minutes; 
maximum waiting time of 300 minutes 
 Long-haul to long-haul connection: minimum waiting time of 60 minutes; 
maximum waiting time of 720 minutes 
3. Application of a routing factor: direct travel time times a factor of 1.5, based on the 
assumptions discussed in Burghouwt & Redondi (2013) 
4. Selection of a particular week during off-peak season during which transfer 
connections are considered, due to reasons outlined in Redondi, Malighetti & Paleari 
(2011) and discussed above.  
 
Figure 31: Underlying assumptions to determine feasible transfer connections 
Source: own depiction 
First, for each hub airport only those flights are considered which are either offered by the 
network carrier operating at that hub (Table 47), or by an airline which is a member of the 
same alliance as the network carrier (Table 51). Furthermore, at least one leg of the 
connecting flights offered via the hub has to be by the airline which has its base at the hub 
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airport. In the case of Frankfurt Airport (FRA), for example, at least one leg has to be operated 
by its network carrier Lufthansa. This requirement is imposed since transfer connections are 
often defined by a single ticket by one airline or its alliance partners as well as baggage 
check-through at the hub airport  (Airports Council International Europe, 2016a). 
The second assumption concerns the minimum as well as maximum feasible connecting time, 
or waiting time, between flights at a hub airport. The thresholds applied in the following 
analysis are based on values mainly applied in the literature on airport connectivity analyses, 
including Malighetti, Paleari & Redondi (2007) and Redondi & Burghouwt (2010). Hence, 
for a transfer flight connecting two airports within Europe, i.e. a short-haul to short-haul 
connection, a minimum waiting time of 60 minutes and a maximum waiting time of 180 
minutes are assumed. For a connecting flight between a European and an intercontinental 
destination, i.e. a short-haul to long-haul connection, a maximum transfer time of 300 
minutes is assumed. In case the transfer connection is between two intercontinental 
destinations, a maximum connecting time of 720 minutes is considered. All connecting 
flights exceeding these thresholds are eliminated from the dataset.  
In a third step, a routing factor is applied which is determined by multiplying the direct travel 
time between two destinations by 1.5. If the overall travel time of a connecting flight exceeds 
this time threshold it is eliminated from the dataset.  
Last but not least, only one particular week during an off-peak period within each year is 
considered, in this case the last full week in September of each year34. According to Redondi, 
Malighetti & Paleari (2011), using scheduled traffic data during peak periods may lead to 
biased results regarding the level of connectivity at a hub airport, since some flights are only 
scheduled during these peak periods. Hence, the focus on a regular week during the off-peak 
season ensures consistency of flights throughout the year.  
Based on these assumptions, Figure 32 shows the number of transfer connections for all 
European hub airports in the dataset for the respective weeks in September in 2000 and 2016. 
The airports are ranked in ascending order of the total number of transfer connections offered 
                                                 
34 The following weeks are considered in each observed year: 18.-24.09.2000; 20.-26.09.2004; 22.-28.09.2008; 
24.-30.09.2012; 19.-25.09.2016 
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in 2016. The number of transfer connections for each considered time period and the 
respective change in offered connections is outlined in Table 54 in Appendix 8.10. 
 
Figure 32: Development of connectivity levels across European hub airports 
Source: own depiction 
This initial analysis reveals the difference in the number of transfer connections offered at 
the European hub airports, and outlines those airports which have been either winning or 
losing in terms of number of transfer connections offered over the observed time period. 
According to the total amount and percentage change in the number of connections offered 
at each hub between 2000 and 2016, five different hub categories can be identified: 
(1) Disappearing hubs, including those hub airports which have been offering less than 
ten transfer connections during the observed week in 2016. 
(2) Declining hubs, including those hub airports which faced a steady decline in the 
number of transfer connections across all time periods considered (negative growth 
rates across all time periods), or which saw a decline in the number of connections 
by more than 50 per cent between 2000 and 2016.  
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(3) New hubs, including those hub airports which saw a more than 90 per cent increase 
in transfer connections offered between 2000 and 2016, and which had less than 100 
transfer connections per week in 2000, implying that operations started at the 
beginning of the observed period.  
(4) Emerging hubs, including those hub airports whose transfer connections increased by 
more than 50 per cent in between 2000 and 2016, or that had between 100 and 400 
transfer connections per week across the observed period.  
(5) Incumbent hubs, including hub airports with more than 400 or more transfer 
connections per week within each observed time period, i.e. between the years 2000 
and 2016. 
The first category includes those airports which have been offering transfer connections in 
2000 but none or less than ten transfer connections per week in 2016. De-hubbing due to 
cessation of network carrier operations affected Antalya (AYT), Barcelona (BCN), Budapest 
(BUD), Lyons (LYS), Manchester (MAN), and Milan (MXP) airports. In the case of 
Budapest airport, the network carrier Malév went bankrupt and had to stop operations 
(Bilotkach, Müller & Németh, 2014), whereas in the case of the other airports the respective 
network carriers relocated their operations to other airports, which is reflected by decreasing 
shares of these carriers in the total airport seat capacity. Airitalia (AZ), for example, had a 
share of 57 per cent in total seats in 2000 at Milan Malpensa Airport, which decreased to a 
share of less than one per cent in 2016. At the airports of BCN, MAN, and LYS the respective 
network carriers also cut their offered seat capacities to less than one per cent of the total 
seats offered within the observed period.  
Declining hubs, the second category, are those airports which have been losing a significant 
share of transfer connections. These airports include Athens (ATH), Dusseldorf (DUS), 
London Gatwick (LGW), Paris Orly (ORY), Palma de Mallorca (PMI), and Prague (PRG) 
airports.  
As new hubs those airports are considered which have started offering transfer connections 
in or after the year 2000. Based on the number of connections offered in these considered 
time periods, Rome Fiumicino Airport (FCO), Moscow Domededovo Airport (DME), 
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Istanbul Sabiha Gökcen (SAW), and Berlin Tegel (TXL) are classified as having newly 
started operations as airline nodes.  
Emerging hubs are those airports whose number of transfer connections has increased 
significantly between 2000 and 2016, including Copenhagen (CPH), Lisbon (LIS), Helsinki 
(HEL), Reykjavik (KEF), Dublin (DUB), Warsaw (WAW), Stockholm (ARN), and Oslo 
(OSL) airports.  
Compared to that, incumbent hubs are those airports which have also mostly been gaining in 
terms of their overall transfer connections, and which offered at least 400 transfer 
connections per week across the entire observed period. This category comprises the airports 
of Frankfurt (FRA), Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG), London Heathrow (LHR), Amsterdam 
(AMS), Moscow Sheremetyevo (SVO), Madrid (MAD), Istanbul (IST), Munich (MUC), 
Zurich (ZRH), Brussels (BRU), and Vienna (VIE).  
This high-level categorisation in terms of number of transfer connections offered gives a first 
indication as to the importance of the transfer traffic market at the different hub airports. For 
those airports with a high amount of weekly transfer connection, the competition on this 
particular market plays a more important role than for those airports that offer only a little 
amount of connections per week.  
In addition to the number of transfer connections offered, the geographical location of origin 
and destination give an indication to the type of hub operations. Therefore, European hub 
airports are analysed in regard to the range segments of transfer connections. For this 
purpose, connections are categorised according to the origin and destination of the transfer 
connection. The first range segment denotes those flights which have their origin as well as 
destination within Europe35, i.e. covering the short-haul to short-haul market. The second 
range segment contains those transfer connections which have its origin within a European 
country and its destination in a country outside Europe (or vice versa), i.e. short-haul to long-
haul or vice versa. And the third segment comprises transfer connections which have both 
their origin and destination outside Europe.  
                                                 
35 For an overview of countries within Europe, according to the OAG database, see Appendix 8.9. 
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Based on these definitions, in order to obtain a high-level classification of hub airports 
according to the main range segment they serve, each airport is assigned to one of the above 
categories, depending on the highest share of offered connections within a specific category: 
(1) Short-haul market, including those airports which offer the highest share of transfer 
connections (weighted by seats) on the short-haul to short-haul market. 
(2) Short-haul to long-haul market, including those airports which offer the highest share 
of transfer connections (weighted by seats) on the short-haul to long-haul market. 
(3) Long-haul market, including those airports which offer the highest share of transfer 
connections (weighted by seats) on the long-haul to long-haul market. 
The data on these different range segments is extracted from the OAG database and yields 
the distribution of transfer connections across range segments for 2000 and 2016, depicted 
in Figure 33 and Figure 34. 
 
Figure 33: Distribution of connections across range segments (2000) 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
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Figure 34: Distribution of connections across range segments (2016) 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
Incumbent hubs, such as London Heathrow (LHR), Frankfurt (FRA), or Paris Charles de 
Gaulle CDG), have a strong focus on the long-haul segment, with either offering long-haul 
to long-haul or short-haul to long-haul connections. The short-haul to short-haul segment at 
these airports accounts for less than ten per cents of seats offered. Contrary to that, airports 
with a high share of its connections between European destinations include Berlin Tegel 
(TXL), Dublin (DUB), Helsinki (HEL), or Oslo (OSL). 
Based on the hub airport categorisation according to the number and change of offered 
transfer connections, and according to the range segment an airport mainly focuses on, four 
different hub airport types are obtained (I-IV), which are illustrated in Figure 35.  
Group I contains those airports which faced a declining amount of transfer connections over 
the observed time period, as does Group IV. The airports of the latter group have a stronger 
focus on the short-haul segment than those in Group I. Groups II and III comprise hub airports 
which have mainly been experiencing growth regarding the number of transfer connections 
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being offered between 2000 and 2016. Airports within Group II have a strong long-haul 
focus, whereas those in Group III have a larger share of transfer connections on the short-
haul to short-haul market.   
 
Figure 35: Hub airport categorisation 
Source: own depiction 
This initial categorisation of the European hub airports investigated in this thesis already 
implies that these airports and their respective network carriers focus on distinct market 
segments. As can be seen in Figure 35, AMS, CDG, and LHR are those airports with a strong 
focus on connecting long-haul destinations, whereas FRA and MUC have a high share of 
transfer connections between the short-haul and long-haul market.  
In order to assess the degree of competition European hub airports face on the transfer 
market, it is necessary to analyse individual transfer connections and the degree of overlap 
these face with other hub airports. For example, a transfer connection via FRA might be 
Hamburg Airport (HAM)-FRA-Singapore Airport (SIN). This transfer connection may also 
be offered via one of the investigated European hubs, but also via another hub airport such 
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as Dubai (DXB), for example. Therefore, it is important to consider the distribution of offered 
seats on this connection across all airports offering it. The following chapter analyses the 
level of market concentration for transfer connections at the European hub airports over a 
time period from 2000 to 2016.  
5.3.2 Analysis of market concentration for individual transfer 
connections  
The potential level of competition the considered European hub airports face in regard to 
their transfer market is determined by calculating the degree of market concentration for each 
transfer connection offered at each of the hubs during the considered time period. Figure 36 
illustrates this concept in more detail. As outlined before, a transfer connection is a 
connection from origin A to destination B via a hub airport H. In the example, the connection 
from A to B can be made by transferring via three different hub airports, with each of these 
airports offering a particular amount of seats on this specific connection. Hence, in order to 
calculate the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for this connection, all possible transfer 
connections and the respective seats offered are taken into consideration. A feasible transfer 
connections is determined based on the assumptions outlined in Chapter 5.2.1. 
 
Figure 36: Calculation of HHIconnect for European hub airports 
Source: own depiction 
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The total seats offered on a transfer connection are depicted by 𝑄 , which is the sum of each 
hub airport’s i seats on this transfer connection 𝑄 , , with i = 1, …, N, and c = 1, …, K. The 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index for each transfer connection (HHIconnect) is thus calculated:  
𝐻𝐻𝐼 , 𝑠 ,  (23) 
Where 𝑠 , 𝑄 , 𝑄⁄  represents the share of hub airport i’s seats 𝑄 ,  in total seats offered 
on a transfer connection (𝑄 ). Calculating the HHIconnect therefore yields a single value for 
each transfer connection offered at the hub airport.  
Table 33 gives an overview of this index for all considered European hub airports, taking 
into consideration all time periods, i.e. from 2000 to 2016. The hub airports are ordered in 
ascending order of their mean HHIconnect. A first apparent observation from the analysis of 
the HHIconnect in Table 33 is the median value of one for 31 of the observed 35 airports. This 
means that for at least 50 per cent of the transfer connections offered at these hub airports, 
the respective airport is the sole provider of this particular connection. Furthermore, 
compared to the minimum HHIconnect values, the mean values for each airport are relatively 
high, implying that a high share of transfer connections is rather concentrated at a particular 
hub airport. However, these might be connections between origin-destination pairs with low 
passenger demand.  
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Table 33: HHIconnect for European hub airports (all years combined) 
Hub 
airport 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
 ZRH  0.58 0.51 0.06 1.00 0.42 
 LHR  0.67 0.59 0.06 1.00 0.38 
 FCO  0.69 0.64 0.06 1.00 0.38 
 MXP  0.69 0.66 0.08 1.00 0.38 
 CPH  0.72 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.38 
 FRA  0.74 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.38 
 DUS  0.75 1.00 0.11 1.00 0.37 
 MUC  0.75 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.38 
 AMS  0.75 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.38 
 HEL  0.75 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.38 
 DUB  0.76 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.37 
 BUD  0.76 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.38 
 WAW  0.76 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.37 
 MAN  0.77 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.37 
 KEF  0.77 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.37 
 PRG  0.77 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.37 
 BRU  0.77 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.38 
 VIE  0.79 1.00 0.10 1.00 0.38 
 CDG  0.80 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.38 
 ARN  0.81 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.38 
 MAD  0.81 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.38 
 TXL  0.84 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.37 
 IST  0.85 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.38 
 SVO  0.87 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.38 
 LGW  0.87 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.38 
 OSL  0.88 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.38 
 LIS  0.89 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.38 
 ATH  0.89 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.38 
 SAW  0.89 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.35 
 BCN  0.92 1.00 0.15 1.00 0.38 
 LYS  0.93 1.00 0.18 1.00 0.33 
 DME  0.96 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.37 
 PMI  0.96 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.31 
 ORY  0.99 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.33 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
Since these figures are accumulated for the time periods considered in this analysis, a more 
detailed insight into the development of market concentration on the transfer market for 
European hub airports is obtained by looking at the yearly HHIconnect values. These are 
outlined in Table 34, the hub airports are ranked in ascending order of their HHIconnect value 
in 2016. Here, no hub airport exhibits an HHIconnect value below 0.40 for either the year 2000 
or 2016, with Milan Malpensa Airport (MXP) facing the lowest level of market concentration 
in 2016 with an HHIconnect of 0.37. For the analysis of competition on the transfer market, not 
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only the degree of market concentration for each hub airport is essential but also the 
development of this Herfindahl Hirschman Index over time.  
Table 34: Development of mean HHIconnect for European hub airports over time 
Hub 
airport 
2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
MXP 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.43 0.37 
DUS 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.42 
ZRH 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.53 0.53 
LHR 0.71 0.74 0.63 0.64 0.66 
WAW 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.75 0.66 
CPH 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.68 
MAN 0.75 0.79 0.71 0.71 0.68 
FCO n/a 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.68 
PRG 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.72 
FRA 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.72 
MUC 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.73 
BRU 0.77 0.89 0.85 0.76 0.74 
KEF 0.75 0.72 0.79 0.81 0.75 
AMS 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.75 
HEL 0.88 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.75 
DUB 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.84 0.75 
ARN 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.79 0.75 
CDG 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.75 
VIE 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.77 
MAD 0.83 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.80 
TXL 0.92 n/a 0.98 0.84 0.81 
OSL 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.81 
IST 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 
LGW 0.85 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.86 
SVO 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.86 
LIS 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.87 
SAW n/a n/a n/a 1.00 0.89 
DME n/a 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 
ORY 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 
PMI n/a 0.86 0.98 0.97 0.97 
ATH 0.85 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 
BCN 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.88 1.00 
AYT n/a n/a 1.00 1.00 n/a 
BUD 0.61 0.79 0.82 n/a n/a 
LYS 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.96 n/a 
Source: own depiction 
By this, it can be observed whether potential competition imposed by overlapping transfer 
connections has been increasing over the course of the observed period for the individual 
airports in the dataset. At MXP, a significant decrease in the index is apparent. However, 
MXP is categorised as a disappearing hub airport in Chapter 5.3.1, and hence the importance 
of the transfer market in terms of imposing competition on the airport is rather negligible. In 
the following discussion of the development of the HHIconnect and of the implications for 
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potential competition on the transfer market, the focus is thus placed on the hub airports in 
Categories II and III in Figure 35, i.e. the new, emerging, and incumbent hub airports. 
Starting with the new hub airports, SAW, DME, TXL, and FCO, the latter exhibits the lowest 
value in 2016 with 0.68. All other airports have a value of at least 0.80 suggesting a high 
degree of market concentration on the respective transfer market. TXL shows the largest 
decrease in market concentration over time, considering the change in the mean HHIconnect 
over time (Table 34). With respect to these new hub airports, this analysis implies that the 
transfer connections offered via these are still within a market segment which is not yet 
offered to a large degree via other hubs airports. Although the transfer market at these airports 
is still of rather little importance due to the limited amount of total transfer connections 
offered, the level of market concentration suggests that competition may be lacking for the 
hub airports on this market.  
Moving to the emerging hub airports, including CPH, WAW, KEF, HEL, DUB, ARN, OSL, 
and LIS, none of these shows a continuous decrease in the mean HHIconnect over time, but 
they rather exhibit fluctuations in the level of market concentration. However, CPH, WAW, 
HEL, ARN, and OSL experienced an overall decrease in the mean HHIconnect comparing 2000 
and 2016, thus potentially facing more competition on the transfer market. This negative 
trend in regard to market concentration on the transfer market suggests that competition is 
increasing for these airports.  
In the category of the incumbent hub airports, including LHR, CPH, FRA, MUC, AMS, 
CDG, VIE, MAD, IST, ZRH, and SVO, all airports but AMS, IST, and VIE exhibit a 
decreasing mean HHIconnect in the period between 2000 and 2016. This decreasing level of 
market concentration on the transfer market implies that more overlap between transfer 
connections exists over time, and that the level of competition on this particular market is 
increasing. However, the absolute value of the HHIconnect for all these hub airports is relatively 
high when comparing it to the minimum values obtained for transfer connections outlined in 
Table 33. Here, for both LHR and AMS the minimum HHIconnect value obtained on a transfer 
connection is 0.06, implying that there is a high number of competitors on this particular 
connection. Comparing the mean values for these two airports in 2016 to this, 0.66 and 0.75, 
respectively, shows a significant delta.  
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Furthermore, to determine a rough threshold to compare these HHIconnect values against, in 
addition to the minimum value obtained on some routes, the number of firms in the market, 
and the respective minimum attainable value the Herfindahl Hirschman may take in case of 
equal market shares, serves as an indicator (see Chapter 2.2.2). The minimum attainable value 
of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index decreases with the number of firms in the market, as 
illustrated in Figure 18 in Chapter 4.2.1. With two firms in the market that have the same 
output level, a minimum attainable value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index of 0.50 results. 
Comparing the mean HHIconnect values of all years (Table 34) to this threshold shows that 
only three airports are below or near this threshold, MXP in 2012 and 2016, DUS in 2016, 
and ZRH in 2008, 2012, and 2016. The minimum attainable value might be even lower if 
there are more firms in the market, implying an even higher delta between the actual 
HHIconnect and the lowest possible value. This observation suggests that transfer connections 
at European hub airports are characterised by a relatively high level of market concentration.  
Although the analysis of market concentration of the transfer market at European hub airports 
suggests that these transfer connections experience only limited overlap with other hub 
airports, it cannot be concluded that hub airports are abusing their potential market power in 
this segment. Further analysis is required, and the following chapter therefore focuses on the 
market concentration on specific regional markets. By this, it can be seen whether hub 
airports are active in particular regions, and thus on a particular market segment, as became 
apparent already by the analysis of range segments in Figure 35. 
5.3.3 Analysis of market concentration for region-specific transfer 
markets 
Building on the HHIconnect discussed in the previous chapter, an aggregated and region-
specific Herfindahl Hirschman Index is analysed (HHIregion). For this purpose, the following 
regions are considered, an overview of the countries included in each region can be found in 
Appendix 8.9: (1) North America (NA), (2) Middle East (ME), (3) Europe (EU), (4) Asia 
(AS), (5) Latin America (LA), and (6) Africa (AF). The approach taken here is similar to the 
calculation of the HHIconnect, and yields the following formula: 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑠 ,  (24) 
Where 𝑠 , 𝑄 , 𝑄⁄  represents the share of hub airport i’s seats 𝑄 ,  in 
total seats offered on a transfer connection to or from a particular region (𝑄 ), with i = 
1, …, N. The total seats offered on a transfer connection to or from a particular region are 
hence depicted by 𝑄 , which is the sum of all hub airportss seats on this transfer 
connection 𝑄 , . Calculating the HHIregion therefore yields a single value for each region 
offered via the hub airport.  
Determining this particular index gives a more detailed insight into the regions the network 
carriers at their respective hubs are focusing on, and to derive implications for the potential 
competition faced in the different market segments. Figure 37 illustrates the North American 
market as an example and shows the development of the HHIregion for this particular region.  
 
Figure 37: HHIregion for North America (2000 and 2016) 
Source: own depiction 
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North America has been selected as an example since most European hubs in the sample 
offer connections to or from this market, other regions such as Latin America or Asia are 
served via less airports. Since the focus is on the development of the HHIregion only those 
airports are depicted which have been serving the North American market both in 2000 and 
2016. Budapest (BUD) and Athens as disappearing hubs have been offering connections only 
in 2000, whereas Berlin Tegel (TXL) and Rome Fiumicino (FCO) as emerging or new hubs 
have been active in this market in 2016 only.  
For all hub airports the HHIregion for North America for 2000 and 2016 is plotted in Figure 
37. For those airports above the 45° line an increase in the HHIregion can be observed between 
the two time periods. Above this line, the further away an airport is from the line, the higher 
the increase in market concentration. Among these, BCN and MXP belong to the category 
of disappearing hubs, which means that the transfer market at these airports is becoming less 
important over the observed time period. On the contrary, airports below this line faced a 
decrease in market concentration, the further away the higher. As can be seen in the figure, 
the majority of European hub airports falls into this category.   
Regarding the level of the HHIregion in 2016, it is lower for all airports but MAD, DUS, and 
MXP, than the mean HHIconnect in this year. Frankfurt Airport (FRA), for example, has a 
HHIregion of 0.57 in 2016 whereas the mean HHIconnect in this year is 0.72. This observations 
suggests that on the North American transfer market the duplication of transfer connections 
across multiple hub airports is higher than for other regional transfer markets. However, the 
North American market is also one of high demand due to economic and political ties 
between the U.S. and the European economies. Therefore, a high overlap and hence a low 
degree of market concentration does not necessarily imply that airport market power is 
constrained. Comparing the absolute value of the HHIregion for different hub airports in Figure 
37, Zurich (ZRH) exhibits the lowest level of market concentration in regard to transfer 
connections to and from North America, and Madrid Airport (MAD) the highest level in 
2016.  
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Table 35: HHIregion for all regions (2000 and 2016) 
#  Hub 
North America Middle East Europe Asia Latin America Africa 
2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 
1 IST 0.52 0.61 0.74 0.82 0.87 0.88 0.70 0.74 - 0.66 0.78 0.81 
2 CDG 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.60 0.78 0.67 0.80 0.81 
3 FRA 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.55 0.76 0.75 0.65 0.56 0.64 0.55 0.58 0.63 
4 AMS 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.63 0.58 0.77 0.72 0.71 0.65 
5 LHR 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.74 0.72 0.61 0.57 0.47 0.50 0.64 0.57 
6 SVO 0.82 0.76 0.70 0.69 0.91 0.85 0.90 0.83 0.92 0.88 0.86 - 
7 MUC 0.55 0.66 0.60 0.52 0.75 0.73 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.62 0.46 
8 MAD 0.74 1.00 - 0.72 0.86 0.85 - 0.55 0.80 0.75 0.71 0.79 
9 HEL 0.75 0.48 - 0.51 0.92 0.71 0.68 0.61 - - - - 
10 FCO - 0.49 - 0.66 - 0.78 - 0.49 - 0.57 - 0.68 
11 DME - - - 0.95 - 0.96 - 0.95 - - - - 
12 LIS 0.81 0.68 - - 0.85 0.86 - - 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.83 
13 VIE 0.49 0.61 0.63 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.55 0.51 - - 0.48 0.67 
14 ZRH 0.45 0.41 0.50 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.45 0.36 0.51 0.35 0.56 0.46 
15 BRU 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.70 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.48 - - 0.69 0.73 
16 CPH 0.59 0.53 0.60 - 0.82 0.69 0.60 0.45 - - - 0.57 
17 SAW - - - 0.83 - 0.92 - - - - - - 
18 DUB 0.56 0.60 - - 0.62 0.65 - - - - - - 
19 KEF 0.73 0.74 - - 0.72 0.75 - - - - - - 
20 ARN 0.68 0.55 - - 0.95 0.8 0.43 0.51 - - - - 
21 LGW 0.76 0.66 0.79 - 0.84 0.90 0.80 0.65 0.78 0.89 0.86 0.90 
22 WAW 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.75 0.69 - 0.42 - - - - 
23 TXL - 0.53 - 0.77 0.94 0.77 - - - - - 0.93 
24 ORY - 0.87 - - 0.99 0.97 - - 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 
25 OSL 0.89 0.57 - - 0.92 0.89 - 0.43 - - - - 
26 PRG 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.77 0.65 - 0.49 - - 0.65 - 
27 ATH 0.68 - 0.69 - 0.86 1.00 0.67 - - - 0.75 - 
28 PMI - - - - - 0.95 - - - - - - 
29 DUS 0.59 0.47 - - 0.75 0.45 - 0.32 - - - - 
30 MXP 0.57 0.87 0.60 0.31 0.80 0.55 0.56 0.22 0.62 - 0.63 - 
31 BCN 0.62 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.91 1.00 - - - - 0.79 - 
32 MAN 0.58 0.57 - 0.51 0.74 0.64 - - - - - - 
33 LYS 0.64 - - - 0.88 - - - - - 0.67 - 
34 BUD 0.40 - 0.56 - 0.69 - 0.44 - - - 0.69 - 
35 AYT - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Note. HHIregion values in bold depict that this market accounts for at least 20 per cent of the respective hub 
airport’s offered seat capacities in its total transfer market. (-) indicates that this market is not offered via the 
hub airport.  
Source: own depiction 
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However, in order to assess the impact of the degree of market concentration on the North 
American market on each hub, the market share of this particular regional market in the total 
connections of each hub airport has to be considered. In the case of ZRH, for example, the 
North American market accounted for about 30 per cent of total offered seats in both 2000 
and 2016, and thus transfer connections to and from North America are exposed to an 
increasing degree of overlapping connections via other hub airports. Frankfurt’s (FRA) and 
London Heathrow’s (LHR) transfer connections to and from this particular region account 
for about between 25 and 30 per cent of their respective transfer markets, and both airports 
have seen a decrease in the level of market concentration over the observed period (see Table 
35).  
The development of market concentration for each European airport in the sample and across 
the different regions is depicted in Table 35. Here, figures in bold indicate that a market 
accounts for at least 20 per cent of the airport’s total transfer connections. Based on this, it is 
apparent that all airports have a focus on connections from and to Europe, with differences 
across airports, however. Amsterdam (AMS), London Heathrow (LHR), Frankfurt (FRA), 
and Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) have shares between about 20 and 30 per cent, whereas 
Stockholm (ARN), Oslo (OSL), or Helsinki (HEL) have shares of more than 50 per cent in 
2016 (Table 55 in Appendix 8.11). With the latter airports facing a high level of market 
concentration in terms of their European connections and having a high share of traffic 
volume on this market, this potentially implies that there is only limited competition for these 
airports on this market. Notably, however, is the decrease in HHIregion over the considered 
period for HEL and DUB but not for ARN. 
From the analysis of these regional transfer markets, it is also apparent that some of the 
considered airports focus on particular niche markets such as Lisbon (LIS) and Madrid 
(MAD) offering between about 25 and 30 per cent of its seats to and from Latin America, 
Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) directing more than 20 per cent of connections to the African 
market in 2016, or Berlin Tegel (TXL) and Istanbul Sabiha Gökcen (SAW) having shares of 
slightly less than 30 per cent in the Middle Eastern market in 2016. The latter is due to the 
geographical location, and the former has special ties to this market since Etihad is one of 
the main shareholders in Air Berlin (AB).  
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Chapter 5.3 focused on the analysis of market concentration on the transfer market at 
European hub airports. Having established the methodology to identify feasible transfer 
connections based on scheduled airline data, the number of transfer connections offered by 
each hub airport in a predefined week for the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 was 
determined. Categorising the hub airports according to their amount of total transfer 
connections, their development over time, and the predominant range segments being offered 
yielded a high-level differentiation between airports. According to this classification it 
becomes apparent that European hub airports seem to be focusing on different market 
segments. This initial assumption was confirmed by the subsequent analysis of market 
concentration for each transfer connection using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
(HHIconnect). The mean values across transfer connections are relatively high for all European 
hub airports, compared to the minimum feasible values at each airport, implying that transfer 
connections are rather concentrated at these hub airports. However, this does not necessarily 
imply that market power is being abused by increasing prices or decreasing output. To shine 
more light on this particular issue, the following chapter therefore focuses on the effects of a 
degree of high market concentration on the seats provided per transfer connection.  
 Empirical analysis 
Having analysed the development of market concentration on the transfer market at European 
hub airports, the next step involves the empirical analysis of the effects of this level of market 
concentration on the amount of seats offered on transfer connections at European hub 
airports. The following research question will therefore be in the focus of Chapter 5.4:  
(6) What is the impact of market concentration on the output decisions, in terms of seats 
offered on a transfer connection, at European hub airports? As a measure for market 
concentration, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for each available transfer connection 
(HHIconnect) will be employed as explanatory variable in the regression analysis. A 
transfer connection is a route offered from origin A to destination B via a hub airport 
H, which is comprised of the European hub airports considered in this thesis.  
According to this research question, Chapter 5.4 consist of three main parts. The first part of 
the analysis (Chapter 5.4.1) focuses on the description of the applied variables. The following 
Chapter 5.4.2 defines the empirical model and provides the respective theoretical 
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background. Chapter 5.4.3 discusses the findings of the estimation and assesses the impact 
of market concentration on seats being offered on different transfer connections.  
5.4.1 Selection of variables 
The effect of market concentration on the transfer connections offered via the different 
European hub airports is tested by using as dependent variables the overall number of seats 
per week offered on a transfer connection, log(Connect), the mean number of seats per flight 
on this connection, log(MeanConnect), and the total frequencies, log(FreqWeek) on a 
particular connection during the observed weeks. These dependent as well as the various 
independent variables are outlined in Table 36. 
Table 36: Variables considered in empirical analysis 
Variable  Description 
log(Connect) The total number of seats offered on a transfer connection via a hub airport 
(during a particular week, as specified in Chapter 5.3.1, logarithmic variable). 
log(MeanConnect) The mean number of seats offered per flight on a transfer connection via a 
hub airport (during a particular week, as specified in Chapter 5.3.1, 
logarithmic variable), proxy for the aircraft size employed on a transfer 
connection. 
log(FreqWeek) The total frequencies offered on a transfer connection via a hub airport 
(during a particular week, as specified in Chapter 5.3.1, logarithmic variable). 
log(Demand) The average of the gross domestic product per capita in the departure and the 
arrival country, weighted by the population in the urban regions of the 
departure and arrival airports (logarithmic variable).  
HHIconnect The Herfindahl Hirschman Index for a particular transfer connection, 
considering all other transfer connections between points A and B 
log(Distance) The distance between the origin and the hub airport plus the distance between 
the hub airport and the destination, logarithmic variable. 
AirlineGroup Dummy variable which is 1 if the transfer connection is also offered via 
another hub airport of the same airline or airline group.  
Year Categorical variable indicating the year of the observation (reference year = 
2000). 
Source: own depiction 
Within the empirical analysis, a variable is introduced which controls for the potential 
passenger demand between two destinations, log(Demand). This is done by using the 
weighted average of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of both the origin and 
destination region, the weights are based on the population of the urban regions in which the 
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origin and the destination airports are located. The variable therefore depicts the mean 
purchasing power of the two urban regions connected by the transfer flight via the hub. This 
approach is similar to the one taken by Albalate, Bel & Fageda (2015), who investigate the 
impact of competition from high-speed rail on the number of seats supplied at airports. The 
weighted GDP per capita serves a proxy to account for the demand on a particular route. 
Here, data on the population of urban regions, for all years considered, is extracted from 
United Nations / Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) and the GDP per capita 
stems from the database of The World Bank (2017). Since a high GDP per capita as well as 
large urban agglomerations are assumed to induce a higher demand for mobility, it is 
expected that the explanatory variable log(Demand) exhibits a positive coefficient. This 
variable hence accounts for the fact that flights between two cities with a high level of 
demand can be offered via several hub airports without imposing competitive constraints on 
either of these hubs.  
The Herfindahl Hirschman Index on the connection level (HHIconnect) is applied as a proxy 
for the level of market concentration on a connection, it thus represents whether this 
connection via a particular hub is also offered by another hub airport and to what degree. In 
line with the argumentation in Chapter 2, a negative coefficient of this variable is expected 
since a firm operating in a monopolistic market is assumed to restrict output.  
Another explanatory variable is included which accounts for the distance between the origin 
and the destination, including the transfer at the hub airport, log(Distance), and is measured 
in kilometres. The distance between two points is reported in the OAG database. Contrary to 
the assumptions in Chapter 4.3, a positive effect of the Distance coefficient on the seats 
offered is expected. It is expected that with increasing distance between two points, less direct 
connections between these are available, solely due to being outside the range of current 
aircraft types. Therefore, for long-haul to long-haul connections a transfer stop is required. 
Also, in case of mean seats per flight (log(MeanConnect)) as dependent variable, a positive 
coefficient is expected since long-haul destinations are served by larger aircraft, in line with 
the argumentation for the O&D market investigated in Chapter 4.3. 
5 Competition for Transfer Traffic at European Hub Airports 
175 
Table 37: Hub airports of airline groups 
Hub airports (year of same airline 
ownership)36 
Airline group Reference 
LHR, MAD, BCN, LGW, MAN 
International Airlines Group 
(IAG) (2011) 
International Airlines 
Group (2017) 
FRA, MUC, ZRH (2007), DUS, 
VIE (2009) 
Lufthansa Group (LHG) Lufthansa Group (2017) 
CDG, AMS, ORY, LYS Air France-KLM (2004) Air France-KLM (2017) 
CPH, OSL, ARN SAS SAS (2017) 
Source: own depiction 
An additional variable accounts for the fact that a connection offered by one hub is also 
offered via another hub, and both these hub airports are the base of either the same airline or 
part of the same airline group (AirlineGroup). Table 37 shows that airlines within the 
Lufthansa Group, for example, have been operating five distinct hub airports in the observed 
period. In regard to the discussion on airline countervailing power in Chapter 5.1, the 
empirical analysis gives more insight into the network structure of the network carriers 
engaging in some form of multi-hub strategy. It is therefore interesting to see whether airlines 
might strategically build up their connecting traffic via their different hubs in a way not to 
engage in competition, or that they duplicate some of their network via other hubs in order 
to be able to exert buyer power on the respective airports.  
Table 38 shows the degree of overlap between the different hubs of the same airline group, 
and reveals distinct behaviour across the four airline groups. In the Lufthansa Group, the 
secondary hub airports next to Frankfurt (FRA) exhibit a high share of overlapping 
connections with the Lufthansa’s (LH) main hub. Especially at Zurich (ZRH), almost half of 
the connections are duplicated at another hub airport of the airline group. Munich (MUC), 
which has been growing as secondary hub airport in Lufthansa’s multi-hub strategy, has been 
duplicating between 20 and 30 per cent of the connections offered via other hubs of the airline 
group in the years 2012 and 2016.  
 
                                                 
36 Only those airlines and respective hub airports are included which have the same ownership either over the 
entire or part of the considered time period from 2000 to 2016. Therefore, Brussels Airlines (SN) is excluded 
from the Lufthansa Group here since it will be fully integrated from 2018 onwards (Lufthansa Group, 2016).  
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Table 38: Degree of overlap between hubs of the same airline group 
Group hub 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
AF-
KLM 
AMS n/a 14% 11% 11% 12% 
CDG n/a 9% 6% 8% 8% 
 ORY n/a 4% 0% 0% 2% 
 LYS n/a 9% 8% 7% n/a 
LH 
Group 
FRA 2% 4% 8% 9% 11% 
MUC 12% 12% 19% 21% 28% 
ZRH n/a n/a 35% 45% 45% 
VIE n/a n/a n/a 18% 22% 
DUS 19% 18% 23% 31% 23% 
IAG LHR n/a n/a n/a 3% 2% 
MAD n/a n/a n/a 7% 4% 
 LGW n/a n/a n/a 1% 3% 
 MAN n/a n/a n/a 0% 0% 
 BCN n/a n/a n/a 9% n/a 
SAS CPH 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 ARN 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
 OSL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
Pursuing a duplication strategy across its different hub airports may imply that the Lufthansa 
Group has a greater leverage than other network carriers to potentially switch connections 
between its multiple hubs. London Heathrow (LHR), being one of the largest European hub 
airports, has only a very low share of duplicated connections within its airline group, although 
this only applies to the years 2012 and 2016. Within the network of the carrier SAS (SK), 
only a very low level of overlapping connections exists, implying that this carrier has a 
complementary hub strategy across its three main airports. The coefficient of AirlineGroup 
gives hence an indication to the airline group’s strategy by either avoiding overlap or 
duplicating operations across their different hub airports. A negative coefficient of this 
variable in the empirical analysis would therefore imply that hub airport A reduces the 
number of seats or frequencies offered on a connection if this is also offered by hub airport 
B. The descriptive statistics of the variables are outlined in Table 39. 
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Table 39: Descriptive statistics of variables (values at the transfer connection level) 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Connect 5100 1590 829 136 8701 
MeanConnect 5100 242 61 48 474 
FreqWeek 5100 7 3 1 33 
Demand (in ‘000) 882 136000 99900 1630 598000 
HHIconnect 5100 0.56 0.32 0.06 1 
AirlineGroup 5100 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Distance 5100 12951 2843 4523 20714 
Source: own depiction 
In order to test for the effect of these variables on the output, i.e. seats being offered on 
transfer connections at European hub airports, the following chapter specifies the empirical 
model applied for this analysis.  
5.4.2 Model specification 
In the empirical analysis, the effect of market concentration on the seats offered on transfer 
connections via European hub airports is the main causal relationship investigated in this 
chapter. The model applied in this chapter is analogous to (19) in Chapter 4.3.2, with a least 
squares dummy estimation, with the dummy variable 𝛾  representing the time fixed effect in 
the regression model. Furthermore, a balanced panel is used, which means that only those 
transfer connections are considered that are offered in each time period. The following 
equation is estimated, using log(Connect), log(MeanConnect) and log(FreqWeek) 
subsequently as dependent variables: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝛽 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐼 ,
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝛽 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝛾
𝑢  
(25) 
with 𝑡 ∈  2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016  and c = 1, …, K, representing the transfer 
connections offered via each hub airport, 𝛾  is treated as the unknown intercept which is to 
be estimated for each time period, and 𝑢  is the error term. The results of the estimation are 
displayed in Table 41 in Chapter 5.4.3. 
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The dependent variables as well as the continuous explanatory variables log(Demand) and 
log(Distance) are in logarithmic form since a non-linear relationship between these variables 
is expected, see Chapter 4.3.2 for a more detailed discussion of these relationships. In 
addition, Table 40 displays the Pearson correlation coefficient for the continuous variables 
in the model.  
Table 40: Pearson correlation coefficient for selected variables 
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log(Connect) 1.00           
Connect 0.91 1.00          
log(MeanConnect) 0.57 0.50 1.00         
MeanConnect 0.57 0.53 0.97 1.00        
log(FreqWeek) 0.83 0.76 0.02 0.04 1.00       
FreqWeek 0.75 0.83 0.01 0.03 0.91 1.00      
log(Demand) 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.19 1.00     
Demand 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.11 0.13 0.84 1.00    
HHIconnect -0.34 -0.30 -0.22 -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.41 -0.33 1.00   
log(Distance) 0.37 0.34 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.03 0.49 0.44 -0.25 1.00  
Distance 0.38 0.36 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.06 0.49 0.46 -0.25 0.98 1.00 
Source: own depiction 
Having defined the empirical model as well as the variables to be estimated, the following 
chapter will address the research question highlighted at the beginning of Chapter 5.4 and 
discuss the respective findings. 
5.4.3 Effects of market concentration on connectivity levels 
Coming back to the research question whether market concentration on the transfer market 
affects output decisions (by a network carrier and its partners) at hub airports, this chapter 
focuses on the empirical estimation of this specific causal relationship. The variables 
specified in Chapter 5.4.1 are employed in model (25). The results of this estimation are 
displayed in Table 41, all models exhibit no multicollinearity and standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 41: Results of OLS estimation with time fixed effects 
Variable (10a) log(Connect) (10b) log(MeanConnect) (10c) log(FreqWeek) 
log(Demand) 0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.009 
(0.10) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
HHIconnect -0.38*** 
(0.06) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.29*** 
(0.05) 
log(Distance) 0.74*** 
(0.08) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
AirlineGroup -0.009 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.06) 
Year2004 0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
Year2008 0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.04) 
Year2012 0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
Year2016 0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
Intercept -0.73*** 
(0.71) 
-0.48 
(0.34) 
-0.25*** 
(0.64) 
Observations 882 882 882 
R2 0.2712 0.3351 0.1395 
SER 0.4742 0.2255 0.4260 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity). 
*** Significance at 0.1%. ** Significance at 1%. * Significance at 5% 
Source: own depiction 
In models (10a) and (10c) in Table 41, the variable log(Demand) is positive and statistically 
significant. Since both the dependent variable and the independent variable are in logarithmic 
form, the coefficient of the latter represents the elasticity of demand with respect to the 
dependent variables (see Table 22). This implies that a one per cent increase in the level of 
demand leads to a 0.06 per cent increase in both the seats and frequencies offered per week. 
These results confirm the assumption that a high level of demand on particular routes leads 
to an increase in capacities offered on these. In model (10b), however, with log(MeanSeats) 
as dependent variable, this coefficient has a negative sign and is not statistically significant. 
It can be assumed that a higher number of total seats is offered by increasing the frequencies 
instead of employing larger aircraft (mean seats per flight being a proxy for the latter). This 
finding is interesting since it suggests that a high value is placed on having more frequencies, 
and thus also resulting in a higher level of flexibility for passengers.  
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The coefficient of the explanatory variable AirlineGroup is negative, and thus implying that 
in case a transfer connection is also offered via a hub of the same airline (group), the number 
of seats on this connection is reduced. However, this effect is not statistically significant in 
any of the models.  
In terms of the log(Distance) variable, the coefficients are statistically significant and positive 
in models (10a) and (10b), no statistically significant effect can be observed in regard to 
log(FreqWeek) as dependent variable. Considering the first two models, a one per cent 
increase in distance leads to an increase in total seats offered on a transfer connection by 0.74 
per cent, and by 0.65 per cent regarding the mean number of seats being offered per flight. 
Therefore, it can be deduced that aircraft size increases with distance as does the total number 
of seats being offered. As outlined in Chapter 5.4.1, the reason for this observation might be 
that no or only little direct connections exist on long-haul to long-haul connections. On 
shorter transfer connections, the competition from direct connections may therefore constrain 
offered seat capacities. 
In addition to this, the categorical variables for each year exhibit a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for all years in models (10a) and (10c), but only for the years 2004 and 
2016 in model (10b). In terms of the dependent variables log(Connect) and log(FreqWeek) a 
positive effect on the total number of seats, and the frequencies being offered can be 
observed. The strongest increase in total seats can be observed in 2016. 
The proxy variable for market concentration, HHIconnect, is statistically significant and has a 
negative coefficient in all three models. This variable and its effects represent the main causal 
relationship investigated in this chapter. Confirming the assumption outlined in Chapter 
5.4.1, an increase in the market concentration on a particular transfer connection leads to a 
decrease in total seats, mean seats per flights, and frequencies being offered. This finding is 
in line with that of the local catchment where an increase of market concentration also leads 
to the reduction of seats on an origin-destination pair (Chapter 4.3.3). If a transfer connection 
is concentrated at a particular hub airport, the network carrier operating at this airport restricts 
the output being offered on that connection. If the HHIconnect increases by one unit, the total 
number of seats decreases by 38 per cent, the mean number of seats by eight per cent, and 
the frequency per week by 29 per cent. Controlling for other parameters influencing the 
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number of seats being offered on a transfer connection, it can thus be concluded that transfer 
connections with a high degree of market concentration are more prone to restrictive 
behaviour than those routes which are less concentrated, i.e. the latter face more competition 
from other airports and network carrier offering the same transfer connections.  
Based on these findings, the following chapter discusses the implications of the effects of the 
level of the HHIconnect in terms of the identified degree of market concentration on transfer 
connections at European hub airports in Chapter 5.3. This discussion provides a detailed 
insight into which airports may exhibit market power and may be prone to abuse this.  
 Assessing potential competition on the transfer market at 
European hub airports  
The constraints imposed on hub airports’ market power on the transfer market by other hub 
airports has been the main research focus within this chapter. Since this particular market is 
determined by airlines organising their network in a hub-and-spoke structure, and using hub 
airports as their nodes, the chapter started with a short analysis of the position of these 
network carriers at their respective hub airports. Based on this, the amount of transfer 
connections offered at each European hub airport during a predefined week in each 
considered time period has been identified. This analysis already provides insight into the 
different types of hub airports in terms of the importance of the transfer market. The degree 
of overlap between each hub’s transfer connections with other hub airports was investigated 
by applying the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, yielding the level of market concentration for 
each individual transfer connection at all European hub airports. Using this indicator as 
explanatory variable in the empirical estimation of the effects of market concentration on seat 
capacities offered on transfer connections, complements the findings on potential 
competition on the transfer market.  
Concerning the interlinkage between hub airports and their respective network carriers, the 
latter have a share in total seats offered of about 40 per cent or more at the majority of the 
European hub airports. Coming back to the discussion on this vertical relationship in Chapter 
3, a dominant carrier at an airport may be able to exercise some degree of bargaining power 
over the airport regarding the terms and conditions of operations. Furthermore, in the case of 
hub-and-spoke operations, these carriers are prone to charge a hub premium in the form of 
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higher ticket prices for passengers. On the other hand, many hub airports play an important 
role in the network of a carrier, and the limited ability of the latter to easily relocate operations 
to another airport therefore strengthens the dominant position of the hub airport. However, 
cooperation between the airline and airport may also aim at fostering the competitive position 
on the market for transfer connections, and thus deriving benefits for passengers. Eventually, 
the implications for the hub airport depend on the importance of the transfer market in its 
total operations. 
The amount of transfer connections offered during the investigated week therefore provide a 
good indication of the role the transfer market is playing in the airport’s total operations. By 
analysing these as well as the different range segments covered by these connections, the 
different European hub airports can be categorised accordingly. The transfer market 
constitutes a significant part in airport operations at both the incumbent and emerging hub 
airports, including AMS, CDG, LHR, FRA, IST, MAD, MUC, SVO, VIE, DUB, HEL, KEF, 
LIS, WAW, ARN, and OSL. The other investigated hub airports either only have a very small 
amount of transfer connections, or none at all anymore in 2016. The competitive constraints 
imposed by this particular market is therefore stronger for the airports with a high amount of 
connections.  
In order to analyse these potential constraints, the degree of overlap between transfer 
connections, measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, shows that most airports in the 
sample face decreasing market concentration levels (Figure 38). Some of those experiencing 
an increase are of the category declining or disappearing hub airports, in which case the 
transfer market does not play a major role in the assessment of competitive constraints. 
Others such as DME, FCO, PMI, and SAW are in the category of new hubs, with only a small 
amount of transfer connections being offered. This market is therefore currently of minor 
importance at these, it might increase over time, though, and therefore has to be observed 
closely.  
Considering the decrease in market concentration at the other hub airports, including most of 
the major hub airports in Europe, both in terms of total passengers numbers and regarding 
the amount of transfer connections offered per week, implies that these have seen an 
increasing overlap of their transfer connections. This suggests that passengers have more 
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choice available when selecting their most feasible connection, thus putting increasing 
competitive pressure on these hub airports.  
 
Figure 38: Development of market concentration on the transfer market 
Source: own depiction 
Regarding the level of market concentration, however, for most of these airports a rather high 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index can be observed. Applying the same threshold as in Chapter 4, 
most hub airports have a mean index of well above 0.50, implying that a high share of transfer 
connections offered at these hubs is relatively concentrated, i.e. only little or no competing 
transfer connections are provided. Comparing the four incumbent airports LHR, CDG, AMS, 
and FRA shows that LHR faces the highest degree of overlap in terms of its transfer 
connections, and AMS the least.  
Providing further insight into the potential competition on the transfer market is the regional 
analysis of transfer connections. On the North American market, for example, which 
accounts for a large share of transfer connections at all airports, concentration levels have 
been decreasing over time for the majority of airports, and are lower than the above 
highlighted mean concentration level. This suggests that passengers are able to choose from 
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a range of alternatives when travelling to and from the North American market. Furthermore, 
the regional analysis also reveals at that some airports, such as Lisbon (LIS) or Istanbul 
Sabiha Gökcen (SAW), the network carriers focus a large share of their connecting traffic on 
a niche market segment, e.g. Latin America, or the Middle East. For these markets only a 
limited degree of overlapping connections exist, thus endowing these hub airports with a 
dominant position on these markets.  
Looking further into the effects of market concentration in regard to transfer connections, the 
complementary empirical analysis confirms the findings from Chapter 4. An increase in 
market concentration on the transfer connection level has a negative effect on the output level 
at the hub airport, i.e. the number of seats and frequencies offered per week are reduced. This 
implies that the output on transfer connections exposed to high market concentration is 
restricted. Again, as in Chapter 4, translating this to the analysis of market concentration on 
the transfer market at European hub airports suggests that a high amount of transfer 
connections at these airports may be subject to output restrictions, in the form of frequency 
reductions and/ or decreases in total seats. Carefully analysing this development over time, 
and whether trends of decreasing market concentration on the transfer market are continuing, 
further contributes to a detailed assessment of competition on this particular market.   
Although the mean level of concentration appears to be relatively high in Figure 38, the 
regional analysis suggests that markets which contribute a high share of these airports’ 
overall operations face some degree of overlap, such as the North American transfer market, 
for example. LHR, CDG, AMS, and FRA have more than 20 per cent of their transfer traffic 
to and from this market in 2016, and all face a Herfindahl Hirschman Index of around 0.60 
on this market, suggesting that there is higher overlap with other hub airports than on most 
of the other markets. Considering the development of market concentration on markets with 
a high share of traffic therefore provides a further criterion in the assessment of overall 
competition.  
The complementary implications of the findings of market concentration in both the local 
catchment and on the transfer market for the competitive constraints imposed on European 
hub airports are discussed in the following chapter.  
 Conclusion 
Focusing on the assessment of competitive constraints faced by European hub airports over 
a period of 16 years, both in the local catchment and on the transfer market, the initial 
research questions formulated in Chapter 1 have established the structural framework of this 
thesis. Competitive constraints in this case refer to the availability of substitute airports, to 
what degree the hub airports’ destinations are also offered at these, and deducing from this 
the choice passengers have to switch between different airports, both in the local catchment 
and on transfer connections. This potential to substitute between airports has been considered 
as one of the reasons why the assumed market power in the airport industry is being 
restrained, and thus this increased competition should foster a rethinking of current regulatory 
frameworks in place at European (hub) airports. The debate on the existence and degree of 
market power in the airport industry has been a long and controversial one, though, with the 
different sides delivering evidence supporting both strands of arguments. The research in this 
thesis provides a structured and empirically funded approach to assess some of these 
competitive constraints on the origin-destination market in the local catchment and on the 
transfer market at European hub airports. To provide a comprehensive overview of the 
specific characteristics of the airport industry, and to evaluate potential competition on both 
markets, the thesis has been structured into four main parts.  
Since airports have long been considered as (natural) monopolies with significant market 
power, the first part discusses the theoretical background of this particular market structure. 
The associated behaviour of firms often makes economic regulation in industries with 
monopolistic bottlenecks essential, especially in the case of public utilities, in order to reduce 
overall welfare losses. Potential entry barriers for new competitors may strengthen the 
dominant position of an incumbent firm in the market, the efficacy of these barriers, however, 
is controversially discussed. Economies of scale, for example, are, on the one hand, 
considered as an entry barrier since incumbents have an advantage producing at a large scale, 
and potential entrants may incur losses due to producing at a lower scale. On the other hand, 
opposing arguments highlight that a new competitor can charge lower prices and therefore 
redirect demand to its own products. This discussion in Chapter 2 shows that market power, 
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the efficacy of entry barriers, and the resulting implications for firm behaviour are often not 
clear-cut, thus requiring a detailed assessment of each firm assumed to engage in abusive 
behaviour.  
The approaches in determining an industry’s degree of market power and subsequently 
deciding on required measures which constrain abusive behaviour have also all seen its 
respective opponents and advocates. In the first part of this thesis, the discussion of the direct 
and indirect approaches to assess market power hence highlights the benefits and drawbacks 
of the different methodologies. The application of the indirect approach in antitrust law, and 
its associated assumptions, was often criticised as imposing too strict rules on concentrated 
industries. This was often due to the reason that market power was directly inferred from the 
existence of high market shares. This ruling potentially ignored the superior efficiency of 
large firms in the market and the respective increase in overall welfare. However, over time 
this strict interpretation of market shares or concentration measures changed, and these are 
rather regarded as providing a good insight into the structure of a market. In combination 
with the analysis of new firms’ ease of entry into an industry, this indirect approach is 
currently often applied in European and U.S. competition policy when assessing mergers 
between firms or market power within an industry. Salop (2015) also highlights that “… 
various theories of oligopoly conduct … are consistent with the view that competition with 
fewer significant firms on average is associated with higher prices” (p.276). The change in 
an index measuring market concentration, for example, is hence often applied to evaluate 
whether a firm’s dominant position in a market has been manifesting over time. In 
comparison, the direct approach often focuses on demand and price analysis, and deduces 
the degree of a firm’s market power from this assessment. This particular method requires 
detailed firm-level data in order to draw a picture of the firm’s behaviour. This sort of 
disaggregated data on a firm’s prices and costs is often not available, though, and therefore 
antitrust analysis resorts to indirect measures of market power. In line with this, the pursued 
research methodology within this thesis also applies elements from the indirect assessment 
of market power in an industry.  
When assessing the potential competition European hub airports face, the two different 
markets considered in this analysis are distinct to hub airports. The second part of the analysis 
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in this thesis, Chapter 3, therefore focuses on the discussion of airport market structure. Some 
airlines organise their network in a hub-and-spoke structure, with a particular airport 
representing the node. These network carriers bundle their flights within this node in order 
to realise economies of scale, scope, and density. Due to this network structure, these airlines 
often contribute a high share of the airport’s overall operations. On the other hand, the airlines 
are dependent on their nodes as well, since the relocation of network carrier operations proves 
to be rather difficult, oftentimes these are associated with high investment in respective 
airport infrastructure. Depending on this specific interlinkage, the network carrier is able to 
earn a significant hub premium, for example, and, due to contractual long-term agreements 
with the airport and mutual investment, has the ability to restrict other carriers’ access to 
essential facilities at the airport. But this relationship between network carrier and hub airport 
may also bear benefits for passengers in terms of higher travel frequencies, and more travel 
destinations available. Furthermore, since network carriers benefit from offering transfer 
connections, this leads to competition with other airports also offering these connections. In 
order to persist in this competitive market, network carriers and hub airports may decide to 
engage in a closer relationship with each other to strengthen their overall position.  
Concerning the previously addressed substitution potential between airports as well as the 
vertical relationship between network carriers and hub airports, this particular part of the 
thesis furthermore highlights factors that influence passengers’ decision for a specific airline 
or airport. In regard to the origin-destination market in the local catchment of a hub airport, 
it is often assumed that passengers make their decision regarding airport and airline choice 
jointly, and that airports compete for passengers through the airlines (Suzuki, 2007; 
D’Alfonso & Nastasi, 2012). In terms of the transfer market at European hub airports, the 
close relationship between these airports and their respective network carriers leads to the 
inference that competition between network carriers for passengers on transfer connections 
also implies competition the hub airport is exposed to. Different approaches to measure 
competition between airports are discussed in Chapter 3, highlighting the various areas 
airports may compete in – the competition for airlines, competition on both the origin-
destination and transfer market, and the constraints arising from the two-sided nature of the 
airport business.  
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Building on this current research landscape in the field of airport competition, this thesis 
considers both the origin-destination and the transfer market for 36 European hub airports 
over a time span of 16 years, and the degree of competition these markets have been exposed 
to. Most other studies in this area mainly focus on only a subset of these airports, and also 
cover shorter time periods. The structure and research methodology applied is the same for 
the origin-destination and the transfer market. For the analysis of potential market power of 
European hub airports, the first step of the analysis of each market hence comprises an 
assessment of the level of market concentration as well as its development over time. The 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index is employed as a measure for this, and, as highlighted before, 
this method is taken from the indirect approach to assess market power. Regarding the 
substitution potential passengers are exposed to in terms of switching between airports, 
determining the degree of market concentration for each of these airports provides a good 
first approximation to the overlap in destinations between airports, and thus the choice 
passengers have when planning their journey. It therefore constitutes a first detailed insight 
into the position of European hub airports on both the origin-destination and the transfer 
market. 
A high degree of market concentration does not necessarily imply that an airport is abusing 
its market power by restricting output and increasing prices. In the second step of the analysis, 
the effect of market concentration on the output offered at each hub airport is therefore 
empirically estimated, again for both the origin-destination as well as the transfer market. 
Output in this case is denoted by the flight frequencies or total seats offered to a particular 
destination per year. Using airport output as the dependent variable in regression analysis, 
and employing the Herfindahl Hirschman Index as explanatory variable, as a measure for 
market concentration, is in line with previous research in the field of airport competition, 
including Burghouwt & Veldhuis (2006); Givoni & Rietveld (2009); Fageda (2013); 
Albalate, Bel & Fageda (2015). The lack of demand data for the disaggregated analysis on 
the destination level over a period of 16 years has been another reason to resort to supply 
data, and derive implications for the market power of European hub airports. Furthermore, 
especially in regard to the origin-destination market in the local catchment of European hub 
airports, other factors impacting the level of competition faced by a hub airport, are included 
in the empirical analysis. This two-step approach has been applied to both the origin-
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destination and the transfer market, thus contributing parts three and four of the thesis, 
respectively.  
Investigating the degree and development of market concentration on the origin-destination 
market in the local catchment of European hub airports in the third part of the thesis (Chapter 
4), thus addressing research question (1), shows that the majority of these experienced a 
decrease in market concentration in the period between 2000 and 2016. Since market 
concentration is measured on the individual route level, this development suggests that 
secondary airports in the hub airports’ catchment areas have been providing a larger overlap 
with the hub airport over time. As initially stated, a higher degree of overlap between 
destinations provides passengers with more alternatives when selecting their location of 
arrival and departure. This may subsequently impose increasing competitive constraints on 
hub airports since passengers may be more likely to switch to other airports in the catchment 
if these offer better conditions in the form of ticket prices, for example.  
However, in regard to the level of market concentration, expressed by the value of the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index, a rather highly concentrated market at most of the European 
hub airports can be observed. Although there is no predefined threshold at which an industry 
is said to exhibit high market concentration, some properties of this index allow for the 
deduction of a value each airport can be benchmarked against. If firms in a market are of 
equal size, the minimum value this index can take is the inverse of the number of firms. With 
two equally sized firms in the market, the minimum value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
is 0.50. In the local catchment, all airports but Brussels Airport and Dusseldorf Airport 
exceed this value by far, implying that the routes offered at the hub airports exhibit a rather 
high degree of market concentration, and thus only limited overlap with other airports in the 
catchment. This means that the airports within a catchment, including hub and secondary 
airports, potentially focus on distinct market segments. These findings are complemented 
with the empirical estimation of the effect of market concentration on airport output, 
addressing research question (2). The statistically significant results show that an increase in 
market concentration, i.e. the value of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, leads to a decrease 
in the total offered seats on a route, a reduction in the aircraft size employed, and to less 
frequencies being offered. This also means that in case of increasing competition, i.e. 
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decreasing Herfindahl Hirschman Index values, a rise in frequencies can be observed. 
Competition between airports may therefore take place by raising the flight frequencies to 
particular destinations, thus providing more flexibility to passengers.  
Another observation to be made on the origin-destination market is the effect of the presence 
of low cost carriers at secondary airports in the catchment, referring to research question (3). 
In case a route at the hub airport is also offered by a low cost carrier in the catchment, the 
total seats offered per year as well as the flight frequency are increasing at the hub airport. 
This means that airlines at these react to the offer of low cost carriers by increasing their 
output to these specific destinations. Furthermore, an effect on air services at hub airports by 
the quality of a rail network can be noticed, thus answering to research question (4). In case 
this quality increases, measured in the available rail-kilometres per square kilometre in a 
country, the number of total seats as well as frequencies offered to a destination decreases. 
The reasons for this may be twofold: Either the attractiveness of offering the same route 
decreases due to not being able to compete with rail prices, or the rail network is used as a 
complement for air traffic, hence replacing air routes. In case a hub airport is well connected 
to the rail network, airlines may substitute feeder flights in its hub-and-spoke network by 
cooperating with rail providers.  
The analysis of the transfer market at European hub airports, which is analysed in the fourth 
part of the thesis (Chapter 5), reveals similar results to that of the origin-destination market. 
However, first, it can be observed that this particular market is of different importance across 
the sample of hub airports. The calculation of feasible transfer connections within a 
predefined week within each year shows that at some airports only a very small number of 
connections is offered. The significance of the transfer market at these airports may therefore 
be only limited, and competitive constraints imposed on this market may thus not apply. 
Investigating the degree and development of market concentration on this particular market, 
referring to research question (5), also measured by applying the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index, points to an increasing overlap between transfer connections at most airports in the 
dataset over the considered period. Especially for connections to and from the North 
American market passengers faced an increasing choice of transfer flights in the period from 
2000 to 2016. Other regional markets, such as connections to and from Latin America, for 
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example, are more concentrated since only a rather small share of airports focuses on these 
markets. Considering the market share each hub airport has in a region and the respective 
market concentration on the connections to and from this region, therefore provides further 
insight into the degree of overlap a hub airport faces on its transfer market.  
Comparing the overall level of market concentration on the transfer market at the airports, 
applying the same threshold as for the origin-destination market, shows that all but three 
airports exhibit a value of at least 0.60, implying a rather concentrated market for transfer 
connections at European hub airports. The effect of a decrease in airport output on routes 
with increasing market concentration can also be observed on this particular market, 
answering to research question (6). The statistically significant results show that an increase 
in the Herfindahl Hirschman Index leads to a decrease in the amount of total seats offered, 
the mean aircraft size, and the flight frequencies per week. On transfer connections with high 
overlap, i.e. those with low market concentration, the airports, and in this regard the network 
carriers, compete via increasing their frequencies, for example. Passengers selecting a 
transfer connection may therefore be more willing to choose a connection with higher 
frequencies, thus accounting for potential delays of a connection and having another one 
available in due time.  
Bringing together the assessment of the origin-destination and the transfer market at the 
considered European hub airports yields a high-level overview of the degree of market 
concentration each of these airports faces on both markets. Figure 39 depicts the mean values 
for the Herfindahl Hirschman Index in 2016 for both these markets as well as the number of 
transfer connections offered at each airport within this period. The latter is an indication to 
the importance of the transfer market when assessing the potential competition on this. In 
evaluating the potential competition for an airport, it is important to consider the different 
markets in which an airport might be exposed to some degree of competition and investigate 
these in more detail. The transfer market hence plays only a minor role at those airports which 
offer a very small amount of transfer connections during the investigated week. For these 
airports, the degree of competition on the origin-destination market therefore has a higher 
impact on the airport’s output decisions and pricing behaviour than the transfer market.  
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Figure 39: Market concentration on the origin-destination and transfer market 
Source: own depiction 
This overview shows that the majority of hub airports in Europe has a dominant position both 
on the origin-destination and on the transfer market. In general, this implies that the overlap 
in routes offered on these markets with other airports is rather limited. Using a Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index with a value of 0.50 as a rough threshold illustrates that all but three airports 
in the dataset exceed this limit on both the transfer and the origin-destination market. As the 
results of the empirical estimation have shown, an increase in the level of the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index leads to a decrease in output offered on the respective origin-destination 
route or transfer connection. Having an airport with a high share of routes on both the origin-
destination and transfer market with a high level of market concentration therefore implies 
that this airport has a dominant position, and is likely to restrict output accordingly. However, 
the second observation for these markets shows that market concentration has been 
decreasing steadily for the majority of European hub airports. The analyses in Chapter 4 and 
5 reveal that only Dublin Airport (DUB) and Sabiha Gökcen Airport (SAW) faced an 
increase in market concentration on both markets across the observed period from 2000 to 
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2016. This development shows, on the other hand, that most airports in the sample have been 
exposed to an increasing overlap of their destinations, i.e. a decrease in market concentration. 
This implies that origin-destination routes and transfer connections which face more overlap 
are offered with higher frequencies and a higher amount of total seats, thus providing more 
choice to passengers. Another implication, not investigated in this thesis but shown in other 
studies such as Fageda (2013), is the negative effect a decreasing level of market 
concentration has on the ticket price on a route. With the majority of European hub airports 
experiencing a decrease in market concentration, it can be assumed that the individual routes 
particularly exposed to this are subject to an increase in output and a reduction in ticket prices. 
European hub airports are thus exposed to an increasing level of competition considering the 
period between 2000 and 2016. 
Of the large hub airports in Europe in terms of total passenger volume, London Heathrow 
Airport (LHR) exhibits the lowest degree of market concentration on the transfer market, and 
ranks in second place in terms of low market concentration on the origin-destination market. 
Furthermore, for both markets a decrease of market concentration from 2000 to 2016 can be 
observed. The competitors on the origin-destination market in the local catchment of London 
Heathrow are strong in terms of offering similar destinations as the hub airport, thus 
providing a high degree of substitution potential for passengers. In addition to that, a high 
share of transfer connections via London Heathrow are to or from the North American 
market, which has been outlined as being the most competitive transfer market in Chapter 5. 
Considering only these developments, London Heathrow can be considered as facing 
competition on a rather high share of routes and transfer connections, thus limiting its ability 
to exert market power on its customers, the airlines and passengers.  
As a guideline to approach the assessment of the degree of competition faced by an airport, 
in this case especially hub airports, the following criteria analysed throughout this thesis have 
to be considered: 
 The degree and development of market concentration on the origin-destination 
market in the local catchment of an airport; assuming that an increase in market 
concentration on the individual route level leads to a decrease in the output offered 
on this route. 
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 Investigation of the strength of low cost carriers in the catchment of a hub airport; the 
empirical analysis suggests that airlines at hub airports compete with these carriers, 
which often focus on holiday destinations and thus leisure passengers.  
 Analysis of the availability and quality of the rail network on the short-haul market 
at hub airports, usually only focusing on a distance of up to 800 kilometres, and 
assessment of the degree of cooperation or competition between rail and air services; 
the empirical results imply that the availability of rail connections leads to a decrease 
of air services, thus suggesting a substitution or complementary effect between 
transport modes. 
 The degree of interlinkage between hub airports and their network carriers, in terms 
of the airline’s traffic shares at the hub airport as well as potential contractual 
agreements between these; the discussion of the vertical relationship between an 
airport and airline shows that there might be potential drawbacks of a dominant 
airline, such as charging a hub premium, but also benefits derived for passengers, 
including higher flight frequencies.  
 The degree and development of market concentration on the transfer market of an 
airport; assuming that an increase in market concentration on the individual transfer 
connection level leads to a decrease in the output offered on this route. 
This list is not exhaustive and there are additional aspects that have to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the degree of competition an airport faces. However, the listed 
criteria provide an insight into the airport’s position in the origin-destination market in the 
local catchment and on the transfer market. To exemplify this, these aspects are discussed for 
the case of Frankfurt Airport (FRA).  
In terms of overall passenger volume per year, FRA has been in third or fourth place in 
Europe in between 2000 and 2016. In its local catchment area, defined as a two-hour driving 
radius, there are nine different secondary airports with scheduled airline traffic, which may 
impose some degree of competition on FRA in terms of the overlap in origin-destination 
routes. In this regard, market concentration in this local catchment decreased steadily over 
the observed period but is still relatively high compared to the threshold of 0.50 discussed 
above, with 0.73 in 2000 and 0.69 in 2016. However, the decreasing level of market 
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concentration suggests that secondary airports in the catchment have been catching up and 
providing more routes, and respective total seats or frequencies, which are equivalent to the 
offer at FRA. Cologne Airport (CGN) has been a strong base of Germanwings as well as 
Stuttgart Airport (STR), thus these airports can be considered as drivers of the increased 
overlap in destinations available to passengers. Furthermore, Ryanair opened a base at 
Frankfurt Hahn Airport (HHN) in 2002, and increased its offered capacities to various 
destinations over the considered period. Dusseldorf Airport (DUS), as being one of the other 
hub airports considered in this thesis, also contributed to this development. Having strong 
counterparts in its local catchment therefore provides more choice available for passengers 
when selecting their arrival or departure airport.  
Frankfurt Airport is also well connected to the rail network, with a high-speed rail connection 
being provided in close vicinity to the terminals. The results from the empirical estimation 
in Chapter 4 show that a better connected rail network leads to a decrease in the seat 
capacities offered on a route. Since the main carrier at Frankfurt Airport, Lufthansa, has a 
close cooperation with the German rail provider, Deutsche Bahn, it can be assumed that the 
airline replaces some of its routes with rail services and feeding passengers into its node by 
rail (Lufthansa, n.d.).  
The transfer market at Frankfurt Airport exhibits a similar development as its origin-
destination market regarding the degree and development of market concentration. With a 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index of around 0.70 and a decrease of this over the observed time 
period, more transfer connections offered via this airport face an overlap with connections 
via other hub airports. The analysis in Chapter 5 illustrates that the transfer markets on which 
Frankfurt Airport offers its highest shares of seat capacities, North America and Asia, face a 
lower degree of market concentration than on other regional markets, and it has also been 
decreasing over time. This finding suggests that these regional markets are exposed to 
competition from other hub airports and their respective network carriers. And since these 
contribute a large share of transfer traffic at this particular airport, it can be inferred that this 
market is exposed to competition. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this high-level insight into the degree of competition faced 
by Frankfurt Airport is the development towards more competitive markets, both for origin-
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destination and transfer traffic. Resulting in lower ticket prices for passengers as well as 
higher quality of air services, in terms of more flight frequencies being offered, for example, 
leads to an increase in consumer welfare. It is therefore important to further foster this 
development towards a more competitive market in the future.  
However, some aspects have to be noted which were not considered in this analysis but may 
influence the degree of airport competition in the future. First, as already discussed in Chapter 
4, low cost carriers are making a move towards hub airports, as observed in the case of 
Ryanair and Frankfurt Airport. Questions arising in this context concern the growth of low 
cost carriers and whether this will still be equally distributed across hub airports and their 
secondary counterparts, or whether this will be at the expense of the latter. Having more low 
cost carriers relocating their operations to large or hub airports may therefore lead to an 
increase in market concentration again, thus offering less alternatives to passengers.  
Another aspect addresses the competition on the transfer market hub airports are exposed to. 
In this thesis only those transfer connections are considered which are offered by a network 
carrier and its respective alliance partners. Not in the scope of the analysis was the concept 
of self-hubbing which means that passengers organise their transfer connections by 
themselves or use online portals that match flights according to available flight schedules. 
Currently, this does not include single ticketing or baggage through handling. However, with 
online platforms advancing into more businesses areas, providing this single ticket for 
passengers and taking over liabilities in case of delays or cancellations might only be a matter 
of time. Thus, the availability of this type of transfer connections adds another dimension to 
the competition hub airports face. This development is further fostered by the rise of the long-
haul low cost business model such as Eurowings or Norwegian. Integrating these connections 
into the assessment of competition on the transfer market should therefore be within the scope 
of future research.   
This thesis has considered a particular aspect regarding the degree of competition faced by 
European hub airports, namely the overlap in destinations and respective seat capacities 
across airports for the origin-destination market in the local catchment and on the transfer 
market. This analysis thus provides insight into the structure of the European hub airport 
market, and gives an indication across considered airports as to the level of market 
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concentration they face, and the resulting implications for competition. This approach and 
the respective findings in this thesis serve as further guidance to policy makers deciding on 
the extent of economic regulation feasible for individual hub airports in Europe. From an 
airport and airline standpoint these results can, of course, also be applied to gain insight as to 
which airports are their main competitors, and which routes face a high overlap with other 
airports and airlines, thus designing their network structure accordingly.   
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 Appendix 
 Catchment areas of European hub airports 
Table 42: Catchment airports of European primary airports 
Rank Airport 1h drive time 2h drive time 
1 LHR LTN, LGW, LCY, STN, SOU BOH, BHX, GLO, BRS, EMA  
2 CDG ORY, BVA XCR 
3 AMS RTM EIN, NRN, ANR, GRQ, MST, BRU, DUS 
4 FRA MHG HHN, CGN, SXB, SCN, FKB, ZQW, STR, DUS 
5 IST SAW KCO 
6 MAD TOJ SLM, RGS 
7 BCN REU GRO, ILD, PGF 
8 LGW LHR, LCY STN, LTN, SOU, BOH, BHX 
9 MUC AGB FMM, NUE, SZG, INN, STR  
10 FCO CIA  n/a 
11 SVO VKO DME  
12 ORY CDG BVA, XCR 
13 SAW IST KCO 
14 CPH MMX AGH ,KID, HAD 
15 DME VKO SVO 
16 DUB n/a BHD, BFS, WAT 
17 ZRH ACH BSL, BRN, FDH, FMM, STR, SXB 
18 PMI n/a n/a 
19 MAN LPL, BLK LBA, EMA, BHX, DSA, HUY, MME, GLO 
20 OSL  RYG, TRF 
21 ARN BMA NYO, NRK, ORB 
22 STN LCY, LTN, LHR NWI, LGW 
23 DUS CGN, DTM, MST EIN, FMO, PAD, BRU, ANR, FRA, AMS, RTM 
24 VIE BTS GRZ, LNZ 
25 LIS n/a n/a 
26 BRU ANR, CRL 
EIN, MST, OST, LIL, RTM, DUS, AMS, LUX, 
CGN 
27 TXL SXF LEJ, RLG, DRS, SZZ 
28 ATH n/a n/a 
29 MXP LIN, BGY LUG, TRN, VBS, PMF, GOA, VRN 
30 AYT n/a ISE 
31 HEL HEM TKU 
32 PRG n/a KLV, DRS 
33 WAW WMI LCJ 
34 BUD n/a n/a 
35 LYS LYN, GNB GVA, CFE 
36 KEF REK n/a 
Source: own calculation based on Google (2017) 
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 Mean HHIroute for European hub airports 
Table 43: Development of mean HHIroute for European hub airports over time 
Hub 
airport 
2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
DUS 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.43 
BRU 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.47 
LGW 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.60 
AMS 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.64 
MAN 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.63 0.65 
STN 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.66 
LHR 0.71 0.74 0.70 0.72 0.67 
FRA 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.69 
SVO 0.90 0.78 0.70 0.64 0.69 
ZRH 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.71 0.69 
SAW n/a 0.68 0.78 0.74 0.71 
LYS 0.66 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.71 
MXP 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.76 0.72 
ORY 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.72 
DME 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.74 
TXL 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.78 0.77 
MUC 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.79 
IST 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.86 
CDG 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.86 
DUB 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.88 
WAW 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.90 
VIE 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.91 
ARN 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.92 
PRG 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.93 
OSL 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.94 
BCN 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 
FCO 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.95 
CPH 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 
HEL 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
AYT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MAD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
KEF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ATH 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BUD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PMI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LIS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
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 Overview low cost carriers 
Table 44: Low cost carriers by year 
Year Low cost carriers 
2000 0B, 5D, 5J, 6A, 7R, 8Q, AK, B6, BC, BE, BL, BV, C6, DE, DG, DH, DI, DS, DY, F9, 
FF, FL, FR, G4, GO, H9, HD, HV, IG, IT, JN, JR, JT, KF, LF, N7, NB, NJ, NK, P9, 
QZ, RE, SG, SH, SJ, SY, TV, TV, TZ, U2, VA, VQ, WN, WS, XQ, YX, Z2, ZA 
2004 0B, 2L, 3J, 3K, 3L, 4P, 4U, 5D, 5J, 5P, 6A, 7G, 7R, 8A, 8I, 8Q, 9C, 9X, AK, B6, BC, 
BE, BL, BV, C0, C6, DD, DE, DG, DH, DI, DJ, DS, DY, F7, F9, FD, FL, FR, G3, G4, 
G9, GX, H2, H9, HC, HD, HG, HQ, HV, IG, IT, IV, IX, JN, JQ, JR, JT, KF, KI, KK, 
LF, LQ, LS, MN, NB, NE, NK, NZ, OX, PA, QG, QZ, RE, SG, SG, SH, SJ, ST, SX, 
SY, T6, TR, TV, TW, TZ, U2, U5, UO, VA, VE, VF, VQ, VY, W6, WN, WO, WS, 
WW, X3, XQ, Y2, YX, Z2, Z4, ZB, ZE 
2008 0B, 2L, 2P, 3K, 3L, 4O, 4U, 5J, 5K, 5P, 6A, 6E, 7C, 7G, 7H, 8A, 8I, 8J, 8Q, 8Z, 9C, 
9X, AD, AK, B6, BC, BE, BL, BV, C0, C4, C6, D7, DD, DE, DG, DJ, DJ, DS, DY, EF, 
F7, F9, FD, FL, FR, FZ, G3, G4, G8, G9, H2, H9, HC, HD, HG, HV, IG, IT, IV, IX, J9, 
JE, JN, JQ, JR, JT, KF, KI, KK, LF, LJ, LQ, LS, LZ, MJ, MN, NB, NE, NK, NM, NZ, 
O8, PA, QA, QG, QS, QZ, RE, SG, SJ, SX, SY, T6, TO, TR, TT, TW, TZ, U2, U5, UO, 
V5, VA, VB, VF, VX, VY, W6, WG, WH, WN, WO, WS, WU, WW, X3, XG, XQ, 
XW, XY, Y2, Y4, YV, YX, Z2, Z4, ZB, ZE, ZG, ZS 
2012 0B, 2L, 2P, 3K, 3L, 3O, 4O, 4U, 5J, 5K, 5P, 6E, 7C, 7G, 7H, 8J, 8Q, 9C, AD, AK, B6, 
BC, BE, BL, BV, C6, D7, DD, DE, DG, DJ, DS, DY, E5, EF, F9, FD, FL, FN, FR, FZ, 
G3, G4, G8, G9, GK, H2, H9, HC, HD, HG, HV, IG, IV, IX, J9, JE, JQ, JT, JW, KF, 
KK, LJ, LQ, LS, LZ, MJ, MM, MN, NK, NM, NZ, O6, OD, PA, PQ, QG, QS, QZ, RE, 
RI, SG, SY, T6, TO, TR, TT, TW, U2, U5, UO, V7, VA, VB, VF, VJ, VX, VY, W6, 
WG, WH, WN, WS, WU, WW, X3, XQ, XY, Y4, YV, Z2, ZB, ZE 
2016 0B, 2L, 2P, 3K, 3L, 3O, 4O, 4U, 5J, 5K, 5P, 6E, 7C, 7G, 7H, 8Q, 9C, AD, AK, B6, BC, 
BE, BL, BV, C6, D7, DD, DE, DG, DJ, DS, DY, E5, EF, F9, FD, FL, FN, FR, FZ, G3, 
G4, G8, G9, GK, H2, H9, HD, HG, HV, IG, IX, J9, JE, JQ, JT, KF, KK, LJ, LQ, LS, 
MJ, MM, MN, NK, NZ, O6, OD, PA, PQ, QG, QS, QZ, RE, RI, SG, SY, TO, TR, TT, 
TW, U2, UO, V7, VA, VB, VF, VJ, VX, VY, W6, WG, WN, WS, WU, WW, X3, XQ, 
XY, Y4, YV, Z2, ZB, ZE 
Source: ICAO (2017) 
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Table 45: Airline IATA codes and full name (low cost carrier) 
Code Carrier name Code Carrier name Code Carrier name Code Carrier name 
E5 Air Arabia Egypt Z2 Air Asia Zest BV Blue Panorama EF Easy Fly 
JX Jambojet 5J Cebu Pacific Air 9X ItAli Airlines O6 VivaColumbia 
3O Air Arabia Maroc 2P PAL Express IG Meridiana JR AeroCalifornia 
8A Atlas Blue PQ Philippines Air Asia 8I 
MyAir (MyWay 
Airlines) 
C4 Alma de Mexico 
8J Jet4you DG Tigerair Philippines VA V Australia 6A Aviacsa 
T6 1time Airline DJ Pacific Blue IV Wind Jet V5 Avolar 
MN kulula.com 3K Jetstar Asia Airways 5D Dutchbird 4O Interjet 
JE Mango Airlines TR Tiger Airways HV Transavia.com ZE Eastar Jet 
FN Fastjet VF ValuAir DY Norwegian Air Shuttle QA Mexicana Click 
VQ Impulse Air ZE Eastar Jet 4P Air Polonia VB VivaAerobus 
JQ Jetstar 7C Jeju Air C0 Centralwings Y4 Volaris 
TT 
Tiger Airways 
Australia 
LJ Jin Air 5K Hifly J9 Jazeera Airways 
VA V Australia TW T'way Airlines 0B Blue Air XY Flynas 
9C Spring Airlines MJ Mihin Lanka XW SkyExpress ZS Sama 
UO 
Hong Kong Express 
Airways 
DD Nok Air NE Sky Europe Airlines G9 Air Arabia 
O8 
Oasis Hong Kong 
Airlines 
OX ONE-two-GO XG Clickair FZ flyDubai 
ZG Viva Macau FD Thai AirAsia V7 Volotea C6 CanJet Airlines 
IX Air India Express SL Thai Lion Air VY Vueling HQ Harmony Airways 
G8 GoAir BL Jetstar Pacific Airlines SH Aeris SG SpiceJet 
6E IndiGo VJ VietJet Air LF FlyNordic WG Sunwing 
IT Kingfisher Red LZ Belle Air DS Easyjet Switzerland WS Westjet Airlines 
SG SpiceJet 3L InterSky F7 Flybaboo 3J ZIP 
KI Adam Air HG Niki 2L Helvetic Aiways Z4 Zoom Airlines 
QG Citilink TV Virgin Express KK Atlasjet Airlines ZA Access Air 
QZ Indonesia Air Asia 8Z Wizz Air Bulgaria 7H Corendon Airlines FL Air Tran Airways 
JT Lion Air QS SmartWings 8Q Onur Air G4 Allegiant Air 
RI Tigerair Mandala NB Sterling H9 Pegasus Airlines TZ ATA Airlines 
JW Air Asia Japan KF Blue1 XQ SunExpress F9 Frontier Airlines 
HD Air Do SH Aeris WU Wizz Air Ukraine YV Go! 
GK Jetstar Japan TO Transavia France WO Air Southwest DH Independance Air 
MM Peach Aviation DE Condor Flugdienst WW WOW Air B6 JetBlue Airways 
BC Skymark Airlines DI DBA U2 easyJet YX Midwest Airlines 
LQ Solaseed Air ST Germania Express BE Flybe N7 National Airlines 
7G StarFlyer 4U Germanwings Y2 FlyGlobespan P9 Pro Air 
JW Air Asia Japan X3 TUIFly GO GO SX Skybus Airlines 
AK Air Asia 5P SkyEurope Hungary LS Jet2.com WN Southwest Airlines 
D7 Air Asia X W6 Wizz Air NM Manx2 NK Spirit Airlines 
OD Malindo Air HC Iceland Express ZB Monarch scheduled SY Sun Country Airlines 
Y5 
Golden Myanmar 
Airlines 
WW WOW Air JN XL Airways FF Tower Air 
SJ Freedom Air RE Aer Arann AD 
Azul Linheas Aereas 
Brazileiras 
U5 USA 3000 
DJ Pacific Blue VE Eujet 7R 
BRA Transportes 
Aereos 
NJ Vanguard 
NZ Tasman Express GX JetMagic G3 GOL Linheas Aereas VX Virgin America 
E4 
Aero Asia 
International 
FR Ryanair WH Webjet Linheas Aereas   
PA Air Blue TV Virgin Express H2 Sky Airline   
Source: IATA (2017) 
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 Sensitivity analysis of threshold in HHIdist calculation 
Table 46: Analysis of different thresholds in regard to HHIdist 
  HHIdist with different thresholds 
Hub 
airport HHIroute 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
AMS 0.74 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.54 
ARN 0.94 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 
AYT 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BCN 0.94 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 
BRU 0.70 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.38 
CDG 0.90 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 
CPH 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
DME 0.82 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.65 
DUB 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
DUS 0.65 0.16 0.22 0.27 0.33 
FCO 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 
FRA 0.74 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.63 
HEL 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
IST 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
KEF 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
LGW 0.78 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.63 
LHR 0.75 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.63 
LYS 0.84 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.61 
MAD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
MAN 0.69 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.61 
MUC 0.79 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.70 
MXP 0.83 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.74 
ORY 0.90 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.76 
OSL 0.94 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.89 
PRG 0.94 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.86 
SAW 0.92 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.82 
STN 0.82 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.62 
SVO 0.82 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.64 
TXL 0.81 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.73 
VIE 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 
WAW 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 
ZRH 0.79 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.60 
ATH 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BUD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LIS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PMI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: own depiction 
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Table 47: European hub airports and respective network carriers 
Rank Airport 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
1 London Heathrow Airport (LHR) BA BA BA BA BA 
2 Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) AF AF AF AF AF 
3 Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (AMS) KL KL KL KL KL 
4 Frankfurt Airport (FRA) LH LH LH LH LH 
5 Istanbul Atatürk Airport (IST) TK TK TK TK TK 
6 Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD) IB IB IB IB IB 
7 Barcelona Airport – El Prat (BCN) IB IB IB IB IB 
8 London Gatwick Airport (LGW) BA BA BA BA BA 
9 Munich Airport (MUC) LH LH LH LH LH 
10 Rome Fiumicino (FCO) AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ 
11 Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport  (SVO) SU SU SU SU SU 
12 Paris Orly Airport (ORY) AF AF AF AF AF 
13 Istanbul Sabiha Gökcen (SAW) n/a n/a TK TK TK 
14 Copenhagen Airport (CPH) SK SK SK SK SK 
15 Moscow Domodedovo Airport (DME) n/a S7 S7 S7 S7 
16 Dublin Airport (DUB) EI EI EI EI EI 
17 Zurich Airport (ZRH) SR LX LX LX LX 
18 Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI) IB AB AB AB AB 
19 Manchester Airport (MAN) BA BA BA BA BA 
20 Oslo Airport (OSL) SK SK SK SK SK 
21 Stockholm Arlanda Airport (ARN) SK SK SK SK SK 
22 London Stansted Airport (STN) FR FR FR FR FR 
23 Düsseldorf  Airport (DUS) LH LH LH LH LH 
24 Vienna International Airport (VIE) OS OS OS OS OS 
25 Lisbon Airport (LIS) TP TP TP TP TP 
26 Brussels Airport (BRU) SN SN SN SN SN 
27 Berlin Tegel Airport (TXL) LH LH AB AB AB 
28 Athens International Airport (ATH) OA OA OA OA OA 
29 Milan Malpensa Airport  (MXP) AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ 
30 Antalya Airport (AYT) TK TK TK TK TK 
31 Helsinki (HEL) AY AY AY AY AY 
32 Vaclav Havel Airport Prague (PRG) OK OK OK OK OK 
33 Warsaw (WAW) LO LO LO LO LO 
34 Budapest (BUD) MA MA MA MA n/a 
35 Lyons Airport (LYS) AF AF AF AF AF 
36 Keflavik (KEF) FI FI FI FI FI 
Source: own depiction 
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Table 48: Network carrier share (in total seats) at European hub airports 
Rank Airport 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
1 London Heathrow Airport (LHR) 42% 41% 39% 46% 48% 
2 Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 55% 57% 56% 55% 51% 
3 Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (AMS) 43% 49% 50% 51% 48% 
4 Frankfurt Airport (FRA) 60% 59% 60% 63% 65% 
5 Istanbul Atatürk Airport (IST) 66% 71% 73% 74% 76% 
6 Madrid Barajas International Airport (MAD) 55% 56% 48% 47% 44% 
7 Barcelona Airport – El Prat (BCN) 52% 47% 15% 0.1% 0.1% 
8 London Gatwick Airport (LGW) 59% 40% 26% 17% 15% 
9 Munich Airport (MUC) 51% 56% 57% 62% 55% 
10 Rome Fiumicino (FCO) 52% 44% 40% 45% 41% 
11 Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport  (SVO) 47% 57% 63% 74% 90% 
12 Paris Orly Airport (ORY) 50% 57% 50% 41% 35% 
13 Istanbul Sabiha Gökcen (SAW) n/a n/a 47% 14% 31% 
14 Copenhagen Airport (CPH) 60% 55% 49% 43% 39% 
15 Moscow Domodedovo Airport (DME) n/a 24% 25% 28% 41% 
16 Dublin Airport (DUB) 48% 37% 36% 45% 36% 
17 Zurich Airport (ZRH) 60% 51% 56% 54% 52% 
18 Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI) 0.1% 24% 34% 30% 19% 
19 Manchester Airport (MAN) 38% 26% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
20 Oslo Airport (OSL) 48% 40% 51% 42% 41% 
21 Stockholm Arlanda Airport (ARN) 57% 51% 42% 42% 42% 
22 London Stansted Airport (STN) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
23 Düsseldorf  Airport (DUS) 34% 31% 31% 35% 0.1% 
24 Vienna International Airport (VIE) 41% 54% 49% 49% 46% 
25 Lisbon Airport (LIS) 48% 54% 60% 62% 52% 
26 Brussels Airport (BRU) 55% 27% 34% 36% 36% 
27 Berlin Tegel Airport (TXL) 48% 37% 37% 45% 45% 
28 Athens International Airport (ATH) 48% 40% 36% 23% 13% 
29 Milan Malpensa Airport  (MXP) 57% 55% 28% 0.1% 0.1% 
30 Antalya Airport (AYT) 30% 18% 29% 20% 20% 
31 Helsinki (HEL) 73% 67% 59% 60% 67% 
32 Vaclav Havel Airport Prague (PRG) 54% 52% 47% 32% 19% 
33 Warsaw (WAW) 60% 58% 45% 58% 49% 
34 Budapest (BUD) 53% 49% 43% n/a n/a 
35 Lyons Airport (LYS) 56% 62% 57% 40% 0.1% 
36 Keflavik (KEF) 97% 82% 75% 75% 59% 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
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Table 49: Common ownership of airports within a catchment 
Hub 
airport 
Periods of common ownership with airports in the catchment 
(2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016) 
LHR LGW (2000-2008); STN (2000-2012), SOU (2000-2016) 
CDG ORY (2000-2016); BVA (2000-2004) 
AMS RTM (2000-2016); EIN (2000-2016); MST (2000) 
FRA HHN (2000-2016); SCN (2000-2004) 
MAD TOJ (2000-2016); SLM (2000-2016); RGS (2000-2016) 
BCN REU (2000-2016); GRO (2000-2016) 
LGW LHR (2000-2008); LCY (2012); STN (2000-2008), SOU (2000-2012) 
MUC NUE (2000-2016) 
FCO CIA (2000-2016) 
SVO VKO (2000-2016) 
ORY CDG (2000-2016) 
SAW KCO (2004) 
MAN EMA (2004-2016); HUY (2000-2008) 
ARN BMA (2000-2016) 
STN LHR (2000-2012); LGW (2000-2008) 
TXL SXF (2000-2016) 
MXP LIN (2000-2016); BGY (2000-2016) 
AYT ISE (2000-2016) 
HEL TKU (2000-2016); HEM (2000-2016) 
KEF REK (2000-2016); RKV (2000-2016) 
 
Sources: (Airports Council International Europe, 2016c, 2010; Royal Schiphol Group, n.d.; Flughafen Bern 
AG, n.d.; Groupe ADP, n.d.; Copenhagen Airports AS, n.d.; Fraport, n.d.; TAV Airports, n.d.; Heathrow 
Airport Limited, n.d.; Vienna International Airport, n.d.; Schiphol Group, 2012; LFV, n.d.; Manchester 
Airports Group, n.d.; ifm investors, n.d.) (BBC News, 2008, 2012, Aena, 2016, n.d.; Handelsblatt, 2015; 
Aeroporti di Roma, n.d.; British Airport Authority (BAA), 2006; Athens International Airport, n.d.; TAV 
Airports, n.d.; Flughafen Berlin Brandenbrug, n.d.; General Directorate of State Airports Authority, n.d.; 
Ferrovial, n.d.; Gatwick Airport, n.d.; Orio al Serio International Airport, 2017; Paris Aéroport, n.d.) (RP 
Online, 2014; Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen International Airport, 2017; SEA, n.d., n.d., n.d.; Klingelschmitt, 2009; 
Aéroport Paris-Beauvais, n.d.; Brussels Airport, n.d.; Finavia, n.d.; Airport Saarbrücken, n.d.; Zurich Airport, 
n.d.) (Isavia, n.d.) 
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 Airline countervailing power 
Table 50: Countervailing Power Index 
hub 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
AMS 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
ARN 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 
ATH 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.03 
AYT 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.18 
BCN 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 
BRU 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 
BUD 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.01 n/a 
CDG 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 
CPH 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 
DME n/a 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 
DUB 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
DUS 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.02 
FCO 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
FRA 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 
HEL 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
IST 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 
KEF 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
LGW 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 
LHR 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
LIS 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 
LYS 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.05 
MAD 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 
MAN 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.02 
MUC 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 
MXP 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.03 
ORY 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
OSL 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
PMI 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.08 
PRG 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 
SAW n/a 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.19 
STN 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.18 
SVO 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.12 
TXL 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 
VIE 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
WAW 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
ZRH n/a n/a 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Source: own depiction 
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 Airline alliance members 
Table 51: Airline alliances member airlines 
Year Star Alliance 
2000 AC, NZ, NH, OS, LH, SK, SQ, TG, UA, RG, AN, VO, NG, BM, MX, JK, AA, BA, CX, AY, IB, 
LA/JJ, QF, EI, CP, MA, AM 
2004 JP, AC, NZ, NH, OZ, OS, OU, LO, LH, SK, SQ,  TG, UA, RG, VO, NG, BM, JK, US, KF 
2008 JP, AC, NZ, NH, OZ, OS, OU, MS, LO, LH, SK, SQ, SA, LX, TP, TG, TK, UA, VO, NG, BM, 
JK, US, KF 
2012 JP,  A3, AC, CA, NZ, NH, OZ, OS, AV, SN, CM, OU, MS, ET, LO, LH, SK, ZH, SQ, SA, LX, 
TP, TG, TK, UA, VO, NG, BM, JK, US, KF, FM, CO, JJ, TA 
2016 JP, A3, AC, CA, AI, NZ, NH, OZ, OS, AV, SN, CM, OU, MS, ET, BR, LO, LH, SK, ZH, SQ, SA, 
LX,TP, TG, TK , UA 
Year One World  
2000  AA, BA, CX, AY, IB, LA/JJ, QF, EI, CP, MA 
2004  AA, BA, CX, AY, IB, LA/JJ, QF, EI, MA 
2008  AA, BA, CX, AY, IB, LA/JJ, QF, EI, MA 
2012 AB, AA, BA, CX, AY, IB, JL, LA/JJ, QF, RJ, S7, MA 
2016 NG, BM, AB, AA, BA, CX, AY, IB, JL, LA/JJ, QR, MH, QF, UL, RJ, S7, MA 
Year Sky Team  
2000 AM, AF, DL, KE 
2004 AM, AF, AZ, OK, DL, KL, KE 
2008 SU, AM, UX, AF, AZ, CZ, OK, DL, KQ, KL, KE 
2012 SU, AR, AM, UX, AF, AZ, CI, MU, CZ, OK, DL, KQ, KL, KE, ME, SV, RO, VN, MF 
2016 SU, AR, AM, UX, AF, AZ, CI, MU, CZ, OK, DL , GA, KQ, KL, KE, ME, SV, RO, VN, MF 
Source: Star Alliance, n.d.; SkyTeam, n.d.; oneworld, n.d. 
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Table 52: Airline IATA codes and full name (alliance airlines) 
Code Carrier name Code Carrier name 
A3 aegean MA Malév 
AA American Airlines ME MEA 
AB airberlin MF XiamenAir 
AC Air Canada MH Malaysia Airlines 
AF AirFrance MS EgyptAir 
AI Air India MU China Eastern 
AM AeroMExico MX Mexicana Airlines 
AN Ansett Australia MX Mexicana de Aviacion 
AR AerolineasArgentinas NG Lauda Air 
AV Avianca NH ANA 
AY Finnair NZ Air New Zealnd 
AZ Alitalia OK Czech Airlines 
BA British Airways OS Austrian 
BM BMI OU Croatia Airlines 
BR Eva Air OZ Asiana Airlines 
CA Air China QF Qantas 
CI China Airlines QR Qatar Airways 
CM Copa Airlines RG VARIG 
CO Continental RJ Royal Jordanien 
CP Canadian Airlines RO Tarom 
CX Cathay Pacific S7 S7 Airlines 
CZ China Southern SA South African Airlines 
DL Delta SK Scandinavian Airlines 
EI Aer Lingus SN Brussels Airlines 
ET Ethiopian SQ Singapore Airlines 
FM Shanghai Airlines SU Aeroflot 
GA Garuda Indonesia SV Saudia 
IB Iberia TA TACA Airlines 
JJ TAM Airlines TG Thai 
JK Spanair TK Turkish Airlines 
JL Japan Airlines TP TAP Portugal 
JP Adria UA United 
KE Korean Air UL SriLankan Airlines 
KF Blue1 US US Airways 
KL KLM US US Airways 
KQ Kenya Airways UX AirEuropa 
LA/JJ LATAM VN Vietnam Airlines 
LH Lufthansa VO Tyrolean Airways 
LO LOT Polish Airlines ZH Shenzhen Airlines 
LX Swiss   
A3 aegean   
AA American Airlines   
AB airberlin   
AC Air Canada   
Source: IATA (2017) 
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 Overview OAG regions 
Table 53: Regional differentiation according to OAG 
Region Countries 
AF1 Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia 
AF2 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
AF3 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo 
Democratic Republic of, Cote D'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mayotte, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
AF4 
Burundi,  Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania United Republic of, Uganda 
AS1 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
AS2 Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
AS3 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cocos (keeling) Islands, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-leste, Viet Nam 
AS4 
China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong (sar) China, Japan, Korea Democratic People's Republic of, 
Korea Republic of, Macao (sar) China, Mongolia, Russian Federation 
LA1 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Bonaire, Cayman Islands, 
Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saint Barthelemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Martin, St Maarten (dutch Part), St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands (British and US) 
LA2 Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama 
LA3 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela 
LA4 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Falkland Islands, Paraguay, Uruguay 
ME1 
Bahrain, Iran Islamic Republic of, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
NA1 Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, USA 
EU1 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland Republic of, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
EU2 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia Former Yugoslav Republic 
of, Moldova Republic of, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Ukraine 
SW1 
American Samoa, Australia, Christmas Island, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia Federated States of, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, 
Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands (except Guam), Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna Islands 
Source: OAG database 
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 Number of transfer connections at European hub airports 
Table 54: Number of and change in transfer connections at European hub airports 
      Change in transfer connections 
Hub 
airport 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
2000-
2004 
2004-
2008 
2008-
2012 
2012-
2016 
2000-
2016 
MXP 1238 1087 98 14 9 -12% -91% -86% -36% -99% 
BCN 208 194 72 34 4 -7% -63% -53% -88% -98% 
MAN 45 64 4 5 3 42% -94% 25% -40% -93% 
ATH 408 283 267 56 30 -31% -6% -79% -46% -93% 
LGW 1619 398 239 169 157 -75% -40% -29% -7% -90% 
DUS 37 44 223 238 13 19% 407% 7% -95% -65% 
PRG 139 390 336 134 69 181% -14% -60% -49% -50% 
ZRH 1410 461 768 722 714 -67% 67% -6% -1% -49% 
ORY 154 136 137 80 82 -12% 1% -42% 2% -47% 
BRU 912 137 171 515 662 -85% 25% 201% 29% -27% 
CPH 454 352 384 352 424 -22% 9% -8% 20% -7% 
VIE 813 1020 1485 850 772 25% 46% -43% -9% -5% 
CDG 3434 4996 5838 5460 5646 45% 17% -6% 3% 64% 
AMS 2255 3150 3145 3956 4029 40% 0% 26% 2% 79% 
FRA 3118 3395 4899 4919 5623 9% 44% 0% 14% 80% 
ARN 112 152 171 159 231 36% 13% -7% 45% 106% 
SVO 1207 1154 1412 1504 2506 -4% 22% 7% 67% 108% 
WAW 70 191 97 137 146 173% -49% 41% 7% 109% 
LHR 1597 2336 1993 2952 3464 46% -15% 48% 17% 117% 
MAD 710 938 1583 1145 1705 32% 69% -28% 49% 140% 
OSL 28 15 70 57 77 -46% 367% -19% 35% 175% 
DUB 76 86 124 169 278 13% 44% 36% 64% 266% 
KEF 66 51 88 215 270 -23% 73% 144% 26% 309% 
MUC 473 1116 1470 1915 1979 136% 32% 30% 3% 318% 
HEL 201 250 560 462 1007 24% 124% -18% 118% 401% 
IST 1120 1044 2627 4608 7250 -7% 152% 75% 57% 547% 
LIS 117 176 558 659 781 50% 217% 18% 19% 568% 
TXL 7 0 29 158 113 -100% n/a 445% -28% 1514% 
DME 0 282 610 656 937 n/a 116% 8% 43% n/a 
FCO 0 442 874 912 946 n/a 98% 4% 4% n/a 
PMI 0 12 85 37 15 n/a 608% -56% -59% n/a 
SAW 0 0 0 0 323 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
AYT 0 0 2 0 0 n/a n/a -100% n/a n/a 
BUD 97 176 148 0 0 81% -16% -100% n/a -100% 
LYS 129 93 125 46 0 -28% 34% -63% -100% -100% 
Source: own depiction 
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 Regional shares on the transfer market 
Table 55: Regional shares of transfer markets at European hub airports 
Hub 
airport 
AF AF AS AS LA LA EU EU NA NA ME ME 
2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 
AMS 15% 13% 15% 13% 12% 11% 24% 33% 23% 24% 12% 6% 
ARN - - 2% 13% - - 88% 72% 9% 14% - - 
ATH 15% - 3% - - - 53% 100% 9% - 20% - 
BCN 4% - - - - - 85% 26% 8% 60% 3% 14% 
BRU 22% 24% 4% 4% - - 46% 45% 27% 23% 1% 5% 
BUD 2% - 10% - - - 61% - 13% - 14% - 
CDG 20% 24% 12% 14% 12% 11% 29% 24% 21% 21% 5% 6% 
CPH - 1% 16% 17% - - 70% 59% 13% 22% 1% - 
DME - - - 53% - - - 43% - - - 4% 
DUB - - - - - - 73% 37% 27% 63% - - 
DUS - - - 14% - - 61% 48% 39% 38% - - 
FCO - 7% - 10% - 13% - 46% - 14% - 11% 
FRA 8% 9% 16% 18% 6% 5% 36% 33% 25% 25% 8% 9% 
HEL - - 9% 36% - - 86% 59% 5% 5% - 0% 
IST 6% 15% 12% 28% - 0% 61% 32% 6% 8% 16% 17% 
KEF - - - - - - 38% 52% 62% 48% - - 
LGW 18% 7% 2% 13% 15% 44% 33% 23% 27% 13% 4% - 
LHR 9% 10% 19% 15% 1% 6% 31% 28% 27% 29% 14% 11% 
LIS 15% 23% - - 24% 25% 42% 39% 19% 13% - - 
LYS 2% - - - - - 88% - 10% - - - 
MAD 5% 9% - 2% 29% 34% 52% 38% 14% 14% - 3% 
MAN - - - - - - 64% 9% 36% 27% - 64% 
MUC 0% 3% 3% 16% 2% 3% 72% 53% 22% 23% 1% 2% 
MXP 13% - 8% 14% 4% - 49% 57% 20% 6% 6% 23% 
ORY 13% 20% - - 13% 24% 74% 45% - 11% - - 
OSL - - - 8% - - 78% 80% 22% 12% - - 
PMI - - - - - - - 100% - - - - 
PRG 5% - - 31% - - 51% 48% 21% 16% 24% 5% 
SAW - - - - - - - 74% - - - 26% 
SVO 2% - 42% 52% 1% 2% 44% 39% 7% 4% 5% 3% 
TXL - 1% - - - - 100% 60% - 10% - 29% 
VIE 4% 4% 11% 10% - - 48% 56% 23% 24% 15% 6% 
WAW - - - 9% - - 71% 61% 25% 25% 4% 5% 
ZRH 13% 9% 13% 20% 4% 3% 30% 36% 30% 31% 10% 3% 
Source: own calculation based on OAG data 
 
